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RÉSUMÉ
Les trois essais dans cette thèse étudient les implications des frictions financières, telles
que les contraintes de collatérale ou de crédit, pour les décisions économiques des agents
et leur impact sur les variables macro-économiques agrégées.
Dans le premier chapitre «Financial Contracts and the Political Economy of Investor
Protection»nous proposons une théorie du niveau de protection des investisseurs. Une
faible protection des investisseurs implique un coût de financement externe plus élevé
à cause des problèmes d’agence plus aigus entre les investisseurs et les entrepreneurs.
À l’équilibre, ceci exclut les agents plus dépendants sur le financement externe de l’en-
trepreneuriat, ce qui augmente les profits des entrepreneurs qui restent actifs. Quand le
niveau de la protection des investisseurs est choisi par un vote majoritaire, la théorie gé-
nère (i) une protection des investisseurs plus faible dans les économies avec plus grande
inégalité dans les besoins de financement externe parmi les entrepreneurs, (ii) une dyna-
mique non-monotone de l’output, (iii) améliorations (détériorations) de la protection des
investisseurs suite à des ralentissements (accélérations) de l’output agrégé. L’évidence
empirique donne un support à ces prédictions de la théorie.
Dans le deuxième chapitre «Financial Frictions, Internal Capital Markets, and the
Organization of Production», nous examinons comment la présence des frictions finan-
cières peut mener à la formation des conglomérats et des «business groups»diversifiées.
Particulièrement, nous construisons un modèle d’équilibre général d’entrepreneuriat dans
lequel les conglomérats émergent de façon endogène et substituent partiellement le mar-
ché du crédit imparfait. Nous montrons que ce modèle est capable d’expliquer quantitati-
vement plusieurs faits stylisés concernant l’organisation de la production, les différences
de productivité entre les firmes et les différences en présence des conglomérats entre les
pays.
Le troisième chapitre «Size and Productivity of Single-segment and Diversified Firms :
Evidence from Canadian Manufacturing»étudie empiriquement la relation entre la taille,
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la productivité, et la structure organisationnelle d’une firme. Utilisant les micro-données
sur les établissements manufacturiers canadiens, nous documentons plusieurs faits sty-
lisés concernant la taille et la productivité totale des facteurs des établissements dans
les conglomérats et dans les firmes non-diversifiées. Nous trouvons que les établisse-
ments dans les conglomérats sont en moyenne plus larges que leurs contreparties dans
les firmes non-diversifiées, les petits établissements dans les conglomérats sont moins
productifs que les établissements de taille similaire dans les firmes non-diversifiées, mais
les larges établissements dans les conglomérats sont plus productifs que ceux de taille si-
milaire dans les firmes non-diversifiées. Cette évidence est consistante avec réallocation
interne efficiente des ressources au sein des conglomérats.
Mots clés: frictions financières, protection des investisseurs, contrats financiers,
économie politique, conglomérat, distribution de la taille des établissements, pro-
ductivité totale des facteurs.
ABSTRACT
The three essays in this thesis study the implications of financial frictions, such as col-
lateral and credit constraints, for economic decisions of agents and their impact on ag-
gregate macroeconomic variables.
In the first chapter "Financial Contracts and the Political Economy of Investor Pro-
tection", we propose a theory of the level of investor protection. Lower investor pro-
tection implies higher cost of external financing due to more severe agency problems
between outside investors and entrepreneurs. In equilibrium, this excludes more finan-
cially dependent agents from entrepreneurship, increasing the profits of the remaining
entrepreneurs. When the level of investor protection is chosen by majority voting, the
theory generates (i) lower investor protection in economies with higher inequality in
financial dependence across entrepreneurs, (ii) non-monotone output dynamics, (iii) im-
provements (worsening) of investor protection following output slowdowns (accelera-
tions). The empirical evidence provides some support to these predictions.
In the second chapter "Financial Frictions, Internal Capital Markets, and the Organi-
zation of Production", we investigate how the presence of financial frictions may lead to
formation of diversified conglomerates or business groups. Specifically, we build a gen-
eral equilibrium model of entrepreneurship in which business groups arise endogenously
and partially substitute for imperfect credit market. We show that the model is able to
quantitatively explain several key stylized facts on the way production is organized, on
cross-firm productivity differences, and on cross-country differences in the degree of
conglomeration.
The third chapter "Size and Productivity of Single-segment and Diversified Firms:
Evidence from Canadian Manufacturing" studies empirically the relation between size,
productivity, and the organizational structure of a firm. Using micro-data on Canadian
manufacturing plants, we document several stylized facts about size and total factor
productivity of establishments in conglomerates and single-segment firms. We find that
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establishments in conglomerates are on average larger than their counterparts in single-
segment firms, small plants in conglomerates are less productive than plants of similar
size in single-segment firms, but large plants in conglomerates are more productive than
those of similar size in single-segment firms. This evidence is consistent with efficient
internal reallocation of resources in conglomerates.
Keywords: financial frictions, investor protection, financial contracts, political
economy, conglomerate, establishment size distribution, total factor productivity.
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INTRODUCTION GÉNÉRALE
Cette thèse est constituée de trois essais qui étudient les implications des frictions fi-
nancières pour le développement économique, la macro-économie, et l’organisation des
activités productives d’un pays. Le premier essai présente une théorie de détermination
politique et économique du niveau de protection des investisseurs. La protection des
investisseurs est considérée comme l’un des facteurs les plus importants dans la déter-
minations des frictions financières. Cet essai tente d’expliquer pourquoi nous observons
des niveaux de protection des investisseurs différents dans différents pays et pourquoi
les réformes de la protection des investisseurs sont rares.
Les deuxième et troisième essais étudient comment les frictions financières influencent
le choix de la structure organisationnelle des entreprises. Certaines formes organisation-
nelles, telles que les conglomérats ou les «business groups», permettent une réallocation
interne des ressources au sein de l’entreprise ou d’un groupe d’entreprises. Ceci permet
à ce type d’entreprises d’éviter la nécessité de faire face aux frictions sur les marchés
financiers externes. Les deux essais étudient théoriquement et empiriquement les impli-
cations d’une telle réallocation interne des ressources sur la taille des établissements,
leur productivité et plus généralement, sur l’organisation du secteur productif dans une
économie.
La plupart des entrepreneurs qui démarrent un nouveau projet ou considèrent l’ex-
pansion de leur projet existant, font appel aux investisseurs externes (banques, action-
naires, ou créditeurs) pour obtenir des ressources financières nécessaires à couvrir les
coûts de démarrage. Un entrepreneur est dit plus ou moins financièrement dépendant
selon le montant du financement externe qu’il désire d’obtenir. La protection des in-
vestisseurs, définie comme le contenu et la mise en application de l’ensemble des lois
qui protègent les investisseurs externes contre l’expropriation par les entrepreneurs, in-
fluence d’une façon cruciale la forme et le volume des contrats disponibles pour le fi-
nancement externe des projets entrepreneuriaux. Plusieurs études ont démontré qu’une
2bonne protection des investisseurs améliore la disponibilité du financement externe, ce
qui a un impact positif sur le développement financier et économique du pays (La Porta
et al., 1997, Levine, 1999, Levine et al., 2000, Rajan and Zingales, 1998). Néanmoins, en
regardant les données des mesures standards du niveau de protection des investisseurs,
tels que les indices des droits des actionnaires et des droits des créditeurs (Djankov et al.,
2007, La Porta et al., 1998) et les indices de la mise en application des lois et contrats
(Djankov et al., 2008a, b, World Bank, 2009), nous apercevons une grande disparité dans
les niveaux de protection des investisseurs à travers différents pays. Dans le premier es-
sai, nous proposons une théorie qui peut expliquer pourquoi tous les pays n’adoptent pas
la protection des investisseurs la plus haute malgré son effet bénéfique sur la performance
économique du pays. Notre théorie tente aussi d’expliquer le fait que les reformes qui
engendrent l’amélioration de la protection des investisseurs semblent être relativement
rares, ce qui cause la disparité entre les pays en matière de protection des investisseurs
d’être un phénomène persistant.
Notre théorie est basée sur l’idée que les réformes des lois qui agisse sur la protection
des investisseurs et leur mise en application sont en large partie issues d’un processus
politique. Nous proposons alors un modèle politico-économique qui relie la dynamique
et le niveau de long terme de la protection des investisseurs à l’inégalité en termes des
besoins de financement externe parmi les entrepreneurs. Nous utilisons un modèle à
deux secteurs et à générations imbriquées similaire à celui de Bernanke and Gertler
(1989) pour formaliser notre théorie. Particulièrement, nous supposons que les agents
diffèrent en termes des coûts de démarrage d’un projet entrepreneurial dont le retour est
stochastique. Seul l’entrepreneur peut observer la réalisation du retour de son projet, ce
qui crée un problème d’agence entre les entrepreneurs et les investisseurs externes. Le
financement externe est alors disponible seulement à travers des contrats optimaux avec
un intermédiaire financier qui a accès à une technologie de vérification du retour d’un
projet entrepreneurial. Néanmoins, comme dans Townsend (1979) cette vérification est
coûteuse.
3Nous supposons que le niveau de protection des investisseurs détermine le coût de
vérification et donc la sévérité du problème d’agence. Une faible protection des inves-
tisseurs rend le problème d’agence plus sévère, ce qui implique un coût de financement
externe plus élevé. À l’équilibre, ceci exclut les agents avec des besoins de financement
externe élevés de l’entrepreneuriat, ce qui diminue l’offre du bien produit par les en-
trepreneurs et rend ce bien plus cher. En conséquence, les profits des entrepreneurs qui
restent sur le marché deviennent plus élevés. Quand le niveau de protection des inves-
tisseurs est déterminé par un vote à la majorité, notre modèle génère des niveaux plus
faibles de protection des investisseurs dans les économies avec une plus grande inéga-
lité en termes des besoins de financement externe parmi les entrepreneurs. Le modèle
prédit aussi une dynamique d’output non-monotone et des reformes améliorant la pro-
tection des investisseurs qui suivent les périodes de ralentissement de l’output agrégé.
Les données empiriques semblent supporter ces prédictions du modèle théorique.
Le premier essai contribue à la récente littérature sur les déterminants politiques
du niveau de protection des investisseurs (Biais and Mariotti, 2009, Pagano and Vol-
pin, 2005, Perotti and Volpin, 2007). Notre travail partage avec ces études l’idée que
la protection des investisseurs imparfaite peut jouer comme une barrière à l’entrée dans
l’entrepreneuriat. Le principal apport de notre travail est l’analyse dans un cadre ex-
plicitement dynamique. En contraste avec les études précédentes, ceci nous permet de
regarder les implications pour la dynamique des réformes de la protection des investis-
seurs, ainsi que le niveau de protection des investisseurs et d’output agrégé vers lequel
l’économie est susceptible de converger à long-terme.
Les deuxième et troisième essais étudient comment les frictions financières créent
un rôle pour la réallocation des ressources sur les marchés internes au sein des larges en-
treprises diversifiées. Cette réallocation interne engendre des implications importantes
pour la productivité mesurée des établissements, la distribution de la taille des établisse-
ments et plus généralement, l’organisation de production dans un pays. Les entreprises
larges qui opèrent dans de multiples industries (les conglomérats) ainsi que les groupes
4des entreprises liées par des liens financiers ou familiaux forts (les «business groups»)
représentent une large proportion des actifs corporatifs et des activités économiques dans
beaucoup de pays. Étant donné le poids économique de ces entreprises diversifiées, il est
important de comprendre les effets de conglomération sur l’allocation des ressources à
travers les firmes, l’entrepreneuriat, la taille et la productivité des établissements et sur
les variables macro-économiques.
Dans le deuxième essai, nous construisons un modèle quantitatif dans lequel la
conglomération permet aux entreprises d’éviter partiellement les imperfections sur le
marché du crédit. Nous évaluons la capacité de ce modèle à reproduire quantitativement
des faits stylisés sur l’organisation de production et les différences parmi les pays en pré-
sence des conglomérats. Nous implantons la formation des conglomérats dans un modèle
standard d’équilibre général d’entrepreneuriat à agents hétérogènes avec contraintes de
crédit comme celui de Cagetti and De Nardi (2006). Les agents avec différentes habi-
lités et richesse décident de leur occupation en tant que travailleurs ou entrepreneurs.
Les entrepreneurs choisissent s’ils vont opérer leur propre entreprise ou s’ils deviennent
une partie d’un conglomérat diversifié. À cause des contraintes de crédit, seulement les
agents suffisamment riches ont un accès illimité au financement externe. Les conglo-
mérats émergent de façon endogène donnant la possibilité de créer au sein de la firme
un marché de crédit interne, ce qui réduit la dépendance sur le financement externe de
certains projets affiliés au conglomérats. Les marchés de crédit internes permettent aussi
de réallouer le capital à travers les projets affiliés d’une manière plus efficace.
Nous calibrons le modèle pour l’accorder avec quelques moments empiriques concer-
nant l’importance de l’entrepreneuriat, et l’inégalité de richesse et revenu. Le modèle est
capable de reproduire certains faits saillants de la distribution de la taille des établisse-
ments. Particulièrement, à travers de la réallocation interne du capital, les conglomérats
génèrent une concentration des projets affiliés dans les catégories de taille large. Le
modèle est aussi capable d’expliquer et de concilier les deux observations empiriques
concernant la productivité des projets qui semblaient contradictoire. Particulièrement,
5Schoar (2002) trouve que les établissements dans les conglomérats tendent à être plus
productifs en moyenne que ceux dans les firmes non-diversifiées, mais Maksimovic and
Phillips (2002) trouvent que cette relation est inversée lorsqu’on contrôle pour la taille
du projet. Notre modèle montre que les projets les plus productifs ont une probabilité
plus grande de se sélectionner dans les conglomérats, d’où la relation positive non-
conditionnelle entre la conglomération et la productivité. De l’autre côté, parce que la
conglomération relâche la contrainte de crédit, la masse des projets à très grande pro-
ductivité qui sont contraints à opérer à une taille sous-optimale est plus petite dans les
conglomérats que dans les firmes non-diversifiées. En conséquence, si nous regardons la
productivité moyenne des projets dans une classe de taille donnée, nous allons trouver,
pour la plupart des tailles à l’exemption des plus larges, que les projets en conglomérats
sont en moyenne moins productifs que ceux en firmes non-diversifiées.
Dans des expériences quantitatives, nous montrons que les contraintes de crédit plus
sévères mènent à un degré plus important de conglomération dans l’économie. Nous
montrons aussi que, en général, la conglomération est susceptible d’avoir des impacts
positifs sur le développement économique lorsque les marchés financiers sont affectés
par des frictions.
Le deuxième essai contribue à la littérature qui étudie la diversification des entre-
prises et son impact à la productivité et la taille des établissements (Almeida and Wol-
fenzon, 2006a, Maksimovic and Phillips, 2002, Schoar, 2002) ainsi qu’à la littérature sur
les fusions et acquisitions (Jovanovic and Braguinsky, 2004, Jovanovic and Rousseau,
2002), les partenariats parmi les entrepreneurs (Basaluzzo, 2006) et la littérature sur la
relation entre l’allocation des ressources à travers des établissements et le développe-
ment économique (Alfaro et al., 2008, Banerjee et al., 2003, Buera et al., 2009, Hsieh
and Klenow, 2009, Restuccia and Rogerson, 2008).
Le troisième essai établit plusieurs faits empiriques sur la distribution de la taille et
de la productivité totale des facteurs des établissements dans les conglomérats et dans
les firmes non-diversifiées. À partir des micro-données sur le secteur manufacturier ca-
6nadien, nous d’abord montrons que, bien qu’au Canada les conglomérats ne sont pas
nombreux, leur rôle dans l’économie est important. En effet, les conglomérats repré-
sentent autour de 18% des établissements manufacturiers, mais autour de 70% de la
valeur ajoutée totale du secteur manufacturier au Canada. Nous apportons une nouvelle
évidence sur la distribution de la taille des établissements conditionnellement à la struc-
ture organisationnelle de l’entreprise. Particulièrement, nous estimons séparément les
distributions de taille pour les établissement faisant partie des conglomérats et pour ceux
dans les firmes non-diversifiées en utilisant les estimateurs non-paramétriques des fonc-
tions de densité. Nos résultats montrent que la distribution de la taille des établissements
dans les conglomérats est décalée vers les tailles plus larges comparativement à la distri-
bution de la taille des établissements dans les firmes non-diversifiées. Par la suite, nous
nous posons la question si la taille plus large des établissements dans les conglomérats
est justifiée par leur plus grande productivité. Pour répondre à cette question, nous es-
timons la productivité totale des facteurs suivant la procédure de Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003) qui corrige pour le biais d’endogénéité des inputs de production. Nous trouvons
que les établissements en conglomérats sont en moyenne plus productifs que ceux dans
les firmes non-diversifiées, mais cette relation est inversée lorsque nous contrôlons pour
la taille d’établissement. Ce résultat peut paraître surprenant.
Nous montrons que la comparaison des productivités moyennes cache des détails
très importants concernant la relation entre la taille d’un établissement et sa productivité.
Particulièrement, nous trouvons que dans des classes de taille large, la distribution de la
productivité totale des facteurs des établissements dans les conglomérats est décalée vers
les niveaux de productivité plus élevés par rapport à la distribution de la productivité to-
tale des facteurs des établissements dans les firmes non-diversifiées. De l’autre côté, si
nous regardons la productivité des établissements dans une classe de taille plus petite, la
distribution de la productivité totale des facteurs des établissements dans les conglomé-
rats est décalée vers les niveaux de productivité plus bas par rapport à la distribution de
la productivité totale des facteurs des établissements dans les firmes non-diversifiées. Ce
7résultat est consistant avec la théorie de réallocation efficace des ressources au sein des
conglomérats telle que proposée par Stein (1997) et implantée dans un modèle d’équi-
libre général dans le deuxième essai de cette thèse.
Le troisième essai contribue à la littérature sur la distribution de la taille des éta-
blissements (Angelini and Generale, 2008, Axtell, 2001, Cabral and Mata, 2003, Desai
et al., 2003, Dunne et al., 1989, Evans, 1987, Hall, 1987, Rossi-Hansberg and Wright,
2007) et à la littérature qui regarde les implications pour la productivité et l’allocation des
ressources suite à la diversification des firmes (Maksimovic and Phillips, 2002, Schoar,
2002) et suite aux fusions et acquisitions (Jovanovic and Braguinsky, 2004, Jovanovic
and Rousseau, 2002). Nos résultats peuvent être aussi intéressants pour la littérature qui
tente d’expliquer le rôle des frictions financières dans la misallocation des ressources à
travers des établissements (Castro et al., 2009, Hsieh and Klenow, 2009, Restuccia and
Rogerson, 2008).
CHAPITRE 1
FINANCIAL CONTRACTS AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
INVESTOR PROTECTION
1.1 Introduction
Most entrepreneurs that start a new business or expand an existing one call upon out-
side investors (banks, shareholders, or creditors) to provide financial resources to cover
at least a part of the upfront business set-up costs. An entrepreneur is said to be more or
less financially dependent according to the amount of external finance that he wishes to
obtain. Investor protection, broadly defined as the contents and enforcement of the laws
that protect outside investors from expropriation by the entrepreneurs, crucially shapes
the contracts available for external financing. In fact, several studies have documented
that good investor protection enhances the availability of external finance, which has a
positive impact on financial development and broad economic outcomes (La Porta et al.,
1997, Levine, 1999, Levine et al., 2000, Rajan and Zingales, 1998). On the other hand,
standard indicators of investor protection, such as shareholder rights, creditor rights, and
contract enforcement indices, vary widely across countries.1 Moreover, in most coun-
tries reforms of laws governing investor protection are rare, making these cross-country
differences very persistent. Why do not all countries implement the highest investor pro-
tection ? What determines the level of investor protection ?
The laws that define investor protection and their enforcement are to a large extent
outcomes of a political process. This paper tries to shed some light on political determi-
nants of investor protection by proposing a theory that links the dynamics and the long
run level of investor protection to cross-entrepreneur heterogeneity in the dependence on
external finance. My theory has two main implications. First, more inequality in finan-
1See for example Djankov et al. (2007), La Porta et al. (1998), and the World Bank’s web site at
http ://www.doingbusiness.org.
9cial dependence across entrepreneurs leads to lower levels of investor protection in the
long run. If entrepreneurs that operate in the same industry and use similar technologies
have substantially different needs for external financing, then this is most likely due to
high wealth inequality, unequal access to alternative sources of internal financing (for
example through business groups), or preferential treatment of some entrepreneurs by
public administration (access to preferential public credit, access to government subsi-
dies, corruption). My result therefore suggests that reforming investor protection might
be particularly difficult in countries where these problems are highly prevalent. Second,
my theory predicts a particular timing of investor protection reforms. Specifically, re-
forms improving investor protection should be more likely to occur after periods of low
economic growth, when agents are less wealthy and have to rely more on external finance
in order to start their businesses.
The data provides some support for these two implications. Across countries, the
Gini coefficient of the wealth distribution as well as an interaction term of corruption and
start-up costs are negatively and significantly correlated to most indicators of investor
protection. These correlations are significant even when controlling for country’s legal
origin, which, as shown by La Porta et al. (1998), is a factor explaining differences of
investor protection across countries. Over time, the data is also suggestive of a negative
relationship between changes in indices of investor protection and lagged GDP growth.
The starting point in my theory is a two-sector overlapping generations model of ca-
pital accumulation. Firms in the consumption good sector are perfectly competitive and
produce with standard neoclassical technology with constant returns to scale. The capital
good, on the other hand, is produced in fixed size entrepreneurial projects. Agents differ
with respect to project start-up costs and decide whether or not they become entrepre-
neurs. A part of the business start-up cost may be covered by resources obtained from
outside investors. I refer to the agent as being more or less financially dependent accor-
ding to the amount of external finance that he needs to obtain in order to pay his start-up
cost. Because the output of an entrepreneurial project is stochastic and its realization is
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private information to the entrepreneur, external financing is available only through opti-
mal contracts with a financial intermediary in the spirit of Bernanke and Gertler (1989).
In particular, I assume that the intermediary has access to an auditing technology, which
makes the production publicly observable, but at a cost. Under perfect investor protec-
tion this cost is zero and there are no agency problems. By contrast, under imperfect
investor protection the auditing cost is positive and the agency problem raises the cost of
external funding. Consequently, agents with high dependence on external finance do not
become entrepreneurs and choose instead to invest on international markets. Therefore,
a low level of investor protection lowers the entrepreneurship and the supply of capital
good, and leads to a higher price of capital. For some entrepreneurs this general equi-
librium effect compensates the higher cost of external funds, resulting in higher profits.
In other words, low investor protection induces a redistribution of profits from more to
less financially dependent agents. If reforms of investor protection are made by voting,
imperfect investor protection can be sustained if the less financially dependent agents
have enough political power.
Under a simple majority voting rule voters face a trade-off between higher agency
costs and a higher relative price of capital good. I order the voters according to their bu-
siness start-up cost and show that the median voter theorem applies. Imperfect investor
protection may emerge in equilibrium when (i) the median voter has low enough finan-
cial dependence and (ii) there is enough heterogeneity in external finance dependence
among potential entrepreneurs. The first condition ensures that the rise in the agency
cost of the median voter resulting from a marginal worsening of investor protection is
not too high. The second condition ensures that the rise in the price of capital good re-
sulting from a marginal worsening of investor protection via general equilibrium effect
is sufficiently strong.
The long run outcome and dynamics of the politico-economic equilibrium crucially
depend on the shape of the distribution of financial dependence. This shape determines
the level of capital accumulation that prevails under perfect investor protection, which is
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the economy’s first-best level of capital accumulation. It also pins down the identity of
the decisive voter and the strength of the general equilibrium effect on the price of ca-
pital good. I study how changes in the shape of the distribution of financial dependence
influence the political outcome. I first consider distributional changes that leave the first-
best level of capital accumulation unchanged, but imply different degrees of inequality
in financial dependence among entrepreneurs. In economies with more inequality the de-
cisive voter is relatively less dependent on external finance and the general equilibrium
effect on the price of capital good is relatively weaker. In the decisive voter’s trade-
off, this decreases both the marginal cost and benefit of worsening investor protection. I
show numerically that the decrease in the marginal cost is always dominant, so that hi-
gher inequality in financial dependence leads to lower investor protection, a lower level
of capital accumulation, and lower aggregate output in the politico-economic steady-
state equilibrium. This result appears to be consistent with the cross-country empirical
evidence. I then consider distributional changes that also affect the economy’s first-best
level of capital accumulation. I show numerically that higher variance and skewness to-
wards low financial dependence induce lower equilibrium levels of investor protection,
but may lead to a lower or a higher level of capital accumulation and aggregate output
in the politico-economic steady-state equilibrium. Therefore, with such distributional
changes there is not a clear negative relationship between investor protection and eco-
nomic development. This ambiguity arises because of shifts in the economy’s first-best
level of capital accumulation. In fact, some of these distributional changes imply an in-
crease in the economy’s first-best level of capital accumulation that is sufficiently high
to compensate the negative effect of poorer investor protection selected in the politico-
economic equilibrium. These results help to rationalize why certain countries, such as
France and Belgium, are remarkably rich in spite of having bad investor protection. The
literature has regarded such examples as being puzzling (La Porta et al., 1997, Levine
et al., 2000).
Finally, the relation between economic growth and reforms of investor protection
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is examined. Imperfect investor protection is more likely to emerge after periods with
high aggregate output because the decisive voter is relatively wealthy and relies less on
external finance. On the other hand, low investor protection depresses aggregate output,
which may lead to a reform that improves the level of investor protection in the future.
Generally, in contrast to a model of capital accumulation without voting, the addition of
politics generates non-monotone equilibrium dynamics.
There is a recent literature studying the political determinants of investor protection
(Biais and Mariotti, 2009, Pagano and Volpin, 2005, Perotti and Volpin, 2007) to which
this paper is related. My paper shares the underlying idea that imperfect investor pro-
tection or soft bankruptcy laws act as a barrier to entry into entrepreneurship with Biais
and Mariotti (2009) and Perotti and Volpin (2007). However, in contrast to my paper,
the remaining literature does not consider the political determination of investor protec-
tion in a dynamic framework. In this case, it is not possible to analyze the dynamics
and long run outcomes of the political equilibrium. Perotti and Volpin (2007) develop
a political economy model in which choosing the level of investor protection is equiva-
lent to choosing an entry cost. They stress the the role of political accountability of the
government as the key determinant of investor protection. They also provide empirical
support for the idea that low investor protection and financial underdevelopment act as
a barrier to entry. Biais and Mariotti (2009) consider a model in which soft bankruptcy
laws worsen credit rationing which hinders firm creation and depresses labor demand.
This leads to lower wages and higher profits for the richer entrepreneurs who therefore
favor soft bankruptcy laws. While the mechanism that generates imperfect investor pro-
tection in my model is similar to theirs, the two studies focus on different issues. Biais
and Mariotti (2009) are interested in theoretical and normative implications of their mo-
del. They show under which circumstances soft bankruptcy laws may generate greater
utilitarian welfare than tougher laws. By contrast, my study has a positive perspective
and delivers predictions that are compared to the key empirical stylized facts concer-
ning investor protection. Particularly, my dynamic model suggests an important role of
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political determinants in explaining the timing of investor protection reforms as well as
persistent cross-country differences in levels of investor protection. Pagano and Volpin
(2005) show how proportional electoral systems may to lead to selection of lower in-
vestor protection and stronger employment protection than majoritarian systems. Their
model, however, does not feature endogenous occupational choice and the proportion of
each group of stakeholders in the population is given exogenously, while their political
power is determined by the features of the electoral system.
More broadly, my paper is also related to the vast literature that has shown how the
net worth of potential entrepreneurs matters in presence of financial frictions (Aghion
and Bolton, 1997, Banerjee and Newman, 1993, Bernanke and Gertler, 1989, Piketty,
1997), as well as to more recent contributions of Castro et al. (2004, 2009), Erosa and
Hidalgo Cabrillana (2008), and Rajan and Zingales (2003, 1998) that link financial de-
velopment to economic growth.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1.2 I spell out the
model and characterize the economic and political equilibria. In Section 1.3 I analyze
the main implications of the theory and illustrate them with several numerical examples.
In Section 1.4 I examine whether empirical evidence supports the theory’s main predic-
tions. Finally, I conclude in Section 5.
1.2 Model
My model builds on Bernanke and Gertler’s (1989) general equilibrium version of
Townsend’s (1979) costly state verification framework. I first describe and characterize
the economic equilibrium for a given level of investor protection. Then, in Section 1.2.5,
I analyze the political determination of investor protection.
14
1.2.1 The Environment
I consider a small open economy with overlapping generations of two-period lived
risk-neutral agents. Each generation has measure one. Time is denoted by subscript t
and goes from zero to infinity. The economy has two goods, a consumption good and a
capital good. The consumption good is the numeraire and qt denotes the relative price
of the capital good. I assume that the capital good has to be produced domestically. The
international financial market allows to save at an exogenous gross interest rate r ≥ 1.
All agents born at time t work when they are young and receive labor income wt
in consumption units. Then they decide the occupation for the second period of their
lives. They can either become investors or entrepreneurs. If an agent chooses to become
an investor, he saves wt in the international financial market at the gross interest rate r.
Otherwise, he uses his labor income to cover the cost of setting up a business. Potential
entrepreneurs are endowed with production technologies, which are identical except for
different set up costs. An agent of type z has to pay the amount x(z) in consumption
units in order to become entrepreneur, with x′ (z) > 0. The agents’ types are distributed
according to a continuous probability distribution with cumulative distribution function
G(z) on [0,1]. One interpretation of the start-up cost heterogeneity is that agents differ
in their talent and/or cost function. Alternatively, one may think that some agents are
favored in the process of establishing a business. For example, z could indicate the loca-
tion of the agent. One may argue that some locations are better than others : it could be
easier to establish a business in the city compared to the countryside. Yet another inter-
pretation could be in terms of connections to the "right" people in the administration. It
could be that some agents must pay additional bribes when they want to establish a busi-
ness. These interpretations are relevant for developing countries with bad infrastructure
or countries with a high level of corruption.
The consumption good is produced by a competitive firm according to a standard
neoclassical technology, F (K,L), combining capital and labor with constant returns to
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scale. I assume that F (K,L) is strictly increasing in both arguments, strictly concave,
and satisfies the Inada conditions. For simplicity I also assume that capital fully depre-
ciates in one period. The capital good is produced by the agents who choose to become
entrepreneurs. The capital production technology is described as follows. Each agent
can put up one entrepreneurial project at the end of the first period of his life. If he
is able to gather funds to cover his project’s start-up cost, he becomes an entrepreneur
and the project is implemented. Each project’s return is stochastic, independently and
identically distributed across projects. With probability pi the outcome is "low" and the
project generates an amount κL of capital good, with complementary probability (1−pi)
the project’s outcome is "high" and it generates an amount κH > κL of capital good. The
expected output of a project is denoted by κ ≡ piκL +(1−pi)κH . The return of the en-
trepreneurial project, or the return on investment in the international financial market, is
collected (and consumed) in the next period when agents are old. Figure 1.1 summarizes
the timing.
1.2.2 Financial Intermediation and Occupational Choice
The agents who do not have sufficient funds to cover their business start-up cost
and wish to become entrepreneurs borrow from a financial intermediary. The financial
contract cannot be made fully contingent on the actual production outcome, because the
realization of the idiosyncratic production shock is private information to the entrepre-
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Figure 1.1 – Timing
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neur. Instead, the entrepreneur announces to the intermediary how much was produced
and the contract specifies the amount of loan repayment conditional on this report. The
intermediary can decide to verify the entrepreneur’s report by ordering an audit of the
project which makes the output publicly observable. An audit costs an amount qt+1γt
of consumption good.2 I view the auditing cost γt as a proxy for investor protection.
Lower auditing costs imply better monitoring and better protection of outside investors
from expropriation by the entrepreneur. Conversely, higher auditing costs are associated
with lower investor protection. This approach allows us to think about investor protec-
tion as a broad concept that embodies a large number of regulations, laws, and their
enforcement. For example, when the standards of financial reporting and transparency
requirements are low, investors must pay additional costs for obtaining the financial in-
formation necessary to exercise some control over the company. The auditing cost may
also be thought of as a cost of liquidating the company in case of failure, which will
depend on toughness and enforcement of bankruptcy law. If the law is tough and strictly
enforced, the proceeds from liquidation will be higher than under a poor law enforce-
ment, as less effort and lower costs must be incurred in order to retrieve the proceeds.
I restrict the policy space to the interval
[
0,γH
]
, where γH ≡ (1−pipi )(κH−κL). This is
without loss of generality because the equilibrium allocation under any policy γt ≥ γH
will be identical.3 The actual level of investor protection is assumed to be known before
financial contracts are signed, and thus the contracts take the investor protection as given.
I allow for random auditing : the intermediary can choose the probability with which a
project will be audited contingent on the entrepreneur’s announcement. More formally,
a financial contract for an entrepreneur of type z with labor income wt is a seven-tuple
2The fact that the auditing costs are assumed to be paid in consumption good is not essential for my
results. In fact, if the auditing costs were paid in capital good, the general equilibrium effect of investor
protection on the relative price of the capital good would be stronger which would only reinforce my
results.
3This will be explained in more detail in Section 1.2.3. Intuitively, if the auditing cost is above γH ,
only the entrepreneurs that can fully repay the intermediary even in the "low" production realization obtain
external financing. For those agents the optimal contract will not depend on γt . Therefore, their financial
contract will not change by further increasing the auditing cost beyond γH .
17{
at (z) ,{pit (z) ,cait (z) ,cit (z)}i=L,H
}
, where at (z) is the investment advance, pit (z) is
the probability of auditing when the entrepreneur reports that his output is equal to κi,
with i = L,H, and cait (z), cit (z) are the consumption levels for the entrepreneur for each
possible report in case, respectively, of auditing and non-auditing. I assume that financial
intermediation is a competitive sector with free entry. The optimal contract maximizes
the entrepreneur’s expected consumption subject to an incentive compatibility constraint
in case of high output realization, a financial intermediary’s break-even constraint, and
feasibility constraints on auditing probabilities.4 Denoting V Et (z) the value for type z of
initiating a project, the contracting problem can be written as follows.
V Et (z) = max
at(z),{pit(z),cait(z),cit(z)}i=L,H
{pi [pLt (z)caLt (z)+(1− pLt (z))cLt (z)]
+(1−pi) [pHt (z)caHt (z)+(1− pHt (z))cHt (z)]} (1.1)
subject to
pHt (z)caHt (z)+ [1− pHt (z)]cHt (z)≥ [1− pLt (z)] [cLt (z)+qt+1 (κH−κL)] , (1.2)
pi {pLt (z) [qt+1 (κL− γt)− caLt (z)]+ [1− pLt (z)] [qt+1κL− cLt (z)]}+
(1−pi){pHt (z) [qt+1 (κH− γt)− caHt (z)]+ [1− pHt (z)] [qt+1κH− cHt (z)]}
= at (z)r, (1.3)
at (z) = x(z)−wt , (1.4)
4If the output realization is "low", entrepreneurs never misreport, because, as it will be shown later,
this would imply a higher repayment.
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0≤ pit (z)≤ 1
cait (z) ,cit (z)≥ 0
 for i = L,H. (1.5)
Constraint (1.2) is the incentive compatibility constraint. It states that the expected consump-
tion level when "high" output is truthfully reported must be higher than the expected
consumption level resulting from misreporting. Constraint (1.3) states that the interme-
diary must break even. Constraint (1.4) requires that the investment advance from the
intermediary must cover the need for external funding of the entrepreneur. Notice that,
because of constraint (1.4), when the labor income wt changes over time, the severity
of the agency problem and the whole contracting problem changes as well. Finally, in-
equalities (1.5) are the feasibility constraints on the probabilities of auditing and the
non-negativity constraints on consumption levels.
An alternative to initiating an entrepreneurial project is to save in the international
financial market. This generates a value
V It = rwt .
An agent of type z will become entrepreneur at date t if and only if V Et (z) ≥ V It . This
condition defines the set of entrepreneurs in period t, which I denote byΩt =
{
z : V Et (z)≥V It
}
.
1.2.3 Economic Equilibrium
In this section, I define and characterize the economic equilibrium for a given se-
quence of investor protection policies {γt}∞t=0. The study of policy determination is post-
poned to Section 1.2.5.
Definition 1. Given an initial aggregate capital stock K0 > 0 and a sequence of inves-
tor protection policies {γt}∞t=0, an economic equilibrium is a non-negative consumption
level for the initial old co0, sets of entrepreneurs {Ωt}∞t=0, optimal financial contracts
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k ≡ {at (z) ,{pit (z) ,cait (z) , cit (z)}i=L,H , for all z in Ωt
}∞
t=0
, an allocation for the firm
producing the consumption good c≡ {Kt ,Lt}∞t=0, and prices e≡ {wt ,qt}∞t=0 such that :
• co0 = q0K0, and for all t ≥ 0 :
• given e, the firm in the consumption good sector maximizes profits,
• given e, contracts k solve problem (1.1) for all types z in Ωt ,
• given e, the occupational choice is optimal for all z, that is :
Ωt =
{
z : V Et (z)≥V It
}
,
• the market for capital good and the labor market clear :
∫
Ωt
κdG(z) = Kt+1,
Lt = 1.
The characterization of the economic equilibrium follows. The optimal contract de-
pends on the agent’s type z because the distortion due to the information asymmetry is
more severe for the agents with higher start-up cost (higher z). The low cost types (those
with very low z) need so little external funds that they are able to repay the required re-
turn to the intermediary even in case of "low" output realization. Indeed, we can see that
if at (z)≤ qt+1r κL, then the optimal contract sets all auditing probabilities to zero and lets
cit (z) = qt+1κi−at (z)r for i = L,H. Using constraint (1.4), I introduce the threshold zt ,
which is implicitly defined by x
(
zt
)
= wt +
qt+1
r κL. It follows that for all types z≤ zt the
optimal contract is the one described above.
For types z > zt the optimal contract specifies positive auditing probabilities if the
"low" realization is announced. To see this, note that constraint (1.2) binds for these
types. From (1.3) we can deduce that the optimal auditing probability when the "high"
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realization is announced is always zero to minimize expected auditing costs. Also, to
make constraint (1.2) easier to satisfy, it is optimal to set caLt (z) and cLt to zero. Then, by
(1.3) and (1.4) the optimal auditing probability pLt (z) must satisfy :
pLt (z) =
[x(z)−wt ]r−qt+1κL
(1−pi)qt+1 (κH−κL)−piqt+1γt . (1.6)
However, not all agents may obtain external funding. For high cost types, when γt is
large, it may be impossible to satisfy (1.6) together with the constraints 0≤ pLt (z)≤ 1.
Of course, the financial intermediary will not sign any contract in which the break-even
constraint cannot be satisfied. Particularly, when γt ≥ γH = 1−pipi (κH−κL) only the types
z≤ zt obtain external financing. Note that their contracts will not depend on γt . In fact, the
resulting equilibrium allocation when γt ≥ γH is identical to that which prevails under
γt = γH . This is why constraining the policy space to γt ∈
[
0,γH
]
is without loss of
generality. For the formal proof of this claim see Appendix I.1, Lemma 7. The next
proposition summarizes the characterization of the optimal contract for all types that
obtain external funding.
Proposition 2. Given prices qt+1, wt , and a level of investor protection γt ∈
[
0,γH
]
, the
optimal contracts for types z that have access to external financing are characterized
by the investment advances, the auditing probabilities and the consumption plans for
entrepreneurs,{
at (z) ,{pit (z) ,cait (z) ,cit (z)}i=L,H
}
, such that :
• at (z) = x(z)−wt ,
• pHt (z) = 0,
• pLt (z) = max
{
0, [x(z)−wt ]r−qt+1κL(1−pi)qt+1(κH−κL)−piqt+1γt
}
,
• caLt (z) = cLt (z) = max{qt+1κL− [x(z)−wt ]r,0},
• cHt (z) = max{qt+1κH− [x(z)−wt ]r, [1− pLt (z)]qt+1 (κH−κL)}.
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Using Proposition 2 to substitute for {pit (z) ,cait (z) ,cit (z)}i=L,H , the expected value
of being an entrepreneur is given by
V Et (z) =

qt+1κ− [x(z)−wt ]r for z≤ zt ,
(1−pi) [1− pLt (z)]qt+1 (κH−κL) =
φ (γt){qt+1 (κ−piγt)− [x(z)−wt ]r} for z≥ zt ,
where κ ≡ piκL +(1−pi)κH and φ (γt) ≡ (1−pi)(κH−κL)(1−pi)(κH−κL)−piγt . In equilibrium the expec-
ted value of being entrepreneur is affected by the level of investor protection γt via two
effects. First, investor protection affects V Et (z) indirectly through the price of capital
qt+1. This general equilibrium effect is present for all entrepreneurs independently on
their cost type. Second, for all types z > zt , the value V
E
t (z) is directly affected through
the probability of auditing. Understanding the interplay between the general equilibrium
effect and the direct effect of investor protection on the expected value of being an en-
trepreneur will be key for understanding political preferences.
It is easy to verify that for given prices qt+1 and wt , the value of entrepreneurship
V Et (z) is continuous and strictly decreasing in z. On the other hand, the value of saving
in the international financial market, V It , is constant. It follows that there exists a unique
value z?t for which V
E
t (z
?
t ) =V
I
t . We can then characterize the set of entrepreneurs at date
t as Ωt = {z ∈ [0,1] : z≤ z?t }. The measure of this set is G(z?t ) and the capital supply at
date t + 1 is given by Kst+1 = κG(z
?
t ). Notice that if 0 ≤ z?t ≤ 1, then the number z?t
identifies the type that is exactly indifferent between initiating an entrepreneurial project
and saving in the international market. Not surprisingly, the measure of entrepreneurs
and, consequently, the capital supply are increasing in the price of capital good qt+1.
This is formally established in Appendix I.1 as Lemma 8. An economic equilibrium for
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a given policy {γt}∞t=0 is thus completely characterized by four equations for all t ≥ 0 :
V It =V
E
t (z
?
t ) , (1.7)
qt = F1 (Kt ,1) , (1.8)
wt = F2 (Kt ,1) , (1.9)
Kt+1 = κG(z?t ) . (1.10)
Next, I provide some intuition on how qt+1 is determined. Refer to Figure 1.2.5 The
figure is drawn for a given wt . In fact, notice that by equation (1.9), wt is predetermined
by the current aggregate stock of capital Kt . The D curve depicts the demand for capital
in period t+1 as a function of the relative price of capital qt+1. It corresponds to equation
(1.8). From the strict concavity of the consumption good production function it follows
that D is strictly decreasing. The capital supply in period t + 1 is given by equation
(1.10). The S curve depicts the capital supply in period t + 1 under perfect investor
protection γt = 0. It is increasing in qt+1. This is intuitive since higher qt+1 induces
more agents to become entrepreneurs. Notice that for low and high level of qt+1 the
capital supply is inelastic : for very low level of qt+1 nobody wants to be entrepreneur
and Kst+1 = 0 ; if qt+1 is high all agents will become entrepreneurs and capital supply
attains its maximum Kst+1 = κG(1) = κ . The equilibrium price of capital, and hence
the measure of entrepreneurs at date t, are pinned down by the capital market clearing
condition at date t+1.
1.2.4 Comparative Statics
This section shows how the equilibrium on the capital market at date t + 1 changes
when γt and wt change. This will be useful for understanding agents’ policy preferences.
5The figure was constructed using the functional forms and parametrization as presented further in a
numerical example.
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Figure 1.2 – Capital market with perfect (solid) and imperfect (dotted) investor protec-
tion
First, consider what happens when investor protection falls (γt increases). The capital
demand curve does not move since the marginal product of capital is independent of γt .
On the other hand, the capital supply curve shifts up and to the left, from S to S’ in
Figure 1.2. The intuition is that the rise in agency costs associated with a deterioration of
investor protection induces some of the higher cost types not to start an entrepreneurial
project. Hence, the capital supply curve shifts up and to the left. However, notice that
the capital supply remains unchanged at high and low prices. At low prices, under a
threshold qt , only the low cost types who are able to repay the intermediary even in
case of "low" project’s outcome decide to initiate a project. Because these agents are
not concerned by the agency problem, a deterioration of investor protection does not
have any effect on their occupational choice and hence on capital supply. At high prices,
above a threshold qt (γ), the capital supply curve does not change with worsening of
investor protection because every agent becomes entrepreneur. Under the restriction that
the the start-up cost of the highest cost type is high enough, qt (γ) is increasing in γ
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and qt (γ) > qt for any γ . The following lemma summarizes how the supply of capital
varies when investor protection changes. The formal proof and the details can be found
in Appendix I.1.
Lemma 3. Assume x(1)> κF2(κ,1)(1−pi)(κH−κL) . A deterioration of investor protection from γ
′to
γ ′′, with γ ′ < γ ′′, results in the following changes in the capital supply Kst+1 (qt+1) :
Kst+1
(
qt+1;γ ′
)
> Kst+1
(
qt+1;γ ′′
)
, ∀qt+1 ∈
(
qt ,qt
(
γ ′′
))
,
Kst+1
(
qt+1;γ ′
)
= Kst+1
(
qt+1;γ ′′
)
, ∀qt+1 ∈
[
0,qt
]
∪ [qt (γ ′′) ,∞) ,
with qt ≡
wtr
(1−pi)(κH−κL) and qt (γ
′′)≡ rκ−piγ ′′
{
x(1)−
[
1− 1φ(γ ′′)
]
wt
}
.
It follows that an economy with better investor protection γ ′ will experience a lower
equilibrium price of the capital good than an economy with poorer investor protection
γ ′′ > γ ′, provided that the equilibrium prices in the first economy are in the interval(
qt ,qt (γ
′′)
)
.6 Figure 1.2 gives an illustration of capital good market equilibria under
two policies γ ′ = 0 (solid line) and γ ′′ = 0.8 (dotted line). Notice that the period t + 1
equilibrium price of capital determined on the figure can be regarded as the general
equilibrium price of capital since the wages wt are predetermined by the actual stock of
capital Kt .
In the remainder of this section, I discuss the implications on the number of entre-
preneurs and the price of capital when wages increase.7 The capital demand does not
depend on wt . This follows from the fact that the marginal product of capital is inde-
pendent of wages because of the inelastic supply of labor. On the other hand, the effect
of wages on the supply of capital depends on the level of investor protection. First,
notice that under perfect investor protection (i.e. γt = 0) wages do not matter. In that
case every project’s outcome is verifiable at no cost and there are no agency problems
6If this condition is not verified for the economy with higher investor protection then a decrease in
investor protection has no effects on equilibrium allocation and prices.
7This effect is akin to the financial accelerator mechanism of Bernanke and Gertler (1989).
25
between the intermediary and the entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurship is profitable for all
types whose start-up cost is lower than the project’s expected output actualized with
the international gross interest rate. The set of entrepreneurs under perfect investor pro-
tection is Ω?0 =
{
z ∈ [0,1] : z≤ z?0} with measure G(z?0). The cut-off z?0 is given by
x
(
z?0
)
= q
0κ
r , where q
0 is the equilibrium price of capital under perfect investor pro-
tection. Notice that there is no subscript t under z?0 or Ω?0 in order to emphasize that
they do not depend on the period t wages or capital stock. In what follows I assume
that the parameters are such that in equilibrium z?0 < 1 that is, not all agents choose to
become entrepreneurs in equilibrium under perfect investor protection. This simplifies
the analysis because the equilibrium price qt+1 will always be below qt (γt).
With imperfect investor protection (i.e. γt > 0), the number of entrepreneurs is lower
than under perfect investor protection and it is increasing in the current wage level. To see
this, note that with imperfect investor protection the agency problem distorts the financial
contract for higher cost types (types z > zt) and makes external funding more expensive.
Particularly, the term φ (γt) in the value function of an entrepreneur, V Et (z), is greater
than one which implies that for all types z > zt investing one unit of external funds into
the project costs φ (γt)r, whereas investing one unit of their own wealth costs only r. The
agent’s net worth matters because when wages are high, the entrepreneur needs to borrow
less and he can save the agency costs. This is why entrepreneurship becomes profitable
for higher cost types only when they are sufficiently wealthy. It follows that the capital
supply is higher and the equilibrium price of capital good is lower when wages are high.
Eventually, for sufficiently high wages, all agents that would become entrepreneurs with
perfect investor protection start a project also when γt > 0. In other words, when wages
are sufficiently high, agency problems are not binding and the equilibrium allocations
with γt = 0 and γt > 0 are identical.
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I conclude this section by summarizing the relevant cut-offs :
1. z?t is the least efficient (in terms of the start-up cost) entrepreneur when investor
protection is γt .
2. z?0 is the least efficient entrepreneur when γt = 0. This threshold characterizes the
measure of entrepreneurs and the capital supply in the first-best situation.
3. zt is the least efficient unconstrained type. For all z < zt the optimal contract does
not depend on γt . This does not mean that they do not care about γt , because they
are still affected by the general equilibrium effect on the price of capital.
1.2.5 Political Equilibrium
In this section, I add politics to the model. I assume that agents vote in each per-
iod on the current level of investor protection γt and the equilibrium policy is selected
under simple majority rule. Voting occurs after receiving labor income but before the
occupational choice (see Figure 1.1). When casting their vote, agents are fully rational
and forward-looking. I assume that the old generation and the young types z > z?0 do
not bother to vote.8 This is a plausible assumption since investor protection has no effect
on the utility of these agents. In fact, old agents’ consumption is predetermined by the
previous period election outcome and previous period wages. The future consumption
of the currently young types z > z?0, who would not become entrepreneurs even under
perfect investor protection, is equal to rwt . This does not depend on γt since wages are
related to Kt , which is predetermined, and r is exogenous. The voters are then the young
types z≤ z?0.
Notice that if zt ≥ z?0, which may happen if the wages are sufficiently high, all entre-
preneurs are unconstrained, the agency problems disappear and the investor protection
policy has no effect on the equilibrium allocation. In that case the voters are indifferent
8An alternative assumption would be that they select a policy randomly. Under uniform randomization,
this would not change the results.
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among all policies and the status-quo policy prevails. On the other hand, if zt < z
?0, then
the policy affects the economic equilibrium and there is a disagreement among the po-
tential entrepreneurs over the level of investor protection. This is the interesting case on
which I will concentrate in what follows.
1.2.5.1 Median Voter Theorem
Each voter compares his expected utility under different policies. He votes for the
policy that maximizes his indirect expected utility. However, deriving the indirect utility
is not straightforward because of the general equilibrium effects. Despite the fact that the
indirect utilities are not in general single-peaked in γt , I show that individual preferences
can be ordered according to the type z. Roberts (1977) establishes that this guarantees
that the median voter theorem applies.
Proposition 4. The policy preferred by the median voter cannot be beaten by any other
feasible policy in a pair-wise vote under simple majority rule.
Proof. Note that the expected utility of each voter depends on γt and qt+1. The price
qt+1 itself depends on γt through equilibrium conditions (1.7), (1.8), and (1.10). The
equilibrium price qt+1 is strictly increasing in γt . This follows from comparative statics
with respect to γt and because F11 (·,1)< 0. Applying Theorem 1 of Milgrom (1994), the
preferences over pairs (qt+1,γt) are single crossing in (γt ,z) if and only if the expected
utility function satisfies the Spence-Mirrlees condition that the agents’ marginal rates
of substitution between γt and qt+1 can be ordered according to z. The marginal rate of
substitution for a constrained type z > zt is :
∂V Et (z)
∂γt
∂V Et (z)
∂qt+1
=
φ ′ (γt){qt+1 (κ−piγt)− [x(z)−wt ]r}−φ (γt)piqt+1
φ (γt)(κ−piγt) ,
which is negative and strictly decreasing in z at any γt . On the other hand, unconstrained
agents (types z≤ zt) are not directly affected by γt since their financial contract does not
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depend on γt . The marginal rate of substitution is then equal to zero. Thus, the policy
preferences over the pairs (qt+1,γt) are single-crossing and can be ordered according to
the agents’ types. This ensures that the median voter theorem obtains.
Since the set of voters is equal to all types in the interval
[
0,z?0
]
, the median voter
is the type zM for which G
(
zM
)
= G(z?0)/2. The median voter does not change with the
aggregate stock of capital because z?0 does not depend on wages. The political outcome
in each period is given by the solution to the median voter’s trade-off between higher
agency costs and higher price of capital good. The trade-off fundamentally hinges on
two things. On the one hand, the marginal cost of decreasing investor protection is de-
termined by the degree of dependence on external finance of the median voter. On the
other hand, the marginal benefit of decreasing investor protection is determined by the
elasticity of the capital supply with respect to γt . The determinants of both marginal
cost and benefit of decreasing investor protection are intimately linked to features of the
distribution of financial dependence among potential entrepreneurs.
The distribution of financial dependence inherits the shape of the distribution of start-
up costs but its support is shifted to the left depending on the current wages (which
are determined by the current stock of capital). The shape of the distribution of start-
up costs pins down the identity of the decisive voter and it also affects the marginal
benefit of increasing γt , since it determines how many agents it is possible to discourage
from entrepreneurship.9 This affects both the steady-state and the transition path of the
politico-economic equilibrium. On the other hand, for a given distribution G(z), the
current stock of capital does not affect the identity of the decisive voter but it changes
the decisive voter’s preferred policy since higher wages make the agency problem under
imperfect investor protection less severe. Therefore, the stock of capital in each period
influences the transition path of the politico-economic equilibrium but not the features
9In the remainder of the paper I use the term "decisive voter" to refer to the median voter in order to
avoid confusion with the median of the type distribution.
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of the steady-state. In the next section I parametrize the model and solve it numerically
in order to examine more in detail each of these effects.
1.3 Numerical Examples
For the production function and the cost function I choose, respectively, F (K,L) =
KνL1−ν and x(z) = ζ +θz. The distribution of types is assumed to be a Beta distribution
with parameters α and β . When changing α and β , the Beta distribution can take a wide
range of shapes on [0,1] and therefore this specification is quite general.
The parameter values for the benchmark parametrization are listed in Table 1.I. The
share of capital good in the final good sector production function is consistent with the
evidence on factor income shares. I choose a positive value for ζ to ensure that the
project requires a positive amount of investment even for the lowest cost type. The other
cost parameter θ is then chosen so that, under perfect investor protection, the equilibrium
price of capital good is equal to unity. This is simply a convenient normalization. The
values of κL, κH and pi are chosen so that the ex-ante expected production of an entre-
preneurial project is one unit of capital good. I pick a symmetric distribution of start-up
costs as a benchmark. With values of α and β as specified in the table the variance is
1/36.
As in Bernanke and Gertler (1989) the "generations" in the model should be thought
of as representing the entry and exit of firms from the credit market rather than literal
generations. Consequently, I fix a period in the model to three years, which also deter-
mines the length of a financial contract and r is chosen so that the interest rate is five
percent per year. Finally, in order to study dynamics of the political equilibria I fix the
initial stock of capital to a relatively low value.
Table 1.I – Benchmark parametrization
ν ζ θ κL κH pi α β r K0
0.33 0.1 2.211 0.1 1.9 0.5 4 4 1.1576 0.1
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1.3.1 The Dynamics of Investor Protection
Let us first examine the dynamics of the politico-economic equilibrium under the
benchmark parametrization. Figure 1.3 depicts the equilibrium path. There are two im-
portant observations. First, the model is able to generate imperfect investor protection in
the long run as an equilibrium outcome. Second, in contrast to a model without investor
protection endogeneity, the convergence to the steady state is non-monotone.
When investor protection is chosen in a politico-economic equilibrium, we have that
at the beginning, when the capital stock is low, wages are low and the decisive voter
needs more external funding to cover his business start-up cost. This is why he prefers
high investor protection in order to mitigate the agency problem between him and the
financial intermediary and reduce the cost of external funds. In the next period, as the
capital stock increases, wages increase as well. The decisive voter becomes wealthier,
which reduces the severity of the agency problem. He then chooses low investor protec-
tion in order to exclude high cost types from entrepreneurship and boost the price of the
capital good. That depresses capital and wages and makes the agency problem more re-
levant again. This mechanism suggests a specific timing of investor protection reforms.
Improvements in investor protection occur in periods of low growth, when entrepreneurs
rely more on external finance, whereas in periods of high growth entrepreneurs tend to
be wealthier and investor protection deteriorates.
Notice how both the capital stock fluctuation and its effect on other variables are
created by politics. Absent politics, the dynamics would depend on the (exogenously
fixed) level of investor protection in a simple way. Under perfect investor protection
(that is γt = 0 for all t) there would be no transition dynamics - the economy would
attain its first-best level of capital accumulation in one period. By contrast, under imper-
fect investor protection (γt = γ > 0 for all t) convergence to the steady state would be
always monotone. The dependence of the financial contract on entrepreneur’s net worth
would introduce persistence in capital accumulation in spite of free capital mobility. The
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Figure 1.3 – Politico-economic equilibrium - benchmark parametrization
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economy would converge gradually, as the stock of capital and the wages would grow
over time, to a steady state.
1.3.2 Role of the Shape of the Start-up Cost Distribution
The shape of the start-up cost distribution is the main determinant of the long run
equilibrium outcome. With different distributions of start-up costs the model is able to
generate dynamics that converge to different equilibrium policies in the long run and the-
refore could help us understand persistent cross-country differences in levels of investor
protection. Particularly, the model shows that higher inequality in financial dependence
leads to political outcomes with lower levels of investor protection sustained in the long
run.
To keep the analysis tractable I restrict myself to the study of distributions in the Beta
family. Notice that the Beta family encompasses a wide range of shapes for continuous
distributions on [0,1]. The two key moments that affect inequality are the skewness and
the variance. To isolate the effects of inequality on the political outcome, I consider first
distributional changes that are neutral under perfect investor protection. In other words,
I compare economies that have the same first-best steady-state level of capital but differ
in the start-up cost inequality as measured by Gini coefficient of the type distribution.
Then, in section 1.3.2.2, I discuss some changes in skewness and variance that imply
also a change in the economy’s first-best level of capital accumulation.
1.3.2.1 Inequality in Financial Dependence and the Equilibrium Level of Investor
Protection
It is convenient to use the Gini coefficient of the type distribution for measuring the
inequality in financial dependence because for Beta(α,β ) distributions it can be expres-
sed directly as a function of parameters α and β . Therefore, to obtain a parametrization
for the start-up cost distribution with a desired value for the Gini coefficient, we only
need to impose the condition that under perfect investor protection the level of capital
33
accumulation is the same as in the benchmark parametrization and solve for the values
of α and β .10 By varying a the values of the Gini coefficient we obtain distributions fea-
turing different shapes, which can be ordered in terms of the thickness of tails according
to the following definition.11
Definition 5. Let G(z) and H (z) be cumulative distribution functions of two Beta proba-
bility measures Γ and Λ on [0,1]. Γ has thicker tails than Λ if there exists x and y in (0,1)
such that for all z∈ [0,x] G(z)≥H (z), for all z∈ [x,y] G(z)−G(x)≤H (z)−H (x), and
for all z ∈ (y,1] G(z)−G(y)> H (z)−H (y).
More inequality (higher Gini coefficient) is generated by type distributions with thi-
cker tails, where the mass is less concentrated around the median. Given an initial stock
of capital K0, thicker tails imply two changes that directly affect the political equilibrium.
First, as can be seen in the upper left panel in Figure 1.4, the decisive voter is a relati-
vely lower cost type. Consequently, he relies less on external finance and his marginal
cost of selecting more distortionary policy is lower. Second, at any given level of inves-
tor protection, the mass of agents that could be excluded from entrepreneurship by an
additional marginal deterioration in investor protection is lower. Therefore, the increase
in price that could be obtained by the general equilibrium effect is lower, which means
lower marginal gain from selecting more distortionary policy. The upper right panel in
Figure 1.4 displays this general equilibrium effect by plotting dqdγ at γ = 0 against the
Gini coefficient of the start-up cost distribution. dqdγ is also decreasing in the Gini coeffi-
cient at any other γ > 0. Appendix I.2 provides some analytical results and more formal
discussion of these two changes.
Although the changes resulting from increases in start-up cost inequality affect the
decisive voter policy preferences in opposite directions, numerical experiments show
10The Gini coefficient can be expressed as Gini(α,β ) = α+βα
∫ 1
0 G(t;α,β ) [1−G(t;α,β )]dt. An alter-
native parametrization with Gini coefficient equal to a desired value χ can obtained by solving a system of
two equations in α and β : Gini(α,β ) = χ and κG
(
z?0;α,β
)
= κG
(
z?0;4,4
)
. Notice that the system may
not have solution for some values of χ . Particularly, numerical simulations indicate that it is impossible to
satisfy both equations for values χ > 0.25.
11Definition 5 is a variant of Definition 6 in Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2007).
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Figure 1.4 – Comparative statics with respect to start-up cost inequality, K0 = 0.13
that the decrease in the marginal cost of worsening investor protection is stronger than
the decrease in the marginal benefit associated with weaker general equilibrium effect.
Therefore, as can be seen in the lower left panel in Figure 1.4, in all my simulations more
inequality leads to a (weakly) lower investor protection (higher γt) being selected in the
politico-economic equilibrium.
Given that we now understand how the start-up cost inequality affects the politico-
economic equilibrium within a given period with a given stock of capital, we can study
how its influence is propagated through the dynamic evolution of the economy. In Fi-
gure 1.5 I draw comparative dynamics for four start-up cost distributions with Gini co-
efficient ranging form 0.05 to 0.25. We observe that economies with higher inequality
in start-up costs experience larger fluctuations in stock of capital and its price along the
transition path. Furthermore, the differences in the selected equilibrium policy that we
examined in the initial period, appear to be amplified in subsequent periods. This leads
to larger differentiation in terms of levels of investor protection in the steady state across
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Figure 1.5 – Comparative dynamics
economies.
Figure 1.6 complements the picture by providing comparative statics across long run
steady-states on a much finer grid of Gini coefficients in the same range.12 Comparing
the lower left panel in Figure 1.4 to that in Figure 1.6 we notice that that once the eco-
nomies reach their steady-states the range of values of the Gini coefficient for which
the political equilibrium features perfect investor protection γ? = 0 is much narrower.
This can be explained by the fact that in Figure 1.4 we considered a relatively low ini-
tial stock of capital, therefore wages were low and the average dependence on external
finance higher, which altered the policy preferences towards less distortionary policies.
As the stock of capital and wages grew over time, the policy preferences of the decisive
voter became more pro-distortionary leading to a larger policy differentiation among
economies with different degrees of start-up cost inequality.
12To generate Figures 1.4 and 1.6 I use one hundred different parametrizations for the start-up cost Beta
distribution. In Figure 1.5 only four of those parametrizations are displayed for readability.
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1.3.2.2 Uncompensated Changes in Skewness and Variance
In this section I study directly changes in the moments of the start-up cost distribution
without compensating for their effects on the first-best allocation. I focus on the variance
and the skewness. With either higher dispersion or higher skewness towards low cost
types the economy’s first-best level of capital accumulation rises because more agents
can produce the capital good at lower costs. It now becomes hard to make comparisons
between economies since it is not possible to rank them solely on the basis of a simple
measure of start-up cost inequality. However, it turns out that the effects of increases in
the variance or in the skewness on the politico-economic equilibrium are very similar to
those of increases in inequality when holding the first-best level of capital constant. To
understand this we first need to realize that Beta distributions with the same skewness
but different variance can be ranked in terms of the thickness of tails - higher variance
implies thicker tails. Moreover, Beta distributions with the same variance but different
skewness can be ranked in terms of the first order stochastic dominance - a distribution
37
with a lower skewness first order stochastically dominates a distribution with a higher
skewness. In Appendix I.2 I explain that with these alternative rankings the analysis of
the preceding section to goes through.
It is interesting to look at some examples in Figure 1.7, which compares the dyna-
mics of three economies : the benchmark economy (solid lines), one with higher variance
in the distribution of start-up costs (dotted lines), and one with higher skewness (dashed
lines). Looking at the upper right and at the lower left panels we can see that the economy
with a more skewed distribution converges to a steady state with lower investor protec-
tion but higher capital accumulation. The reason is that the first-best level of capital is
higher with a more skewed distribution. For the parametrization in Figure 1.7, this effect
is so strong that even when the decisive voter chooses the lowest investor protection,
γH = 1.8, the capital accumulation is larger than in the benchmark economy. Although
this result is in odds with the usual negative correlation between investor protection and
economic development, it is appealing since it could explain numerous observed excep-
tions from this relation.
Indeed, the investor protection literature may struggle with cases such that of France,
Belgium, and several other countries. In spite of bad institutions, these countries are
remarkably rich (La Porta et al., 1997, Levine et al., 2000).13 An interesting feature of
my model is that it is capable of delivering outcomes that mimic the experience of these
countries. When a large fraction of entrepreneurs faces relatively low up-front costs, the
capital good is produced more efficiently, which guarantees a larger first-best output. At
the same time, the decisive voter is less dependent on external finance and he prefers a
low level of investor protection. The combination of these two forces may give rise to
an equilibrium path in which a high level of aggregate output and a low level of investor
13According to World Bank’s Doing Business indicators, in 2006 France ranked 62 in protecting in-
vestors ; it shared this rank with several middle-income and low-income countries such as Algeria, Brazil,
Guyana, Jamaica, Malawi, Namibia, Oman, Sri Lanka and Turkey. It actually lagged a number of middle-
income countries, particularly in the Eastern Europe and South America, and even some low-income
countries such as Ghana, India, Madagascar and Nigeria. France also ranks badly in La Porta et al.’s
(1997) rating.
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Figure 1.7 – Comparative dynamics - benchmark (solid), high variance (dotted), and
high skewness (dashed)
protection occur at the same time and are sustained in the steady state.
At this point I would like to note that what essentially matters for the determination
of the level of investor protection is the distribution of dependence on external finance.
In my stylized model I have assumed that agents differ in business start-up costs and
the distribution of dependence on external finance has inherited the characteristics of the
type distribution. In reality there are also other variables that are likely to influence the
shape of the distribution of financial dependence among agents. For example, the distri-
bution is likely to be skewed towards high dependence in countries with high business
start-up costs, high regulation of entry (government licenses, fees, capital requirements
etc.), and generally poor population. Factors implying higher variance are high wealth
inequality among potential entrepreneurs, high prevalence of corruption, presence of
politically connected firms or groups with access to internal capital markets.14 To sum-
14Svensson (2003)presents evidence from micro-level data on Ugandian firms that there is considerable
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marize, heterogeneity in entry barriers and financial dependence determines the support
for investor protection reforms.15 There is a large literature emphasizing the negative ef-
fect of entry barriers on entrepreneurship (Desai et al., 2003, Klapper et al., 2006). This
paper shows how heterogeneity in entry barriers and in access to finance may also hurt
entrepreneurship.16
1.4 Empirical Implications
Previous sections have highlighted two key implication of my model : (i) improve-
ments in investor protection should follow periods of low growth, and conversely for
worsening of investor protection ; (ii) poorer investor protection should arise in econo-
mies with large heterogeneity in entry barriers or external financing needs. I now look at
some data to test the qualitative significance of these implications.
1.4.1 Timing of Reforms in Creditor Rights
Testing the first implication is difficult because of the lack of comprehensive time
series data on investor protection. A rare exception is the creditor rights index, construc-
ted by Djankov et al. (2007) for the whole interval 1978-2003 and for 129 countries.
There were 28 changes in the creditor rights index in 23 countries during the period
1978-2003. Fourteen of these changes correspond to an improvement in creditor rights
and fourteen to a worsening. I rely on these data even if the creditor rights index is only
a very partial measure for effective investor protection. While recognizing the shortco-
mings, I examine the relation between the changes in investor protection and the average
cross-firm variation in bribes that firms facing similar institutions need to pay. Faccio (2006) studies poli-
tical connections of firms in a cross-section of countries. She concludes that strong connections between
managers and politicians give the firm non-negligible advantage that is valued by shareholders.
15This suggests a link between political feasibility of an investor protection reform (financial law re-
form) and a barrier to entry reform (deregulation). Such an interaction is studied by Caselli and Gennaioli
(2008).
16A recent paper by Claessens and Perotti (2007) presents a review of empirical evidence that also
indicates that inequality in access to finance has negative effects on financial development and firm growth.
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annual growth of GDP per capita in the years preceding the reform.
For each observed change in creditor rights I compute the average annual growth rate
of GDP per capita, gi, over the i = 4,5,6 years preceding the reform. Then I consider an
ordered probit regression of changes in creditor rights on the average annual growth rate.
The use of the ordered probit method is justified by the fact that the changes in creditor
rights index correspond to additions or deletions of specific clauses protecting creditors
in the country’s law. Consequently, changes in the creditor rights score correspond to
categorical improvements (deteriorations) of investor protection rather than numerical
measures of how much the investor protection was changed. In the data there are two
categories of worsening in the creditor rights score, −1 and −2, and one category of
improvements in the creditor rights score, +1. In Table 1.II the coefficients in all regres-
sions are negative as predicted by the theory. However, only the coefficients of g4 and g6
are significant at the ten per cent level. Overall, I conclude that there is some evidence
that goes in the direction of the model. Limitations of the data available do not allow to
make the analysis more conclusive.
1.4.2 Inequality in Financial Dependence and Investor Protection
I now turn to the implication that poor investor protection should be observed in
countries with high inequality in financial dependence among entrepreneurs. To test this
implication, the most obvious approach would be to look at the correlation between va-
rious measures of investor protection and measures of inequality in financial dependence.
Unfortunately, one cannot easily obtain appropriate measures of financial dependence
inequality for any single country, much less for a broad cross-section of countries.17
An alternative approach is to realize that, although my model abstracts from wealth
inequality, if agents were heterogeneous in initial wealth, this would have exactly the
17A measure of financial dependence could be in principle constructed using firm-level data (similarly
to Rajan and Zingales, 1998), but it would not correspond well to the model. The reason is that it would
include only the actual entrepreneurs and not those who decided not to start a business because of being
financially constrained.
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Table 1.II – Creditor rights reforms and growth - Ordered Probit Regression
Dependent var. Change in creditor rightsa
g4b
−7.032?
(3.837)
g5b
−5.725
(3.800)
g6b
−7.704?
(4.702)
Estimated thresholds
α1
−1.418
(0.379)
−1.404
(0.382)
−1.381
(0.394)
α2
0.205
(0.249)
0.270
(0.252)
0.248
(0.254)
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.032 0.048
Log-likelihood −24.05 −22.84 −21.79
N. observations 28 26 25
All regressions include a constant. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ? significant at the ten per cent
level.
Data sources : a Djankov et al. (2007), b computed from World Development Indicators Online, World
Bank, accessed on August 20, 2009.
same effect as heterogeneity in start-up costs since it would generate heterogeneity in
financial dependence. I use estimates of wealth inequality in each country, which are
available from Davies et al. (2007), as a proxy for financial dependence inequality among
potential entrepreneurs. Obviously, the approximation is imperfect because not everyone
in the data is a potential entrepreneur.
Yet another approach is to focus on proxies for the heterogeneity in start-up costs.
Particularly, I view the level of the costs to satisfy the entry regulation (including moneti-
zed time of the entrepreneur), compiled by the World Bank according to the methodology
of Djankov et al. (2002), as the median start-up cost in the country. This start-up cost is
then interacted with factors that are likely to induce dispersion and inequality in treat-
ment. Particularly, I consider the interaction term with a corruption index as a (crude)
measure of inequality in start-up costs in a country.
I use the following measures of investor protection. Formal investor protection ( f ip)
is the sum of the anti-director and the creditor rights indices. These indices, which were
42
first constructed by La Porta et al. (1998), reflect presence of particular clauses pro-
tecting investors in the commercial and bankruptcy law. I also construct two additional
measures of effective investor protection : eip(1) and eip(2). Besides the anti-director
and the creditor rights indices, these additional measures include the rule of law index
of Kaufmann et al. (2008), which captures the quality of contract and law enforcement,
as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Eip(1) is based on multiplication of the
formal investor protection with the rule of law index as in Perotti and Volpin (2007),
whereas eip(2) is based on adding the rule of law index to the indices of formal investor
protection.18 Finally, I also consider the anti-self-dealing (asd) index of Djankov et al.
(2008b) that focuses on private enforcement mechanisms, and the efficiency of debt en-
forcement (ede) index of Djankov et al. (2008a). I believe it is interesting to consider
these measures because they are based on the study of a standardized case by law ex-
perts in different countries. They may then reflect the effective investor protection more
accurately. I normalize all measures of investor protection to the interval [0,1]. I try to
maintain as much as possible a direct time series correspondence between my measures
of investor protection and proxies for inequality in financial dependence. However, data
for some variables are not available for the years needed. In those cases I use the data
for the closest preceding or following year available. A detailed description of variables
and data sources can be found in Appendix I.3.
Figure 1.8 plots the measures of investor protection to the Gini coefficient of the
wealth distribution. In simple linear regressions the coefficients are negative and signifi-
cant at the five percent level, except in the regressions involving f ip and asd.19
It is interesting to check whether wealth inequality is still significant when control-
ling for the English common law legal origin - a well-known determinant of investor
protection. The results of regressions that include the common law dummy are reported
18I have verified that the results are robust to use of other constructions with different weightings of
the components of the effective investor protection measure. Eip(1) and eip(2) are representatives of two
basic groups of measures : one based on multiplication the other on addition of the rule of law index.
19I do not tabulate the results of the univariate regressions. The t-statistics used in the tests were calcu-
lated using robust standard errors.
43
ARG
AUS
AUT
BEL
CAN
CHL
COL DNK
ECU
EGY
FIN
FRA
DEU
GRC
HKG
IND
IDNIRL
ISR
ITA
JPN
KEN
KOR MYS
MEX
NLD
NZL
NGA
NOR PAK
PERPHL
PRT
SGP
ZAF
ESP
SWE
CHE
TWN
THATUR
GBR
USA
URYVEN
ZWE
Raw Correlation −0.150
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
fip
.5 .6 .7 .8 .9
Gini Wealth
ARG
AUS
AUT
BEL
CAN CHL
COL
DNK
ECU
EGY
FIN
FRA
DEU
GRC
HKG
IND
IDN
IRL
ISR
ITAJPN
KEN
KOR
MYS
MEX
NLD
NZL
NGA
NOR
PAK
PERPHL
PRT
SGP
ZAF
ESP
SWE
CHE
TWN
THATUR
GBR
USA
URY
VEN ZWE
Raw Correlation −0.390
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
e
ip
(1)
.5 .6 .7 .8 .9
Gini Wealth
ARG
AUS
AUT
BEL
BOL
BRA
BGRCAN CHL
CHN
COL
HRV
CZE
DNK
ECU
EGY
SLVFIN
FRA
DEU
GHA
GRC
HKG
HUN
ISL
IND
IDN
IRL
ISR
ITA
JAM
JPN
JOR
KAZ
KEN
KOR
LVALTULUX
MYS
MEX
MAR
NLD
NZL
NGANOR PAK
PAN
PER
PHL
POL
PRTROM RUS
SGP
SVK
ZAF
ESP LKA SWE
CHE
TW
THA
TUN
TURUGA
UKR
GBR
USA
URY
VEN
ZWE
Raw Correlation −0.060
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
a
sd
.5 .6 .7 .8 .9
Gini Wealth
ALB
DZA
ARG
ARM
AUS
AUT
BLR
BEL
BWA
BRA
BGR
CAN
CHLCHN
COL
CRI
HRVCZE
DNK
DOM
ECU
EGY
SLV
EST
FIN
FRA
GEO
DEUGRC
GTMHND
HKG
HUN
IDNIRN
IRL
ISR
ITA
JAM
JPN
JOR
KAZ
KEN
KOR
LV
LBN
LTU
MKD
MYS
MEX
MAR NAM
NLDNZLOR
PAN
PRY
PER
PHL
POL
PRT
PRI
ROM
RUS SAU
SGP
SVK
SVN
ZAF
ESP
LKA
SWE
CHE
TWN
THATUN
TUR
UKR
GBR
USA
URY
VEN
Raw Correlation −0.270
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
e
de
.5 .6 .7 .8 .9
Gini Wealth
Figure 1.8 – Investor protection and wealth inequality
in Table 1.III. The relation with wealth inequality is significant at the one percent level
for all measures of investor protection, except in the regression involving f ip (significant
at the ten percent level) and asd (not significant).
In the remainder of this section I validate the results with the alternative approach.
I use the interaction between entry costs and corruption as the independent variable.
Figure 1.9 shows the correlations between investor protection and the interaction of entry
costs and corruption.20 The coefficients in the simple regressions are all negative and
significant at the five percent level except in the regression involving f ip and asd (both
significant at the ten percent level). Table 1.IV checks the results while controlling for
the common law legal origin. The negative relation between investor protection and the
interaction term is significant at the one percent level in the regressions involving eip(1),
eip(2) and ede and at the ten percent level in the regression involving asd.
While recognizing possible weaknesses of my proxy variables I conclude that the
20In all these regressions two countries - Zimbabwe and Angola - were discarded as outlayers due to
unusually high entry cost. The regression results were heavily affected by this outlayer.
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Table 1.III – Regressions of investor protection
Dependent var. f ipd,g eip(1)d, f ,g eip(2)d, f ,g asdc edeb
Gini wealtha
−0.559?
(0.307)
−1.071???
(0.298)
−0.788???
(0.247)
−0.543
(0.341)
−1.305???
(0.413)
English legal origin dummye
0.227???
(0.043)
0.132???
(0.049)
0.148???
(0.037)
0.319???
(0.057)
0.237???
(0.055)
R2 0.433 0.300 0.362 0.381 0.227
F stat 13.89 7.79 8.98 16.03 13.10
F stat p-value 0.0 0.001 0.001 0.0 0.0
N. observations 46 46 46 72 82
All regressions include a constant. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ???, ??,? significant at 1, 5, and
10 per cent level.
Data sources : a Davies et al. (2007), b Djankov et al. (2008a), c Djankov et al. (2008b), d Djankov et al.
(2007), e La Porta et al. (1998), f Kaufmann et al. (2008), g Pagano and Volpin (2005).
Table 1.IV – Regressions of investor protection
Dependent var. f ipd,g eip(1)d, f ,g eip(2)d, f ,g asdc edeb
Cost of entrya
× corruptionh
−0.008
(0.005)
−0.0255???
(0.006)
−0.018???
(0.005)
−0.0164?
(0.010)
−0.046???
(0.008)
Common law dummye
0.188???
(0.037)
0.116???
(0.037)
0.128???
(0.029)
0.315???
(0.052)
0.147??
(0.057)
R2 0.298 0.397 0.373 0.430 0.346
F stat 13.43 11.51 13.82 18.48 27.44
F stat p-value 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
N. observations 69 69 69 69 85
All regressions include a constant. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ???, ??,? significant at 1, 5, and
10 per cent level.
Data sources : a Davies et al. (2007), b Djankov et al. (2008a), c Djankov et al. (2008b), d Djankov et al.
(2007), e La Porta et al. (1998), f Kaufmann et al. (2008), g Pagano and Volpin (2005), hTransparency
International (2009).
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Figure 1.9 – Investor protection and Entry cost × Corruption interaction
evidence goes in the direction of the model’s prediction. The regressions reveal a sta-
tistically significant relationship between most measures of investor protection and the
proxies for the inequality in external finance dependence.
1.5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I analyze how investor protection is determined in a capital-accumulation
model with optimal financial contracts. The central idea is that imperfect investor protec-
tion acts as a barrier to entry into entrepreneurship for agents with high external finance
needs. Entrepreneurs that are less financially dependent favor imperfect investor protec-
tion because it increases the price of the entrepreneurially produced good, thereby raising
their profits. The level of investor protection selected in the political equilibrium is inver-
sely related to the inequality in external finance dependence among potential entrepre-
neurs. This result may explain why we observe low investor protection in countries with
high wealth inequality or in countries where high corruption induces unequal treatment
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of entrepreneurs. The political support for imperfect investor protection is also related
to the state of the economy. Imperfect investor protection is likely to emerge when en-
trepreneurs are wealthy and rely less on external finance. An interesting extension of the
present work that I leave to future research would be adding voluntary bequests between
generations. This would allow to endogeneize the evolution of the distribution of wealth
over time and generate a role for long-term contracts between financial intermediaries
and multiple generations of an entrepreneurial family.
CHAPITRE 2
FINANCIAL FRICTIONS, INTERNAL CAPITAL MARKETS, AND THE
ORGANIZATION OF PRODUCTION
2.1 Introduction
Conglomerates (firms under common ownership that operate in multiple industries)
and business groups (groups of legally independent firms that are linked together by
strong equity or family ties) account for a large fraction of corporate assets and business
activity in many countries. For example, Claessens et al. (2000) find that in five East
Asian countries (Hong Kong, Indonesia, South Korea, The Philippines, and Thailand)
the largest 15 business family groups control over 30 percent of listed corporate assets.
Conglomerates and business groups are, in general, more important in East Asia com-
pared to Europe and the United States. However, several empirical studies indicate that
they are important in the latter countries as well. For example, in a study on European
countries Faccio and Lang (2002) document that the top 15 family groups control more
than 30 percent of listed corporate assets in Belgium, France, Portugal, and Switzerland.
In the US and Canada conglomerates are not numerous, but they tend to be very large.
Using detailed plant-level data, Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) find that 12 percent of
firms in US manufacturing industries were conglomerates and that they accounted for
around 75 percent of the total value of shipments in the 1980s. Similarly, in the third
chapter of this thesis, I document that in Canadian manufacturing over the period 1997-
2006 conglomerates accounted for around 19 percent of plants, 8 percent of firms, 75
percent of the total value of shipments, and 71 percent of the total value added.
Given the economic weight of these diversified entities, it seems important to un-
derstand their role in the cross-firm allocation of inputs and production outcomes, the
determination of the aggregate share of entrepreneurship, the average size and producti-
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vity of plants, as well as their implications for aggregate macroeconomic variables. Why
does business conglomeration emerge ? Why are diversified groups predominant in some
countries and not in others ? What are the consequences of business groups for resource
allocation ? What is the impact on economic development ?
In order to address these questions I examine the view that business groups substi-
tute for missing or imperfect markets. More specifically, I develop a model in which
conglomeration allows firms to partially avoid external credit market imperfections,
and evaluate its capacity to generate quantitative implications that are consistent with
empirical stylized facts on on the organization of production and cross-country diffe-
rences in the presence of business groups. My model embeds business group formation
into an otherwise standard heterogeneous agent model of entrepreneurship with credit
constraints such as Cagetti and De Nardi (2006). Agents of differing abilities and wealth
decide whether to be workers or become entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs choose whether
to operate a stand-alone (single-segment) business firm, or to become part of a diversi-
fied business group (conglomerate). Because of credit market frictions, only wealthier
individuals have full access to external finance. Business groups emerge endogenously
as a way for firms to create an internal credit market, reducing their reliance on external
funds. Internal capital markets also allow entrepreneurs to reallocate the available capital
across group firms more efficiently.
I calibrate the model to match some key observations regarding the importance of
entrepreneurship, and overall wealth and earnings inequality. The model performs rela-
tively well in reproducing some of the salient features of the cross-sectional distribution
of production size. Particularly, through internal reallocation of capital, conglomeration
can generate concentration of the affiliated projects in large size categories. The model
is also able to reconcile a seemingly contradictory finding in empirical corporate finance
literature that plants in conglomerates tend to be on average more productive than those
in stand-alone firms (Schoar, 2002), but this relation is inversed if we control for pro-
duction size (Maksimovic and Phillips, 2002). The model shows that highly productive
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plants are more likely to select into conglomerates, hence the positive unconditional rela-
tion between conglomeration and productivity. On the other hand, because conglomera-
tion relaxes credit constraints, a mass of highly productive plants that are constrained to
operate on any given sub-optimal size is lower among conglomerates than among stand-
alone firms. Therefore, conditional on most production sizes, except very high ones,
the average productivity of plants in conglomerates is lower than in stand-alone firms.
These results are in line with new detailed empirical evidence on size and productivity
of diversified and focused firms presented in the third chapter of this thesis.
In quantitative experiments I show that more severe credit market frictions lead to
a higher degree of conglomeration in the economy. The reason is that internal markets
are more profitable in environments with higher frictions in the external markets. Va-
rying the credit frictions can generate differences in the presence of business groups that
are broadly consistent with the cross-country empirical evidence. Another experiment
studies the effects of conglomeration on economic development. Conglomeration leads
to better allocation of capital but also, via general equilibrium effects, makes external
finance and labor more expensive. Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006a) argue that business
groups improve aggregate capital allocation and lead to a higher equilibrium level of
aggregate output when external capital market frictions are severe, but worsen the aggre-
gate capital allocation and lead to a lower aggregate output when capital market frictions
are moderate. However, their three-period model is very stylized and does not allow any
quantitative conclusions. I revisit their question and find that the negative general equili-
brium effects tend to be quantitatively small and, compared to a model without business
groups, endogenous conglomeration leads to higher steady state levels of entrepreneur-
ship, aggregate capital, and aggregate output per capita for realistic parametrizations of
my model.
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2.1.1 Related Literature
Business groups, conglomerates, and corporate diversification have received some
attention in the corporate finance and industrial organization literature. Existing theore-
tical papers provide essentially three different explanations for business conglomeration.
First, several papers argue that business groups emerge as a way to enhance control
rights of group insiders and expropriate outside investors.1 In these studies conglomera-
tion creates additional layers of agency problems between the headquarters and divisio-
nal managers that lead to divisional rent-seeking and inefficient investment. Other papers
view diversification as an optimal response of firms to industry or technological shocks.2
Here firms diversify to take advantage of economies of scale and to explore new produc-
tive opportunities. Finally, a third group of papers argues, like my paper, that business
groups arise as a way to substitute for missing or imperfect external markets. According
to these studies conglomeration creates an internal market that allocates efficiently re-
sources across diversified divisions (Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2006a, Stein, 1997). Dis-
crimination between the alternative theories is difficult since the stylized theoretical mo-
dels cannot be easily taken to the data. The empirical papers, on the other hand, mostly
focus on differences in the market valuation of conglomerates and stand-alone firms but
are silent about the underlying mechanisms that lead to business conglomeration.3
A rare exception that tries to close the gap between the theoretical and the empirical
literature is Gomes and Livdan (2004). They construct a model of corporate diversifi-
cation that is suitable for calibration and show that a theory in which firms diversify to
explore new productive opportunities generates some implications that are quantitatively
consistent with the empirical evidence. My paper follows this quantitative approach but
it differs from Gomes and Livdan (2004) in at least three important aspects. First, I exa-
mine a different theory of conglomeration in which credit market frictions play a crucial
1Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006b), Rajan et al. (2000), Scharfstein and Stein (2000)
2Gomes and Livdan (2004), Maksimovic and Phillips (2002)
3Berger and Ofek (1995), Khanna and Palepu (2000), Lang and Stulz (1994), Santalo and Becerra
(2008), Schoar (2002), Villalonga (2004)
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role. In my model businesses conglomerate to create internal capital markets and avoid
frictions on the external credit market through internal reallocation of capital. This idea
was first proposed by Stein (1997) and my paper puts it into a full-fledged dynamic ge-
neral equilibrium model. Second, in Gomes and Livdan (2004) "diversification" means
that a single firm (entrepreneur) simply initiates a new technology, whereas in my paper
"conglomeration" means that several previously stand-alone firms (entrepreneurs) create
a new entity, which pools their technologies and their internal finance. This is particu-
larly important in presence of credit constraints because when raising external finance
as a group the net worth of rich and less productive entrepreneurs can be used to colla-
teralize credit for more productive affiliated projects. While their approach corresponds
to a particular form of diversification by building a new project "on the green field",
mine can be thought of as diversification by acquisition or merger.4 Looking at US di-
versified companies we can find ample examples of diversification of both types, and we
should think of the two modelling approaches as complementary.5 Third, I introduce the
occupational choice decision into the model. This links endogenously the share of entre-
preneurship, business conglomeration, and credit market imperfections and allows me to
explore the implications of business groups from more macroeconomic perspective.
My work is also close to Basaluzzo (2006), who studies formation of entrepreneu-
rial teams in a heterogeneous-agent general equilibrium model in which entrepreneurs
face financial constraints. Similarly to a business group my paper, a team of two entre-
preneurs in that paper pools partners’ financial resources to achieve better financing of
a productive project. However, in contrast to my paper, Basaluzzo (2006) makes an as-
4Although in the model I cannot clearly identify an acquirer and a seller, each party receives a remu-
neration for its project’s technology as well as for its net worth. One can think of group formation as one
party "purchasing" an ongoing project of the other party a price that is bargained.
5The empirical study of Hubbard and Palia (1999) shows that the acquisition-merger view is particu-
larly relevant for the 1960s conglomerate merger wave in the US, and it may also be more suitable for
diversified business groups in emerging markets. Japanese keiretsus, Korean chaebols as well as Indian
industrial business groups tend to be collections of firms each with its own separate net worth and manage-
ment. For more detailed description of business groups in these countries see Hoshi et al. (1991), Khanna
and Palepu (2000), Shin and Park (1999).
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sumption that an entrepreneurial team is able to operate only one productive project with
a technology given by an ad hoc aggregation of the patners’ productive opportunities. In
consequence, the role of a team is reduced to ownership and profit sharing and his paper
cannot talk about diversification of firm’s productive activities. My work unifies what I
see as two crucial aspects of conglomerates and business groups. In my model, forma-
tion of business groups gives rise to diversification of firm’s operations across several
productive projects, which can be interpreted as firm’s expansion to other industries as
in Gomes and Livdan (2004). At the same time, projects in business groups benefit from
reallocation of financial resources via efficient internal capital markets, similarly to the
internal finance pooling in Basaluzzo (2006). There are at least two other differences
between my paper and Basaluzzo’s. The timing and the search for partners are different.
In Basaluzzo (2006) the decisions on the occupational choice and costly search for a
partner are irreversibly made before the resolution of uncertainty concerning returns to
entrepreneurial and working activities, while in my paper the occupational choice comes
only after this uncertainty is resolved and instead of costly search I assume that partners
are matched randomly. In consequence, in my paper there is not scope for risk sharing
through conglomeration. I abstract from the risk-sharing and costly search issues for
two reasons. First, it makes the model more transparent and allows to highlight the im-
portance of internal capital markets for allocative efficiency. Second, empirical studies
found no evidence that risk-sharing would be an important attribute of internal mar-
kets in business groups (Khanna and Yafeh, 2005). Lastly, Basaluzzo’s study focuses on
small businesses and features a competitive non-entrepreneurial sector to proxy for large
firms. While this substantially facilitates numerical solving of the model, it leads to the
counter-factual implication that the number of small entrepreneurial businesses increases
with economic development (see Gollin, 2008, Tybout, 2000). Without a recourse to this
simplification, my model is able to generate the fact that the number of establishments
is inversely related to the economic development, whereas their size is positively related
to economic development.
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My paper can be related to papers that study the role of mergers and acquisitions in
reallocation of resources. Particularly, Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) propose a theory
of mergers as waves of reallocation across plants. In their theory, mergers are a channel
through which capital flows to better projects and better management. Jovanovic and
Braguinsky (2004) study the selection of acquirers into the takeover pool. In contrast
to my paper, both of these works feature a competitive market for acquisition targets
without any matching frictions. This seems particularly suitable for studying mergers
of publicly listed companies and enables the authors to explain empirical regularities
concerning firm’s Tobin’s Q and the behavior of stock prices before and after acqui-
sitions. While I recognize that these mergers and acquisitions are an important part of
activities that lead to resource reallocation, I adopt a broader perspective of merger ac-
tivity, which includes sales of smaller private companies, divisions of enterprises, entre-
preneurial projects, and even sales of individual plants. In accord, I tie the implications
of my model to the empirical evidence from studies using plant-level data, and I focus on
implications on plant size and plant-level productivity instead of stock prices. I believe
that my approach with random matching of partners instead of competitive market for
targets is well adapted for thinking about such merger transactions for which there is not
necessarily a well organized public market. Moreover, both Jovanovic and Braguinsky
(2004) and Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) assume a linear technology with respect to
capital, therefore only the most productive project in the merged enterprise is operated
and the merger does not lead to diversification in firm’s production activities.
Finally, recent macroeconomic and economic development literature has devoted
considerable attention to studying the effects of misallocation of resources across firms
and productive plants and its effects on aggregate economic outcomes (Alfaro et al.,
2008, Banerjee et al., 2003, Buera et al., 2009, Hsieh and Klenow, 2009, Restuccia and
Rogerson, 2008). While internal reallocation of resources inside conglomerate firms or
business groups is likely to play an important role in the determination of the extent and
the effects of misallocation, it turns out that it has not received any specific attention
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in that literature. In this paper I make a contribution by incorporating some insights on
business conglomeration from the corporate finance literature to a well-articulated ma-
croeconomic model similar to those used for studying the effects of misallocation on
economic development.
2.2 Empirical Evidence
This section summarizes several stylized facts found in the empirical literature against
which my model will be evaluated. These stylized facts come essentially from two types
of empirical studies. First, studies on US and Canadian conglomerates using high-quality
plant-level data provide evidence on relative production size and productivity of firms.
Second, studies from other countries provide evidence on cross-country differences in
the importance of business groups and its link to financial development. Unfortunately,
the latter studies are constrained to use substantially lower-quality and coarser firm-level
data.
2.2.1 Evidence from the US and Canada
2.2.1.1 Distribution of Production Size
The facts on the distribution of relative production size in the US are taken from
Maksimovic and Phillips (1998) and Maksimovic and Phillips (2002). They use detailed
plant-level data on manufacturing sector producers contained in the Longitudinal Re-
search Database (LRD) maintained by the US Bureau of Census. Their unit of analysis
is a firm-segment. A firm-segment is constructed by aggregating the firm’s plant-level
data at the three-digit SIC code, therefore representing a firm’s operations in a given in-
dustry. In their analysis Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) exclude all firm-segments with
a value of shipments lower than one million of real dollars. Firms are then classified as
single-segment or multiple-segment. A firm is classified as multiple-segment (conglo-
merate) if it produces more than ten percent of its sales outside its main three-digit SIC
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code. The relative production size of a firm-segment is measured by the ratio of the
firm-segment’s total value of shipments to the industry median value of shipments.
In Table 2.I I also report distribution of relative production size of plants in Canadian
manufacturing. I constructed these statistics from plant-level data set from the Annual
Survey of Manufacturers (ASM) of Statistics Canada, which provides similar informa-
tion and data quality as the LRD database in the US. There are three differences with
respect to the statistics of Maksimovic and Phillips (2002). First, I report relative produc-
tion size of plants instead of firm-segments. Second, I impose a minimum value of ship-
ments requirement of 50,000 dollars instead of one million. In consequence, my sample
contains much more small-size plants and represents better the actual size distribution
of plants in manufacturing. Third, I use slightly different definition of a conglomerate. I
do not impose a minimum percentage of sales outside firm’s main industry requirement,
but I simply classify a firm as a conglomerate if it operates in more than one 4-digit
NAICS industry.6 For more details on the Canadian data, empirical facts on plant size
distribution and plant productivity see the third chapter of this thesis.
Table 2.I reveals several interesting facts about the distribution of relative production
size of plants and firm-segments. First, in both Maksimovic and Phillips’s sample and in
the Canadian ASM, the proportion of conglomerate firm-segments or plants is more than
two and half times higher than the proportion of conglomerate firms.7 This, together
with the fact that conglomerates account for around 75 percent of the total value of
shipments, points to the importance of multi-segment firms despite their relatively low
number. Second, conglomerate firm-segments and plants tend to be much larger than
those in stand-alone firms. The size distribution is skewed towards large sizes for the
6Another difference is that the Annual Survey of Manufacturers in Canada uses NAICS industry clas-
sification as opposed to SIC classification. However, save for few exceptions, 4-digit NAICS industries
concorde to 3-digit SIC industries.
7The proportion of conglomerate firm-segments in Maksimovic and Phillips’s sample is much higher
than the proportion of conglomerate plants in my Canadian sample. This is largely due to different sample
selection criteria. Particularly, Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) exclude from the sample large number of
smaller plants that have value of shipments lower than one million dollars, which tend to be plants in
stand-alone firms.
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Table 2.I – Distribution of relative production size
US firm-segmentsa Canadian plantsb
Conglomerate Stand-alone All Conglomerate Stand-alone All
Relative size Fraction of firm-segments % Fraction of plants %
<0.5 3.1 29.8 18.3 9.8 35.5 30.8
0.5-1.0 6.2 30.0 19.7 9.46 21.53 19.31
1.0-2.0 8.4 20.4 15.2 13.5 19.4 17.5
2.0-5.0 15.4 12.1 13.5 20.1 14.7 15.7
>5.0 66.9 7.7 33.3 47.1 9.9 17.7
All sizes 43.3 56.7 100 18.5 81.5 100
Nbr. of observations 13,817 18,122 31,939 45,828 202,491 248,319
Nbr. of firms 2,143 15,309 17,452 15,308 193,863 209,171
Proportion of firms % 12.2 87.8 100 7.3 92.7 100
Proportion
of value of shipments % 75.8 24.2 100 75.0 25.0 100
a Statistics are computed from Maksimovic and Phillips (1998) and Maksimovic and Phillips (2002). Statistics on the firm-segment
level are averages over the periods 1976-1978, 1981-1982, 1984-1988 and 1990-1991. For the firm-level statistics the information is
available only at the beginning of the decade (year 1980) and the end of the decade (year 1990). The numbers reported are averages
over these two years. Therefore, they need not directly correspond with the firm-segment-level statistics above.b Statistics computed
by the author from Canadian Annual Survey of Manufacturers. The sample spans period 1997-2006 with a minimum of 17,606
plants per year. For more information on the data and sample selection procedure see the third chapter of this thesis.
firm-segments and plants in conglomerates, but it is skewed towards rather small sizes in
the stand-alone firms. In the third chapter of this thesis, I establish that this observation
is robust to using different measures of size such as value added or employment and
controlling for plant age, as well as for industry and year fixed effects. In that paper I
also show that the firm-segment size differences come mostly from the intensive margin
(larger plants) rather than from the extensive margin (more plants).
2.2.1.2 Differences in Total Factor Productivity
Three recent papers study empirically the productivity differences between conglo-
merates and stand-alone firms. On the plant level, Schoar (2002) reports that plants in
stand-alone firms have on average lower total factor productivity (TFP) than plants in
conglomerates. This fact contrasts with the findings of Maksimovic and Phillips (2002),
who study firm-segment-level TFP. They find that, conditional on size, firm-segments in
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stand-alone firms are on average more productive than those in conglomerates, except for
the lowest size class. It may seem surprising that the two studies find qualitatively such
different results. One might suspect that there might be serious problems with the com-
parability of the results since the two studies use slightly different methodologies and a
different unit of observation.8 In the third chapter of this thesis we use a unifying and
coherent econometric framework to show that the reversion of the relationship between
conglomeration and productivity when controlling for production size can be robustly
found in the Canadian data. My model presented in this paper will provide a way to
reconcile both findings, however, the detailed discussion is postponed to Section 2.7.
2.2.2 Evidence from Other Countries
2.2.2.1 Sensitivity of Investment to Internal Finance
The investment of the firms affiliated with business groups is less sensitive to the
firm’s internal funds than the investment of stand-alone firms. This stylized fact is docu-
mented by Hoshi et al. (1991) for the firms affiliated with Japanese keiretsu groups, by
Shin and Park (1999) for the Korean conglomerates - chaebols, and by Perotti and Gelfer
(2001) for the Russian financial-industrial groups. This has been interpreted as suppor-
ting evidence for the existence of financial constrains, and for the fact that business
groups can help the affiliated firms to overcome these constraints. This interpretation
will be consistent with my model.
2.2.2.2 Presence of Business Groups and Investor Protection
If business groups are a way to address external capital market imperfections, they
should be prevalent in environments where these imperfections are high. One way to
measure these imperfections is to look at indicators of investor protection. Figure 2.1
plots the proportion of group-affiliated firms and effective investor protection index in a
8In Schoar (2002) the unit of observation is a plant, whereas in Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) it is a
firm-segment.
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Figure 2.1 – Conglomeration and investor protection
cross-section of countries. The data on group affiliation in other countries than US and
Canada are from Khanna and Yafeh (2005). For US and Canada the data points show the
proportion of affiliated firm-segments from Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) and from
our work presented in the third chapter of this thesis. It should be kept in mind that au-
thors use several country-specific definitions of group affiliation since it is hard to find a
unique definition that can be applied in different countries. The effective investor protec-
tion index is constructed by multiplying the sum of the shareholder protection index and
creditors’ right index (La Porta et al., 1998) by the rule of law index (Kaufmann et al.,
2008). Although the number of data points is limited, the figure suggests that groups tend
to be more present in the countries with lower investor protection ; the negative relation
is statistically significant at the ten percent level.
2.2.2.3 Development, Entrepreneurship, and Size of Establishments
Tybout (2000) and Gollin (2008) show evidence that in less developed countries
more people are entrepreneurs, and that they manage firms of a smaller size than in the
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developed countries. That is, the number of establishments is inversely related to the
economic development, whereas the size of these establishments is positively related
to the economic development. Simple models of entrepreneurship such as Cagetti and
De Nardi (2006) fail to generate this stylized fact. Particularly, they imply entrepreneur-
ship to be increasing with the level of financial and economic development. While there
are other papers that concentrate on this issue (see Gollin (2008) for a model specifically
designed to account for self-employment), my model’s implications are consistent with
the stylized fact.
2.2.3 Summary of Evidence
For convenience, this section summarizes the evidence presented above.
1. The distribution of relative production size of firm-segments and plants is skewed
to large sizes in conglomerates. It is skewed to small sizes in stand-alone (single-
segment) firms. Unconditional on firm type, the distribution of relative production
size of firm-segments is bi-modal with concentration of mass in both tails.
2. Unconditionally on plant size, plants in stand-alone firms have lower TFP than
plants in conglomerates. Conditionally on production size, plants in stand-alone
firms have higher TFP than plants in conglomerates.
3. The investment of the firms affiliated with business groups is less sensitive to the
firm’s internal funds than the investment of stand-alone firms.
4. The degree of conglomeration seems to be on average higher in countries with
lower investor protection.
5. The number of establishments is inversely related to the economic development,
whereas the size of these establishments is positively related to the economic de-
velopment.
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2.3 The Model
The economy is populated with a continuum of measure one of infinitely-lived risk-
averse agents. The consumption streams are valued according to
U ({ct}∞t=0) = E0
∞
∑
t=0
β tu(ct) ,
where the period utility function u(c) is strictly increasing, strictly concave and satisfies
the usual Inada conditions. Every period each agent is endowed with one unit of time
that he can either supply on the labor market or use to manage his own entrepreneurial
project. Leisure is not valued. The return to each occupational activity depends on the
agent’s working or managerial talent. The working and managerial abilities are denoted
by ζ and θ , respectively, and their logarithms are assumed to follow exogenous AR(1)
processes that are uncorrelated with each other.9 In each period the agents choose whe-
ther they will work for a wage or become entrepreneurs after observing their individual
ability shocks.
Production is carried out by entrepreneurs. As in Lucas (1978), an entrepreneurial
project necessitates three inputs in order to be productive : entrepreneur-managerial time,
capital k, and labor l. Entrepreneur i combines these inputs according to a decreasing re-
turns to scale technology yit = θit
(
kαit l
1−α
it
)ν
, where θit is the managerial ability. The
share parameters α and ν have values between zero and one. (1−ν) can be interpreted
as the span of control of the entrepreneur-manager. During production, capital depre-
ciates at rate δ .
The sole asset in the economy is productive capital. Consumers can save by accu-
mulating capital, which is then lent to the entrepreneurs at the interest rate r. Borrowing
to finance consumption is not allowed.10 Contracts between entrepreneurs and lenders
9I have also computed a version of the model with positive correlation between the ability processes.
The results stay qualitatively unchanged.
10Huggett (1997)makes a similar set of assumptions.
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suffer from imperfect enforceability, which limits the external financing of entrepreneu-
rial projects. Specifically, I assume that lender repayment can be enforced only up to a
fraction η of entrepreneur’s net worth a.
Besides accessing external funds in the credit market, entrepreneurs have the option
to create internal capital markets by forming business groups. A business group allows
the affiliated entrepreneurs to allocate capital among their projects internally, without
being subject to enforcement problems. For simplicity, and to keep the model computa-
tionally manageable, I consider business groups with only two members. The creation
of business groups occurs in the following fashion. After the occupational choice deci-
sion, the agents who have chosen to become entrepreneurs meet randomly in pairs and
observe each other’s managerial abilities and net worth. If two agents i and j meet, they
may form a business group. A business group consists of a headquarters and the projects
of the affiliated entrepreneurs. The headquarters pools the internal assets of the partners
and, eventually, raises additional funds on the external credit market. Then it reallocates
the total available capital between the affiliated projects as to maximize the group profit,
avoiding any enforcement frictions.11 I assume that conglomeration entails a fixed cost
γ . This reflects two things : first it is more costly to manage a business group because
of a complicated organizational structure. The simplest interpretation is to say that there
is a cost of creating and operating the headquarters. Eventually, there may arise addi-
tional agency problems between the headquarters and project managers (Rajan et al.,
2000, Scharfstein and Stein, 2000, and others). Although I do not model these agency
problems explicitly, γ can be thought of as a reduced form of the cost implied by these
additional agency problems. Yet another interpretation that may be advanced is the cost
of reallocating capital that is already installed in each project. Second, imposing a cost
of conglomeration may also be motivated by policy-related issues. For example, it may
be costly to establish a business group due to regulation of mergers, anti-trust laws, and
11The assumption is that the headquarters has the power to reallocate the total capital available as
opposed to only its part that has been raised on the external market. By forming a business group the
entrepreneurs agree to pass the control over their internal assets to the headquarters.
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policies imposing restrictions on the size of large firms.
I assume that the group profit is shared by the affiliated entrepreneurs according to
the Shapley value solution. Thus, each partner is rewarded according to his contribution
to the creation of group profits. Particularly, capital provision and managerial talent (or
technology) provision are both accounted for in the remuneration. In this aspect a busi-
ness group acts as an internal capital market, but it also acts as an imperfect substitute
for market for ideas and entrepreneurial assets.
The timing of events within each period is given by the following sequence.
1. Individual exogenous states (ζi,θi) of each agent are realized.
2. Agents choose their occupation. They cannot change the occupation in the sub-
sequent stages of the current period.
3. Entrepreneurs meet in pairs and observe their managerial abilities and net worth.
They choose whether to form a business group or not. Conglomeration necessi-
tates consent of both partners. At the end of this stage some entrepreneurs will be
conglomerated in a group while others will run stand-alone projects.
4. Entrepreneurs and business groups search external finance on the capital market.
Inside business groups the capital is allocated to the projects so as to maximize the
group profit.
5. Production takes place, wages and interests are paid, external capital is returned
to the lenders, profits are realized. In business groups the group profit is divided
between the partners according to the Shapley value rule.
6. Agents choose how much to save for future periods.
There are two assumptions in the timing that need to be discussed. First, the assumption
of within-period-irreversible occupational choice before business group formation takes
place. This ensures that only the agents who have already engaged their net worth in
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entrepreneurship may affiliate business groups. This seems realistic, in order to aspire
to merge with a strategic partner it is important that a project already has a label of an
active business.12 Second, I assume that business groups are dissolved at the end of each
period and formed anew the next period. This is a strong assumption. In reality, business
group affiliation is rather persistent. In my model, the high persistence of the managerial
ability shocks ensures that certain types of entrepreneurs tend to nearly always parti-
cipate in a business group. However, their business partners are constantly changing.
The assumption is necessary to maintain the complexity of the model manageable. Were
groups allowed to operate for several periods, both group formation (or dissolution) and
the saving decisions of the partners would be the solution of a complex dynamic game.
The dynamic strategic interactions would arise since each partner’s decision rules would
have to be a best response to the other partner’s decision rules, together with the outside
option of staying alone and searching for a new partner in the next period. While these
matters are certainly interesting, they are very hard to deal with in a general equilibrium
framework and are thus out of the scope of this paper.
2.4 Competitive Equilibrium
In this section I define the competitive equilibrium. I start with the consumption-
saving problem and proceed to the occupational choice decision. Finally, I define the
profit maximization problems of stand-alone firms and business groups.
In the maximization problems bellow, the joint distribution over the individual states
Ψ is an aggregate state variable and in principle the agents need to know its law of
motion in order to predict future prices and eventual business partner’s type. However,
in this paper I am going to focus on the stationary equilibria in which prices are constant
and the distribution over individual states is invariant. All maximization problems can
12I have also solved the model with a modified timing in which the occupational choice occurs at
the same time as group formation. That allows any agent (as opposed to only committed entrepreneurs)
to enter into business groups. Results from that version are qualitatively similar, but the model is less
successful from a quantitative perspective.
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thus be written as being parametrized in the prices and the stationary distribution Ψ. To
increase readability, I do not include r, w, and Ψ in the arguments of value functions in
what follows.
2.4.1 Consumption-saving Decision
At the end of the period agents decide how much to save. Let V (ζi,θi,ωi) denote the
end-of-period value function of an agent with abilities ζi, θi and end-of-period assets ωi.
Let also W (ζi,θi,ai) denote the value function at the beginning of the period of an agent
who observed his abilities ζi, θi and who has saved ai from the last period. The value
function W (ζi,θi,ai) already includes the occupational choice decision, which will be
described in detail in the next section. The saving decision of agent i is then given by the
following Bellman equation :
V (ζi,θi,ωi) = max
a′i≥0
{
u
(
ωi−a′i
)
+βEζ ′i ,θ ′i ,W
(
ζ ′i ,θ
′
i ,a
′
i
)}
. (2.1)
2.4.2 Occupational Choice
At the beginning of the period, but after observing his working and managerial abili-
ties, the agent can either become a worker and invest his net worth ai in the credit market,
which will yield at the end of the period assets
ωWi ≡ ζiw+(1+ r)ai,
or he can choose to become an entrepreneur and use ai to finance his business activity.
In this case the amount of assets that will be generated at the end of the period de-
pends on whether the entrepreneur affiliates to a business group or not. Let ZSA (θi,ai)
be the indirect profit function when entrepreneur i operates as a stand-alone firm, and
ZGi
(
θi,ai,θ j,a j
)
the function that gives entrepreneur i’s share of the group profit when
i and j form a business group. These indirect profit functions come from static profit
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maximization problems that are described in the next section. The end-of-period assets
of entrepreneur i can be written as
ωEi j ≡max
{
ZSA (θi,ai) ,ZGi
(
θi,ai,θ j,a j
)}
+(1+ r)ai.
However, at the moment of deciding his occupation the agent does not know his
potential business partner and has to make a conjecture on the partner’s type. The expec-
tation is taken over the set of entrepreneurs B with respect to the invariant measure Ψ.
The occupational choice is then given by
W (ζi,θi,ai) = max
{
V
(
ζi,θi,ωWi
)
,E(ζ j,θ j,a j)∈BV
(
ζi,θi,ωEi j
)}
. (2.2)
Notice that due to the max operator, the value function W (ζi,θi,ai) need not be
concave in the net worth ai even if the value of working and the expected value of
entrepreneurship are concave in ω .13 Compared to a standard occupational choice pro-
blem without business groups, the value of entering into entrepreneurship becomes a
stochastic variable depending on the random match with a partner. Agents consider the
possibility of obtaining higher profits in a conglomerate if they meet a suitable partner,
but also the possibility that their profits may be lower if they are credit constrained and
have to operate their project as a stand-alone firm if the match is bad.
2.4.3 Profits and Factor Demands
Given prices, stand-alone firms and business groups decide how much of labor and
capital they will contract to maximize their profits. Business groups also decide how
to allocate capital to the affiliated projects. Entrepreneur i who meets entrepreneur j
contracts l
(
θi,ai,θ j,a j
)
units of labor and k
(
θi,ai,θ j,a j
)
units of capital. These factor
demands are the solution of profit maximization either for a stand-alone firm of entre-
13Dynamic models of occupational choice often feature such a non-convexity, see for example Bohacek
(2006), Gomes et al. (2001), Vereshchagina and Hopenhayn (2009).
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preneur i, or for a business group {i, j}. The profit maximization problems are static.
2.4.3.1 Stand-alone Entrepreneurs
A stand-alone project generates net profits according to :
ZSA (θi,ai) = max
ki,li
{
θi
(
kαi l
1−α
i
)ν − (r+δ )ki−wli} (2.3)
subject to
(1+ r)(ki−ai)≤ ηai.
The borrowing constraint says that the repayment must be lower than a fraction η of
the entrepreneur’s net worth. The parameter η determines the tightness of the borrowing
constraint. When η is low some entrepreneurs are constrained to implement their project
in a sub-optimal size. The dependence of the credit contracts on the entrepreneurial
net worth prevents the external capital to be allocated optimally among all productive
projects.
2.4.3.2 Business Groups
In this paper I focus on the role of internal capital markets inside the business groups.
To analyse the working of these internal markets as clearly as possible, I assume away
economies of scale and ability spill-overs or other externalities created through joint
group management. Each project is still attached to a particular entrepreneur-manager,
only capital may be reallocated among the affiliated projects. A business group that
disposes with managerial abilities θi and θ j and total net worth a generates net profits
according to :
ZG
(
θi,θ j,a
)
= max
ki,lik j,l j
{
θi
(
kαi l
1−α
i
)ν
+θ j
(
kαj l
1−α
j
)ν − γ
−(r+δ )(ki+ k j)−w(li+ l j)} (2.4)
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subject to
(1+ r)
(
ki+ k j−a
)≤ ηa.
γ is the (fixed) cost of conglomeration. A business group acts as a single entity when
going to the external capital market and the credit constraint applies on the group level
(total of external funds raised that depends on the total of internal finance available) and
not on the each affiliated project level.
Group profit is shared according to the Shapley value solution. Each partner is paid
the average of his marginal contributions to the creation of group profit.14 Partner i ob-
tains
ZGi
(
θi,ai,θ j,a j
)
=
1
2
[
ZG
(
θi,θ j,ai+a j,
)−ZSA (θ j,a j)+ZSA (θi,ai)] . (2.5)
A business group is feasible if the profit that each partner could obtain as a stand-alone
entrepreneur is lower than his remuneration from the business group. This is guaranteed
whenever
ZG
(
θi,θ j,ai+a j
)≥ ZSA (θi,ai)+ZSA (θ j,a j) . (2.6)
In that case the business group formation is a convex cooperative game and the Shapley
value is included in the core of that game.
Notice that because conglomeration is costly, efficiency dictates that there would
be no business groups if the credit market was perfect. Without borrowing constraints,
the external capital market would ensure equalization of marginal product of capital
across stand-alone firms. However, in presence of borrowing constraints the production
size of each project is linked to the amount of internal finance that acts as a collateral.
Consequently, some very productive projects have to be operated on an sub-optimal scale
if the entrepreneur is poor. In this environment, a possibility of forming a business group
14Because I allow only for two-member groups the Shapley value solution is particularly simple and
identical to the generalized Nash bargaining solution with equal bargaining powers. I consider the Shapley
value since it allows to think of business group formation as a cooperative game with a specific surplus-
sharing rule. This interpretation seems to me better suited and more micro-founded.
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and reallocating capital internally may generate large gains. Inside the business group
the most productive project receives most of capital and its credit constraint is eased,
possibly on expense of tightening it for the less productive project. This corresponds to
"winner picking and looser sticking" (Stein, 1997) and leads to more efficient allocation
of capital. Of course, it follows that a necessary condition for group formation is that
at least one of the affiliated projects would be credit constrained were it operated as a
stand-alone firm. The gain from conglomeration rises with the net worth - productivity
mismatch of the affiliated entrepreneurs. It is highest when a poor high-productivity type
meets a rich low-productivity type.
I now provide a formal definition of the equilibrium.
Definition 6. A stationary equilibrium is an invariant joint distribution of types over
the individual states Ψ, prices r and w, set of entrepreneurs B, indirect profit func-
tions ZSA (θ ,a), ZG (θm,θn,a), and ZGm (θm,am,θn,an), and associated allocation func-
tions k (θm,am,θn,an), l (θm,am,θn,an) for m,n ∈ B, and value functions V (ζi,θi,ωi)
and W (ζi,θi,ai) together with the associated saving decision rule g(ζi,θi,ωi) such that :
• Given the distribution Ψ, and the prices r and w, the indirect profit functions and
allocation functions solve (2.3), (2.4) and (2.5).
• Given the distribution Ψ, and the prices r and w, the value functions and the deci-
sion rule solve (2.1) and (2.2).
• Given the distribution Ψ, and the prices r and w, the set of entrepreneurs is B ={
(ζi,θi,ai) : V
(
ζi,θi,ωWi
)≤ E(ζ j,θ j,a j)∈BV (ζi,θi,ωEi j)}.
• Labor market clears
∫
m∈B
∫
n∈B
l (θm,am,θn,an)dΨdΨ=
∫
ζidΨ−
∫
m∈B
ζmdΨ.
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• Capital market clears
∫
m∈B
∫
n∈B
k (θm,am,θn,an)dΨdΨ=
∫
aidΨ.
• Consumption good market clears
∫
[ωi−g(ζi,θi,ωi)]dΨ=
∫
m∈B
∫
n∈B
ym−δk (θm,am,θn,an)dΨdΨ
−
∫
m∈B
∫
n∈B
1[{m,n}]
γ
2
dΨdΨ,
where 1[{m,n}] is an indicator function, which equals one if {m,n} form a business
group and zero otherwise.
• The invariant distribution Ψ is generated by the exogenous ability processes toge-
ther with the agents decision rules.
2.5 Analysis
2.5.1 Occupational Choice
Given working and managerial abilities, the expected value of each occupation de-
pends on the agent’s net worth ai. The occupational choice decision can then be charac-
terized by a simple cut-off rule : an agent becomes an entrepreneur if his net worth is
higher than a threshold a¯(ζi,θi), which is the solution of
V
(
ζi,θi,ωWi |ai=a¯(ζi,θi)
)
= E(ζ j,θ j,a j) j∈BV
(
ζi,θi,ωEi j |ai=a¯(ζi,θi)
)
.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the threshold a¯(ζi,θi) for two values of ζi and ten values of θi.15
For some combinations of abilities such a threshold may not exist. Particularly, for some
15Figure 2.2 is constructed using the benchmark calibration that is detailed in Section 6. Qualitative
conclusions are unchanged for alternative calibrations.
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Figure 2.2 – Occupational choice
agents, becoming entrepreneur is never profitable enough to guarantee them an expec-
ted value of entrepreneurship higher than the value of working for wage. The threshold
a¯(ζi,θi) is increasing in the working ability ζi, and decreasing in the managerial ability
θi. This follows directly from monotonicity of V (ζi,θi,ωi) in ωi, which is guaranteed by
the assumption of strictly increasing utility function. Intuitively, for any given net worth,
higher ζi increases the value of working for wage. On the other hand, higher θi makes
entrepreneurship profitable even on a smaller scale.
2.5.2 Conglomeration
To gain more intuition on the selection of entrepreneurs into business groups I would
like to represent the conglomeration decision in the space of state variables. Given prices,
four individual state variables are relevant for the decision : each partner’s managerial
ability, θi and θ j, and each partner’s net worth, ai and a j, respectively. Since the gain
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from conglomeration depends crucially on the net worth-productivity mismatch between
the two partners, let us first fix the total amount of net worth available to the group at
a. Now assume that partner i’s net worth accounts for share φ of this total net worth,
therefore ai = φa and a j = (1−φ)a. For a given φ and a, I can plot curves in the
(
θi,θ j
)
space along which the joint group profit equals the sum of profits if the two projects were
operated as stand-alone firms. More formally, I draw the set of couples
(
θi,θ j
)
satisfying
the following equation
ZG
(
θi,θ j,a
)
= ZSA (θi,φa)+ZSA
(
θ j,(1−φ)a
)
.
Refer to Figure 2.3. Each panel depicts such curves for φ = 0.3, 0.5 and 0.9, respectively,
and a 45-degree dotted line. The curves represent matches in which both entrepreneurs
are indifferent between operating in a business group or as stand-alone firms. The curves
divide the space into three regions. Regions labeled with C represent the set of matches
that lead to conglomeration. The points in the SA region correspond to matches that will
be operated as two stand-alone firms. The shape of the curves is related to the fixed cost
of conglomeration. Particularly, if both partners have managerial ability lower than some
threshold, no internal reallocation will make enough gains to compensate for the fixed
cost γ , and entrepreneurs will operate stand-alone firms.
Now concentrate on the middle panel of the figure. It plots the conglomeration de-
cision when both partners have the same amount of net worth (φ = 0.5). In this case
the 45-degree line is never in the C-region. This is intuitive since there are no possible
gains from internal capital reallocation if both partners are of exactly the same type. The
C-regions are located in the opposing corners, where the partners are heterogeneous en-
ough in managerial abilities. Because capital is reallocated efficiently inside a business
group, the more productive entrepreneur will operate his project on a larger scale. From
this fact we can identify the internal flows of capital. In the upper left C-region capi-
tal is reallocated from entrepreneur i to entrepreneur j, and in the lower right C-region
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Figure 2.3 – Conglomeration decision : left φ = 0.3, middle φ = 0.5, right φ = 0.9
capital flows in the opposite direction. This interpretation applies to the other panels of
the figure as well. The only difference is that as φ increases (decreases) the indifference
curves shift down (up) and to the right (left). The intuition is that with more net worth
inequality among the partners (further φ is from 0.5), less productivity inequality is ne-
cessary to find a profitable reallocation of capital through conglomeration. Eventually, a
portion of the 45-degree line will cross one of C-regions as in the right panel (φ = 0.9)
in Figure 2.3. The points in the upper left C-region that are below the dotted line are
the matches in which a relatively wealthy entrepreneur i conglomerates with a relatively
poor entrepreneur j, who also has lower managerial ability. However, the conglomera-
tion is profitable, because the difference in marginal products of capital is high enough,
and the internal flow of capital goes from i to j so that the marginal products are equali-
zed. In conclusion, matches that lead to conglomeration must feature either high enough
differences in managerial abilities of the partners or high enough differences in the part-
ners’ net worth. The analysis stays qualitatively the same for different values of the total
assets available to the group a, only the indifference curves shift closer to each other as
a increases.
A direct implication of the efficient internal capital reallocation is that the model is
consistent with the stylized fact number three : the investment of the projects in business
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groups is less sensitive to the entrepreneur’s internal finance, because the partner’s net
worth can make up for the missing collateral.
2.6 Calibration
2.6.1 Functional Forms
For the period utility function I choose the constant elasticity of substitution form
u(c) =
c1−σ −1
1−σ .
Logarithms of the working and managerial abilities are assumed to follow independent
exogenous stochastic AR(1) processes with persistence ρζ and ρθ , and variance σζ and
σθ , respectively. I approximate the AR(1) processes with first order Markov chains using
two states for the working ability and ten states for the managerial ability. The approxi-
mation is computed using the technique of Tauchen and Hussey (1991). The mean of the
working ability is normalized to one, whereas the mean of the managerial ability µ is
calibrated jointly with other parameters to match selected moments in the US data.
2.6.2 Parametrization
A set of parameters is calibrated using standard practice in the macroeconomic li-
terature and evidence from independent studies. The inverse of intertemporal elasticity
of substitution σ is set to 1.5, the time preference parameter β to 0.87, and capital de-
preciation δ to 0.08 in line with the standard practice in the macroeconomic calibration
literature. Decreasing returns to scale parameter, ν , is set to 0.88. This is well within the
range of values used by recent studies on entrepreneurship (Burnside (1996) estimates it
to 0.92, Gomes and Livdan (2004) implicitly use a value of 0.95, Cagetti and De Nardi
(2006) calibrate it to 0.88, Amaral and Quintin (forthcoming) use 0.85, Gollin (2008)
sets it at 0.9, and Buera and Shin (2008) calibrate it to 0.82). Parameter α is chosen to
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match the aggregate capital income share by imposing αν = 0.33.
The remaining seven parameters, the persistence and variance of the ability pro-
cesses ρζ , ρθ , σζ , and σθ , the mean of the managerial ability process µ , the fixed cost of
conglomeration γ , and the credit enforcement parameter η , are jointly calibrated so that
the model approximately matches seven moments in the US data. These moments are :
the average Gini coefficient of the workers’ earnings in the Panel Study of Income Dyna-
mics (PSID), reported by Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) to be 0.38, the Gini coefficients of
the workers’ and entrepreneurs’ wealth in the PSID of 0.73 and 0.69 as reported by Bo-
hacek (2006), the average exit rate from entrepreneurship of 24.2% reported by Quadrini
(2000), the proportion of entrepreneurs defined as active business owners in the Survey
of Consumer Finances of 11.5% reported by Cagetti and De Nardi (2006), the average
proportion of firm-segments affiliated with conglomerates of 0.43 from Maksimovic and
Phillips (2002), and the average fraction of external financing of 0.54 obtained by di-
viding the sum of credit market liabilities of the private sector by the aggregate capital
stock of this sector (this moment is taken from Buera and Shin (2008)). Tables 2.II and
2.III summarize the baseline calibration and the moments matched.
2.7 Results
I simulate the model and I use the artificial model-generated data to produce statistics
that can be compared to the empirical evidence. In my model each project corresponds
to one firm-segment but also to one plant. In other words, in the model all firm-segments
have exactly one plant. In consequence, if the aggregation of plant-level observations
to the firm-segment level in the real-world data is not affected by strong composition
effects, the statistics from the model should be comparable to the empirical evidence on
both firm-segment and plant level. In what follows I use a generic term “establishment”
to refer to either a firm-segment or a plant and I compare the model to empirical facts
for US firm-segments as well as Canadian plants.
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Table 2.II – Baseline calibration
Parameter Description Value
σ Inverse of intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1.5
β Discount rate 0.87
δ Depreciation rate 0.08
ν Variable factors output share 0.88
α Capital share in the output to variable factors 0.378
ρζ Persistence of the working ability process 0.98
ρθ Persistence of the managerial ability process 0.92
σζ Variance of the working ability process 0.5
σθ Variance of the managerial ability process 0.04
µ Mean of the managerial ability process 0.5
γ Fixed cost of conglomeration 0.5
η Enforcement of credit contracts 3.0
Table 2.III – Moments matched
Moment Data Model
Gini workers’ earnings 0.38 0.30
Gini workers’ wealth 0.73 0.58
Gini entrepreneurs’ wealth 0.69 0.51
Exit rate from entrepreneurship 0.24 0.23
Proportion of entrepreneurs 0.11 0.10
Proportion of conglomerate firm-segments 0.43 0.41
Proportion of external financing 0.54 0.52
76
2.7.1 Production Size Distribution
In this section I look at the equilibrium distribution of production size that is gene-
rated by the model and compare it to the stylized facts on this distribution mentioned in
Section 2.2. The stylized facts are established using the relative production size defined
as the value of shipments of an establishment divided by the median value of shipments
in the establishment’s industry. Since I do not model explicitly different industries, I de-
fine the relative production size in the model as the production of each project divided
by the median production in the whole cross-section of active projects.
Table 2.IV shows that the success of the model in reproducing the features of the
relative production size distribution is mixed. In line with the data, the model gene-
rates concentration of establishments in stand-alone firms in the low size categories and
some concentration of the conglomerated establishments in the large size categories. The
main discrepancy between the data and the model is that the model generates too much
establishments in the lowest relative size category. This problem is quite severe for the
conglomerated establishments.
The larger proportion of low size conglomerated establishments in the model can
be explained by the internal capital reallocation combined with the selection of group-
affiliated projects. Since inside a business group the capital is reallocated without any
frictions, the most productive project will receive most of the capital and the less produc-
tive project will be operated at a smaller scale. Thus, one of the affiliated establishments
will generally have a larger size than the other, but this still does not explain the large
quantitative difference in their size. To understand this difference quantitatively, we must
look at the selection of the projects that do conglomerate. Remember from Section 2.5
that conglomeration is most beneficial between partners with unequal net worth and
unequal managerial abilities. Because the gain from internal reallocation must be high
enough to outweigh the fixed cost of conglomeration, the entrepreneurs in the extremes
of the distribution of net worth and abilities are most likely to conglomerate. From ef-
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Table 2.IV – Distribution of relative production size
Conglomerate Stand-alone All types
US Canada US Canada US Canada
Relative size segments plants Model segments plants Model segments plants Model
<0.5 3.1 9.8 32.2 29.8 35.5 42.1 18.3 30.8 38.1
0.5-1.0 6.2 9.5 8.8 30.0 21.5 14.1 19.7 19.3 11.9
1.0-2.0 8.4 13.5 6.2 20.4 18.4 29.2 15.2 17.5 19.8
2.0-5.0 15.4 20.1 20.7 12.1 14.7 8.5 13.5 15.7 13.5
>5.0 66.9 47.1 32.2 7.7 9.9 6.0 33.3 16.7 16.7
All sizes 43.3 18.5 40.7 56.7 81.5 59.3 100 100 100
Relative Size in the data is segment’s value of shipments divided by industry median value of shipments. Relative Size in the model
is project’s production divided by the median production in the cross-section of all active projects. US statistics in the data are
computed from Maksimovic and Phillips (1998), and Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) over the periods 1976-1978, 1981-1982,
1984-1988 and 1990-1991. Canadian statistics are computed by the author from Canadian Annual Survey of Manufacturers over the
year 1997-2006. Details about Canadian sample can be found in the third chapter of this thesis.
ficient internal capital reallocation then follows that inside groups the high-productivity
entrepreneurs will operate their project on a very large scale and the low-productivity
entrepreneurs will operate their project on a very small scale, leading to concentration
of the mass of affiliated projects in both extremes of the size distribution. The data, on
the other hand, exhibit concentration of the conglomerated establishments only in the
large size category. This may point to existence of barriers to frictionless internal capi-
tal reallocation. As discussed in the introduction, I abstracted from the possible agency
problems inside the business groups that affect the relations between headquarters and
division managers. However, such agency issues may be relevant for explaining the dis-
crepancy between the model and the data. Particularly, some frictions in the internal
capital markets could limit free internal reallocation and impose minimum size require-
ments for each conglomerated project.
2.7.2 Productivity of Conglomerates and Stand-alone Firms
Here I relate the implications of my model to several recent papers that examine the
relation between plant or firm-segment total factor productivity and diversification. All
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papers ((Maksimovic and Phillips, 2002, Schoar, 2002) measure plant-level TFP as a
residual from a regression of the total value of plant’s shipments on production inputs.
Since in my model the factor shares are calibrated, I measure the project-level TFP using
a standard accounting approach. Particularly, in the model the logarithm of project i’s
production can be decomposed as :
lnyi = lnθi+να lnki+ν (1−α) ln li.
The measured TFP of project i is then equal to lnθi.
There are two remarks in order with respect to comparing the results on TFP in the
model to the empirical evidence. First, because in the model all firm-segments comprise
only a single plant, I cannot distinguish between plant-level and a firm-segment-level
TFP. The measured TFP in the model is thus best compared to the plant-level TFP in
the data, because there could be some composition effects in play while aggregating
the plant-level TFP to the firm-segment level. Second, the model features a two-factor
production function in which there is no place for intermediate inputs such as materials.
In consequence, the measured TFP is best compared to the estimates of TFP obtained
from a value-added production function.
Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) and Schoar (2002) estimate TFP from gross revenue
production functions. While Schoar (2002) reports results directly on the plant-level,
Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) construct firm-segment-level TFP as a weighted average
of plant-level TFPs over the plants within the firm-segment. In the third chapter of this
thesis, I estimate plant-level TFP from both gross revenue and value added production
function, perform a similar analysis as in Schoar (2002) and Maksimovic and Phillips
(2002), and check the robustness of results with respect to different levels of aggregation.
Fortunately, the main stylized facts seem to be robust to the differences in the level of
aggregation or in type of production function used to estimate TFP.
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2.7.2.1 TFP Differences Unconditional on Size
To examine the relation between average productivity and firm diversification Schoar
(2002) and our study presented in the third chapter of this thesis regress plant-level TFP
on the number of firm-segments in which the firm operates. Both studies find a signi-
ficant positive relationship, which means that the plants in the diversified firms are on
average more productive than those in stand-alone firms.16 Consistent with this evidence,
I also find a positive relationship when running this regression on artificial data obtained
by simulating my model. The positive relationship captures the selection of highly pro-
ductive projects into conglomerates. A disproportionally large fraction of projects that
end up in conglomerates have very high TFP, because the gain from internal realloca-
tion of capital towards these projects is likely to be high. This selection can be nicely
seen on Figure 2.4, which compares the distribution of TFP for the conglomerated and
stand-alone projects.
2.7.2.2 TFP Difference Conditional on Size
Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) find that, conditional on production size, conglo-
merated firm-segments have on average lower TFP than the stand-alone firm-segments.
This might seem in contradiction with the finding of Schoar (2002) and the results of the
previous section. However, in the third chapter of this thesis I show that when running
a regression of TFP on conglomeration dummy in the Canadian data set, we can find a
positive coefficient unconditionally on production size, but a negative coefficient if we
do condition on production size. Moreover, from the statistics reported in Maksimovic
and Phillips (2002) one can actually infer, with a simple calculation, the unconditional
means of TFP for the segments in conglomerates and single-segment firms. Interestin-
gly, one then also finds that unconditional on size, the firm-segments in conglomerates
16In her alternative specifications, Schoar (2002) controls for the number of plants on the firm-segment
and firm level. This actually makes her results even more suitable for comparison to my model since it
compensates for the fact that I have only single-plant segments. However, she does not control for the
plant production size. The results in these alternative specifications are qualitatively same.
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Figure 2.4 – TFP distribution by firm type
are more productive than the stand-alone firm-segments. Therefore, the two results are
not incompatible. My model allows to understand some of the effects that can be in play.
If we run a regression of TFP on a conglomeration dummy and we control for the
project’s relative production size in the artificial data, we find, in line with Maksimovic
and Phillips (2002), a negative relation between TFP and conglomeration. Examining
more in detail the mechanisms of the model, we discover that the conglomerates are on
average less productive when controlling for size because they allocate capital from less
productive projects to more productive ones, eliminating the capital-productivity mis-
match. Figure 2.5 visualizes this effect. It gives the distribution of TFP for projects of
relative production size between 0.1 and 0.15 (left panel), and projects of relative pro-
duction size between 1.35 and 1.4 (right panel). For smaller production sizes, there is
less high-productivity projects constrained to operate at this size among conglomerated
firm-segments than among stand-alone firms. Consequently, the average TFP in these
size categories is lower among conglomerated firm-segments. For large sizes the com-
position effect goes in the opposite direction. However, it comes out that in the regression
the former effect dominates. This is because TFP is bounded from above and all projects
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Figure 2.5 – TFP distribution in given production size classes ; small size in the left
panel, large size in the right panel
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larger than a certain threshold have the highest TFP whether they are in conglomerates
or not. The model therefore suggests that the simple regression analysis hides impor-
tant details about the two opposing effects of the selection mechanism. Interestingly, in
the third chapter of this thesis, we look at the data more in detail and we find shifts in
the TFP distribution of plants in conglomerates with respect to the TFP distribution of
plants in stand-alone firms that are exactly in line with the predictions of the model.
Figure 2.6 depicts smoothing kernel estimates of TFP distributions from the Canadian
data. Effectively, among the plants in the first decile of the plant-size distribution, there
is more low-TFP plants in conglomerates than in stand-alone firms. On the other hand,
among the plants in the top 10% of the size distribution, there is more high-TFP plants
in conglomerates than in stand-alone firms.
Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) and some other studies that cite their paper broadly
interpret lower productivity of conglomerates conditional on size as evidence of their
low performance compared to the specialized firms. However, my results indicate that
one should be careful with making conclusions on performance of conglomerates based
on this finding, especially in presence of frictions in the external capital market. When
conditioning on size, the negative relation between TFP and conglomeration may ac-
tually stem from reallocation of capital towards highly productive projects inside conglo-
merates, which should have a positive impact on performance.
Another way to see the implications of internal reallocation on size and productivity
is to look at average production size conditional on productivity. Since in the model TFP
is discretized, we can easily plot the average relative production size and TFP for conglo-
merated firm-segments and stand-alone firms, what is done in Figure 2.7.17 We see that,
except in the highest productivity class, the average size of conglomerated firm-segments
is lower. This suggests that conglomerates channel the capital more aggressively from
low to the highest productivity projects than the external credit market.
One may be concerned with the fact that, due to selection, the underlying distribution
17In Figure 2.7 y-axis is scaled logarithmically.
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Figure 2.7 – Average production size and productivity
of internal funds is not the same for stand-alone and conglomerated projects. To address
this issue, I plot the hypothetical average size of projects that select into conglomerates
if they were forced to remain stand-alone. In that situation they would be constrained
to use only the amount of capital that they were able to raise with their own internal
funds. I call these averages "Reference" points, and they are depicted as black diamonds
in Figure 2.7. The Reference points closely follow the average size of stand-alone firms
except for the two most productive categories, where they actually emphasize even more
the internal reallocation towards the highest productivity projects. Clearly, this confirms
that conglomerates allocate capital more efficiently than stand-alone firms on average.
Their average performance, measured by profit creation or capital allocation efficiency,
should therefore be higher than that of single-segment firms in environments with fric-
tions in external markets. This finding is consistent with Santalo and Becerra (2008),
who find a conglomerate premium in industries in which information that is not veri-
fiable by company outsiders is important, and a conglomerate discount in industries in
which such "inside" information is not important.
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2.8 Quantitative Experiments
2.8.1 Credit Frictions and the Degree of Conglomeration
This section examines how the degree of conglomeration in the economy changes with
the severity of borrowing constraints. The implications of the model are then contras-
ted with the data. Specifically, I ask whether cross-country differences in the degree of
conglomeration tend to be associated with measures of investor protection (my proxy for
credit constraints) in the way predicted by the model.
Figure 2.8 depicts some comparative statics with respect to the enforcement para-
meter η . Lower enforcement, or, equivalently, more severe credit constraints, leads to
higher levels of entrepreneurship, higher degree of conglomeration, lower prices, lower
average output per firm-segment, and lower output per capita.18 The proportion of en-
trepreneurs in the economy is higher with tighter credit constraints because lower wages
and interest rates make the entrepreneurship profitable (compared to working for wage)
for types with lower managerial abilities. Notice that this mechanism endogenously re-
produces stylized fact number five - in economies with lower aggregate output there is a
higher number of active entrepreneurs operating lower scale projects.
Due to lack of quality data on conglomeration and difficulty to measure credit constraints
in a broad cross-section of countries, it is hard to quantitatively evaluate whether the mo-
del is able to generate differences in degree of conglomeration consistent with the data.
However, Figure 2.9 aims to give an idea on this issue. It plots the degree of conglo-
meration and an investor protection index normalized by its the level in the US. The
real-life data points are labeled by three letter country codes. The connected diamonds
correspond to model equilibria in which the enforcement parameter, normalized by its
level in the benchmark calibration, is equal to the relative investor protection on the x-
axis. The abscissas for the simulation points were selected to be equal to quintiles of the
distribution of relative investor protection. The model gets quite well the average degree
18Output is net of fixed costs of conglomeration.
85
1 1.5 2 2.5 3
0.09
0.1
0.11
0.12
% entrepreneurs
1 1.5 2 2.5 3
0.4
0.45
0.5
% of conglo segments
1 1.5 2 2.5 3
0.02
0.04
0.06
Interest rate
1 1.5 2 2.5 3
0.5
0.6
0.7
Wages
1 1.5 2 2.5 3
6
8
10
12
Average net output per firm−segment
η
1 1.5 2 2.5 3
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
Net output per capita
η
Figure 2.8 – Comparative statics with respect to credit constraint
of conglomeration of countries in the second, and third quintile of the distribution. The
evaluation out of this range is difficult due to low number of data points.
In any case, the reader should take all comparisons based on Figure 2.9 only as a broad
illustration. More precise conclusions are problematic since investor protection indices
are ordinal variables that are not suitable for quantitative comparisons, whereas the en-
forcement parameter in the model has a precise quantitative meaning and implications.
2.8.2 Restrictions on Conglomeration
In this section I look at effects of policies that raise the cost of conglomeration. In my
model conglomeration has two opposing effects on macroeconomic aggregates. First, for
any given prices, the internal capital markets reduce the misallocation of capital over the
productive projects. This allows highly productive entrepreneurs to operate their pro-
jects at sizes closer to their unconstrained levels and raises the level of entrepreneurship.
Second, via general equilibrium restrictions, conglomeration implies higher prices of
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Figure 2.9 – Conglomeration and credit constraints
production factors, which tends to reduce production size of all projects and the level of
entrepreneurship.
As mentioned in the introduction, my paper is not the first to study these effects.
Indeed, Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006a) speculate that the negative general equilibrium
effect may be dominant in environments with intermediate level of investor protection.
This would have important implications in terms of policies restricting conglomeration
such as merger and acquisition regulation. However, no work, in my best knowledge,
attempts to measure these effects quantitatively. To do such quantitative comparisons in
my model, I consider following three scenarios. A "No Groups" stationary equilibrium in
which conglomeration is prohibitively costly and no business groups emerge, a "Groups
Partial" perspective in which prices are held constant on their level in the "No Groups"
scenario, but in which the cost of conglomeration is as in the benchmark calibration, and
a "Group Benchmark" stationary equilibrium that corresponds to the benchmark calibra-
tion. The Groups Partial is an off-equilibrium scenario in which agents optimize, but they
expect prices and the joint type distribution to be as in the stationary equilibrium without
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groups. Although in this situation markets are not cleared and the resulting distribution
of wealth and production size is not invariant, this scenario can serve for evaluating the
direct effect of conglomeration separately from the general equilibrium effect.
Refer to Table 2.V. Comparing the Groups Partial scenario to the No Groups scenario
gives us some information on the direct effects of conglomeration. If the prices stayed at
the No Groups level, possibility of forming groups would raise entrepreneurship by 37%.
A possible match with a suitable partner makes entrepreneurship profitable for many
agents that would choose to work if they were constrained to operate their project alone.
The rise in entrepreneurship and the possibility to reallocate capital internally boosts the
aggregate demand for capital by 110%, and the aggregate output by 189%. The average
proportion of external financing decreases because internal capital reallocation allows to
circumvent the external credit markets to some extent. The agents also tend to save more
on average (increase by 6.5% in the saving rate) because of improved the prospects for
investing the savings efficiently through a business group partnership.
Off course, the numbers cited above look quite spectacular, but they correspond to
an off-equilibrium situation and illustrate only one part of the story. The second part are
the general equilibrium effects of conglomeration, which can be illustrated by compa-
ring the Groups Benchmark scenario to the Groups Partial scenario. In the former prices
adjust so that all markets clear and the joint distribution of wealth and abilities is statio-
nary. Higher prices of production factors (interest rate and wages go up by 51% and 7%,
respectively) make entrepreneurship less profitable inducing a 47% decrease in the pro-
portion of entrepreneurs. The same apply to aggregate demand for capital and aggregate
output. Relative to the Groups Partial scenario, they are lower, respectively, by 66% and
67%. The average proportion of external financing continues to decrease by 16%, the
reason being the higher price of external finance.
Put together, the direct and the general equilibrium effects compensate each other
resulting in a much smaller, but still significant, variation across the stationary equilibria
with and without groups. The equilibrium with business groups features a 25% higher
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Table 2.V – Aggregate effects of conglomeration
No Groups Groups
Statistic groups partial benchmark
Cost of conglomeration 1000 0.5 0.5
Interest rate 3.67% 3.67% 5.56%
Wage rate 0.56 0.56 0.60
Proportion of entrepreneurs 0.08 0.19 0.10
Proportion on conglomerate firm-segments 0.00 0.57 0.41
Aggregate demand for capital 1.83 5.68 1.93
Net output per capita 0.95 2.70 1.00
Net output per unit of capital 0.52 0.48 0.52
Net output per efficiency unit of labor 1.02 3.19 1.07
Average proportion of external financing 0.71 0.62 0.52
Average saving rate 0.46 0.49 0.48
No Groups refers to stationary equilibrium with prohibitive cost of conglomeration, Groups Partial refers to off-equilibrium scenario
in which prices are held constant at the No Groups level, Groups Benchmark refers to the stationary equilibrium under the benchmark
calibration. Net output is output minus fixed costs of conglomeration.
level of entrepreneurship, higher levels of capital accumulation and aggregate output (by
5.4% and 6.3%), and a lower level of external financing than the equilibrium without
conglomeration. This suggests that internal capital markets play quite important role in
allocating resources to their more productive use and that this beneficial effect outweighs
the negative general equilibrium effect. This result is in line with a recent study of broa-
der size-restricting policies by Guner et al. (2008). My analysis focuses on a particular
type of these policies that restrict conglomeration. However, an important caveat applies
since my analysis assumes away any ties between governments and business groups. In
several countries large diversified groups tend to be closely connected to the politicians,
which may sometimes lead to inefficient outcomes such as corruption, over subsidizing
of groups, or concentration of market power through state-granted monopoly rights.
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2.9 Concluding Remarks
This paper contributes to the literature studying conglomerates, business groups, and
allocation of resources in the economy. I consider the role of conglomeration in an eco-
nomy with financial frictions. In my model conglomeration arises endogenously as a
way for firms to partially avoid external credit market imperfections, and to reallocate
the available capital across affiliated projects more efficiently. The quantitative analy-
sis shows that this view of conglomeration is consistent with several observed styli-
zed facts on how production is organized across firms, on productivity differences bet-
ween conglomerates and stand-alone firms, and on cross-country differences in degree
of conglomeration. The model suggests that conglomeration may have a positive effect
on economic development through improving the allocation of capital to productive pro-
jects. Therefore, regulations restricting conglomeration may be potentially harmful.
I can think of at least three important points where my analysis may be improved.
First, I have abstracted from potentially important agency issues that may arise inside
business groups. Those are likely to limit the ability of the headquarters to efficiently
reallocate capital across projects. Integrating explicitly such issues into my model may
help to better reproduce the marked concentration of conglomerated firm-segments in
the large size categories. Such an extension, however, would require thinking more dee-
ply about detailed ownership and control structure of conglomerated firms and business
groups, which varies considerably even within a given country. Second, I have abstrac-
ted from business groups dynamics. Allowing for long-lived business groups may help
understand the observed persistence in group affiliation and the long-term interactions
among the affiliated firms. Finally, I have not considered the market and political power
that is often concentrated in the hands of large business groups. While the market power
considerations could help better understand market structure and innovation and pricing
behavior of firms, a political economy extension could shed some light on emergence of
subsidy policies, barriers to entry, or barriers to financial development.
CHAPITRE 3
SIZE AND PRODUCTIVITY OF SINGLE-SEGMENT AND DIVERSIFIED
FIRMS : EVIDENCE FROM CANADIAN MANUFACTURING
3.1 Introduction
Diversified business groups, conglomerates, and multi-industry enterprises are present
in almost every country. Often they are among the largest and the most widely known
firms in the economy - General Electric, Bombardier, Fiat Group, Mitsubishi, and Hyun-
dai all are internationally renowned. Anecdotal evidence suggests that in many countries
conglomerates account for a particularly large fraction of corporate assets and business
activity. Given the economic weight of these diversified entities, it seems that understan-
ding conglomerates should also be key for understanding several phenomena, which are
of interest for micro as well as macro-economists, such as the organization of produc-
tion, the cross-firm allocation of inputs and production outcomes, and the productivity
of firms. In this paper, I make a step in this direction by establishing several key facts
about size and productivity of plants in conglomerates and single-segment firms from
Canadian Annual Survey of Manufacturers and Canadian Business Register.
I first document that although in Canada conglomerates are not numerous, they do
play an important role in the Canadian economy. In fact, conglomerates represent about
18 percent of manufacturing plants but they account for around 70 percent of the ove-
rall manufacturing value added. This suggests that conglomerated plants are much larger
than plants in single-segment firms. To show some more detail, I provide new evidence
on establishment size distribution conditional on firms’ organizational structure. Parti-
cularly, I separately estimate size distributions for establishments in conglomerates and
in single-segment firms using non-parametric smoothing kernels. My results show that
the size distribution for plants that are part of diversified firms is shifted towards larger
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sizes compared to the size distribution for plants in single-segment firms. The result is
robust to different measures of plant size such as the value of shipments, value added, or
employment, as well as to controlling for selection of conglomerates into some specific
industries.
Is the larger size of plants in conglomerates justified by their productivity being hi-
gher than that of plants in single-segment firms or are they just overgrown and inefficient
dinosaurs ? To shed some light on this question, I estimate plant level total factor pro-
ductivity (TFP) using the estimation procedure of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) to correct
for the endogeneity of inputs bias. I compare the productivity of conglomerated plants
to the productivity of plants in single-segment firms. I find that conglomerated plants
are on average more productive than plants in single-segment firms, but this relationship
is reversed when controlling for plant size. The reversion of the relationship between
conglomeration and productivity when conditioning on size may seem puzzling. In or-
der to understand the mechanism that may lead to this reversion result, I examine the
empirical evidence in more detail. I show that in the data the reversion can be explai-
ned by a shift of the TFP distribution of large-size conglomerated plants towards higher
productivity levels compared to the TFP distribution for single-segment firm plants of si-
milar size and a shift of the TFP distribution of small-size conglomerated plants towards
lower productivity levels compared to the TFP distribution for single-segment firm plants
of similar size. I argue that this evidence supports the theory of efficient internal reallo-
cation of resources inside conglomerates in presence of frictions on the external markets
as proposed by Stein (1997) and taken to a general equilibrium framework in the second
chapter of this thesis. An important implication of that theory is that a very productive
plant should be operated on a larger size if it is a part of a conglomerate than if it is a
part of a single-segment firm. The intuition is that in presence of frictions that limit the
allocative efficiency of external markets, conglomerates have better ability to channel re-
sources to their most productive use via internal reallocation among their divisions. This
mechanism induces a higher selection of highly productive plants into large size cate-
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gories in conglomerates than in single-segment firms. In line with my empirical finding,
plants in conglomerates will then be on average less productive in small size categories,
whereas in the large size categories they will be on average more productive than their
single-segment firm counterparts.
My paper is most related to the industrial organization literature on firm and esta-
blishment size distribution and to the corporate finance literature on corporate diver-
sification. Although the empirical literature concerning establishment size is abundant
(Axtell, 2001, Dunne et al., 1989, Evans, 1987, Hall, 1987), the only existing study that
allows to infer some information concerning the size distributions conditional on conglo-
meration is the paper by Maksimovic and Phillips (2002). Using data from Longitudinal
Research Database (LRD) of the US Bureau of Census, they divide firm-segments1 in
conglomerates and single-segment firms into five coarse size categories. Their statis-
tics suggest that there are important differences in the shape of the distribution of firm-
segment size between conglomerates and stand-alone firms, but they do not examine the
size distributions in detail nor do they provide any indication on where these differences
come from. This is understandable, since their work does not explicitly focus on do-
cumenting facts about establishment size. Related, the particular measure of size used
by Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) is practically non-comparable to any other standard
ways of measuring establishment or firm size. Compared to Maksimovic and Phillips
(2002), this paper provides much more detailed insights and it addresses some measu-
rement and definition issues in their approach. It also ensures comparability to the firm
size distribution literature by considering several standard measures of establishment
size. More generally, several recent studies tried to provide and test empirically a theory
that could explain salient features of the establishment size distribution. For example,
Angelini and Generale (2008), Cabral and Mata (2003), and Desai et al. (2003) assess
whether financial constraints play an important role in determining the features of the
size distribution and explaining firm growth. Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2007) pro-
1A firm-segment summarizes the activity of a firm on the industry level.
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pose a theory that relates the shape of the size distribution to differences in the physical
capital share across industries. My paper shows another dimension that might be im-
portant to understand the overall shape of the firm size distribution - the organisational
structure of firms with respect to corporate diversification.
There is a large body of corporate finance literature devoted to the study of effi-
ciency of corporate diversification. Since the seminal work of Berger and Ofek (1995),
which found that publicly listed diversified conglomerates in the US trade on average
at a discount relative to the focused firms, most of empirical literature concentrated on
differences in stock valuation of diversified versus single-segment firms. The question in
these papers is whether diversification creates value for the shareholders. The so-called
diversification discount was often interpreted as evidence of inefficiency of conglome-
rates. However, more recent empirical papers cast some doubts on the robustness of the
diversification discount finding (Khanna and Palepu, 2000, Santalo and Becerra, 2008,
Villalonga, 2004)2 as well as its power to indicate the inefficiency of conglomerates
(Gomes and Livdan, 2004, Schoar, 2002). The approach in my paper is quite different. I
contribute to the small group of works that rather than relying on stock market valuation
look directly at the plant-level productivity in conglomerates (Maksimovic and Phillips,
2002, Schoar, 2002). The advantage of this approach is that it does not suffer from the
sample selection bias related to the focus on publicly traded companies and it is able
to provide information on the actual differences in the plant-level total factor produc-
tivity. This enables one to ask a different types of question such as do conglomerates
channel resources to their best use more efficiently than external markets ? My finding
of the reversion of relationship between conglomeration and productivity when control-
ling for plant size is in line with what suggests a comparison of the two previous studies
2The diversification discount is not found in other countries (Khanna and Palepu, 2000 find instead a
diversification premium for firms affiliated with large industrial groups in India), when using more detailed
establishment-level data (Villalonga, 2004 also finds a diversification premium instead of a discount in the
BITS establishment-level data), or when controlling for industry heterogeneity (Santalo and Becerra, 2008
find a diversification discount in industries with a large number of stand-alone firms, but a diversification
premium in industries in which stand-alone firms capture a small market share).
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in corporate finance. Using the LRD data on American manufacturing plants, Schoar
(2002) finds that plants in diversified firms have on average higher TFP than those in
the single-segment firms. Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) find the exact opposite when
looking at firm-segments and conditioning on a given size category.3 However, the com-
parison of the results in those papers suffers from several problems. First, the authors
use a different level of observation and slightly different form of the production function
to estimate TFP, so the results are not exactly comparable.4 Second, and more impor-
tantly, both studies use a simple regression-based approach to obtain TFP residuals. This
approach is well known to suffer from the endogeneity of the input decisions problem.
Third, none of these studies combine the size and productivity statistics to specifically
test the efficiency of internal resource reallocation. In contrast, my paper examines the
subtle relation between plant’s productivity, firm’s organizational structure, and plant’s
size in a unified econometric framework that corrects for the endogeneity bias and that
is commonly used in the industrial organization literature (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003,
Olley and Pakes, 1996). My paper is also the first that studies size and productivity
of conglomerates from Canadian plant-level data. I view this as a nice robustness test
of facts suggested by previous studies that all worked with data on US manufacturing
firms.
My paper can also be related to several papers that study the role of mergers in
reallocation of capital and labor and the role of product switching in intra-firm allocation
of resources. Jovanovic and Braguinsky (2004) and Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) find
that a theory of mergers as waves of reallocation of resources across plants can explain
empirical regularities concerning firm’s Tobin’s Q and behavior of firm’s stock prices
before and after acquisitions. Bernard et al. (2010) model product switching in American
manufacturing firms and conclude that it significantly contributes to better allocation of
3 Surprisingly, each of these studies is silent about the finding of the other paper.
4In Schoar (2002) the unit of observation is a plant, whereas in Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) the
unit of observation is a firm-segment. Schoar (2002) uses a standard Cobb-Douglas form of production
function with labor, capital, and material inputs, while Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) augment it with a
cross-product of any two inputs, squared terms of any inputs, and a plant-firm specific fixed effect.
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resource. In contrast to my paper, these works do not estimate TFP and they do not
consider the role of establishment size in comparing the firm’s performance.
I think that the evidence presented in this paper could also be of interest to the indus-
trial organization literature that tries to estimate and explain plant-level heterogeneity in
productivity (Abrahám and White, 2008, Bartelsman and Doms, 2000, Jensen and Mc-
Guckin, 1996), as well as to the macroeconomic and economic development literature
that recently became interested in the role of financial constraints and other firm-specific
frictions for the efficiency of the aggregate resource allocation (Castro et al., 2009, Hsieh
and Klenow, 2009, Restuccia and Rogerson, 2008).
3.2 Data
In this study, I use data on Canadian manufacturing establishments. Statistics Ca-
nada uses a four-level hierarchy of statistical entities for businesses : the Enterprise, the
Company, the Establishment, and the Location. My sample is selected from Statistics
Canada’s records from the Annual Survey of Manufacturers (ASM hereafter), which
collects financial and commodity data at the Establishment level. Establishment is the
smallest level at which the data on principal inputs, revenues, salaries, and wages are
available (Statistics Canada, 2010). In manufacturing industries this level usually repre-
sents a plant and I will use terms plant and establishment interchangeably. The Enterprise
is defined as the organisational unit of a business that directs and controls the allocation
of resources relating to its domestic operations (Statistics Canada, 2010). In what fol-
lows, I will use terms firm and enterprise interchangeably.
ASM gathers detailed information on production inputs, revenues, salaries and wages
of manufacturing plants from three principal types of sources : questionnaires sent to sur-
vey participants,5 administrative tax records, and imputation from aggregate or industry
records. My sample covers the period from 1997 to 2006. From the initial 568,628 plant-
5Responding to ASM questionnaires is mandatory and firms can be fined for non-compliance.
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year observations I exclude 137,274 observations that were imputed from aggregate or
industry records. I further exclude from the sample observations for which the value
of manufacturing shipments plus the difference in inventories of finished products and
goods in progress is lower than CAD 50,000. This leaves me with a sample of 295,132
plant-year observations.
In order to classify firms as conglomerate or stand-alone, I construct so-called firm-
segments. Particularly, I use the firm identifier to aggregate plant-level data at the 4-digit
NAICS code for every firm. A firm-segment therefore represents a firm’s operations in a
given industry. I classify a firm as a conglomerate if it has more than one firm-segment.
I will also use the number of firm-segments and herfindahl-based measures to measure
the actual degree of diversification.
A limitation of the ASM data is its concentration on manufacturing industries. In
consequence, if a firm is diversified outside manufacturing, the non-manufacturing ope-
rations are not recorded. This issue has been recurrent in all studies on conglomeration
that used detailed plant-level manufacturing data. (Schoar, 2002) tries to address this
problem by matching the observations from the Longitudinal Research Database of US
Bureau of Census to the Compustat Segment data. While this may partially solve the dif-
ficulty of controlling for diversification outside manufacturing, it comes at a great cost
of limiting the sample to firms included in the Compustat files. Given the known issues
with the Compustat data, this sample selection could introduce serious bias to the analy-
sis. One contribution of this study is that I was able to obtain the information on firms’
activities outside manufacturing directly from the Business Register (BR hereafter) re-
cords.6 This information is of substantially higher quality than the Compustat Segment
files and, because BR represents the universe of Canadian enterprises, the sample selec-
tion issue is mitigated as well. BR is supposed to provide information on all activities
of Canadian firms, particularly the NAICS industry codes in which a firm operates as
6I am indebted to Robert Gibson from Statistics Canada for recovering and cleaning the data on ma-
nufacturing firms from the Business Register.
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well as sales and employment in each of these industries. However, BR was designed
as a sampling framework for various business surveys and it is not a coherent research
database. Therefore, not all records in BR are accurately up to date and suitable for re-
search purposes. Using the firm identifier and the reporting year in the ASM as matching
variables, I was able to obtain firm-level information from the BR records for 249,830
plant-year observations in the ASM. I had to further delete 1,511 observations associated
to firms for which BR reports activities in manufacturing industries that are not reported
in the ASM.7 After this final cut I have a sample of 248,319 plant-year observations
spanning the period 1997 to 2006 with at least 17,606 plant observations per year.
In some of my analysis I will divide the sample into two sub-sample periods, the
first including all pre-2000 years and the second including years 2000 to 2006. The
reason for this division is that in 2000 the ASM was redesigned as a part of the United
Enterprise Survey program. One important consequence is that since 2000 the ASM
moved to the Business Register as its frame for sampling, whereas it had its own specific
sampling frame before 2000. There were also several other modifications in the survey
design. Although the database variables were checked to insure compatibility over both
sub-periods, repeating the analysis on each sub-period provides a nice opportunity to
examine the robustness of some results.
3.2.1 Prevalence of conglomeration in Canadian manufacturing
The proportion of plants in the sample that operate under conglomerate firms ranges
from 16 percent in 1997 to 24 percent in 2000. It tends to be slightly lower in the first sub-
sample period with an average of 17 percent over the years 1997-1999 and 19 percent
over the years 2000-2006. Table 3.I reveals that the proportion of firm-segments that ope-
rate under conglomerate firms is smaller than the proportion of conglomerated plants. At
7This is a consistency requirement. Since the ASM file is updated on a regular basis and provides much
more accurate information on manufacturing industries than BR, I use the ASM data whenever BR records
on manufacturing are not coherent with the ASM files. I make implicitly the assumption that ASM records
truthfully all manufacturing activities of the firm.
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Table 3.I – Proportion of conglomerates
year % plants % segments % firms % gross output % value added % employment
1997 16.3 8.7 6.1 77 73 55
1998 17.2 9.3 6.6 76 73 55
1999 18.1 9.7 7.0 77 74 55
2000 24.5 13.9 10.1 79 75 59
2001 19.0 10.0 7.2 77 72 56
2002 21.5 11.9 8.8 79 76 60
2003 22.1 12.5 9.1 79 74 60
2004 17.7 9.3 6.7 75 70 55
2005 16.2 8.8 6.4 72 66 51
2006 16.1 9.0 7.0 66 61 46
All years 18.5 10.0 7.3 75 71 55
the firm level the proportion of conglomerates is even lower. This points to the impor-
tance of the choice of the level of aggregation for conducting any analysis concerning
multi-segment firms. In following sections I will generally report results at the plant level
and at the firm-segment level.
To assess the part of production accounted for by conglomerates, I look at the gross
manufacturing output defined as the value of shipments plus the variation in inventories
of goods in progress and final goods. The proportion of gross manufacturing output pro-
duced in conglomerated plants ranges from 66 percent in 2006 to 79 percent in 2002,
averaging around 75 percent for both sub-sample periods. These high numbers point to
importance of conglomerates in the economy, or at least in manufacturing. The industries
in which conglomerates account for the largest fraction of output appear to be NAICS
3365 Railroad Rolling Stock Manufacturing (1997), NAICS 3122 Tobacco Manufactu-
ring (1998-2000), NAICS 3241 Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing (2001-2003
and 2006), and NAICS 3311 Iron and Steel Mills and Ferro-Alloy Manufacturing (2004-
2005). In these industries the proportion of the gross output produced by conglomerates
was above 98 percent. Over the two sample sub-periods, the largest fraction of the gross
output was produced by conglomerates in NAICS 3122 for the pre-2000 period and in
NAICS 3241 for the post-2000 period. The industries with the lowest concentration of
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production in conglomerates were NAICS 3159 Clothing Accessories and Other Clo-
thing Manufacturing (1997, 2001-2004), NAICS 3169 Other Leather and Allied Product
Manufacturing (1998-2000 and 2005), and NAICS 3161 Leather and Hide Tanning and
Finishing (2006). The fraction of the gross output produced by conglomerates in these
industries is generally lower than 10 percent. Over the two sample sub-periods, NAICS
3169 has the lowest concentration of output in conglomerates for the pre-2000 period
and NAICS 3159 for the post-2000 period.
The numbers are similar if we look at the value added instead of gross output. The
proportion of total manufacturing value added produced in conglomerated plants ranges
from 61 percent in 2006 to 76 percent in 2002, averaging around 75 percent for both
sub-sample periods. The industries in which conglomerates account for the largest and
the lowest fraction of the value added appear to be the same as when looking on gross
output, with addition of NAICS 3361 Motor Vehicle Manufacturing in the category of
industries with production most concentrated in conglomerates.
3.3 Size distribution
Previous literature (Maksimovic and Phillips, 2002) suggests that there are important
differences in the size distribution between plants and firm-segments operating under
conglomerates and those in single-segment firms. In this section I provide new detailed
evidence on the size distribution of plants and firm-segments according to their diversi-
fication status. In subsections 3.3.1 to 3.3.3, I rely on non-parametric kernel density esti-
mation to compare the size distributions. This approach has the advantage of conveying
information not only on few selected moments of the distribution, such as average size
and its variance, but on the shape of the whole distribution. The non-parametric approach
has also some limitations. Particularly, I cannot easily control for plant characteristics,
such as age and industry, or for year effects. This might be important because, as is well
known from firm-size literature, older plants and firms tend to be larger, the minimum
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scale of operation in some industries is larger than in other industries, and the produc-
tion will be generally lower in recession years. Some of these issues can be addressed
by carefully constructing the measures of plant size (I consider several of them) used
for kernel density estimation. For other issues and as a robustness check, I include a
regression analysis in subsection 3.3.4.
3.3.1 Nominal output size measure
First, following the standard approach in the literature on firm size distributions, I
measure the plant size by the logarithm of the nominal gross output. Nominal gross
output is defined as the total value of shipments plus changes in inventories of goods in
progress and finished goods.8
Figure 3.1 provides kernel density estimates of the size distribution for conglome-
rates and single-segment firms. In the left panels I draw the non-parametric estimates
for the size distribution of plants and in the right panels I draw the estimates of the
firm-segment size distribution.
Kernel density estimates clearly indicate that plants and firm-segments in conglome-
rates tend to be larger than those in single-segment firms. We see that the mass of the size
distribution of conglomerate plants and firm-segments is shifted towards larger sizes, but
it also has thicker tails. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test also strongly rejects (p-value=0.0)
the hypothesis of equality of distribution function estimates for both sub-periods and at
both plant and firm-segment levels. Notice that the finding that conglomerated plants
and firm-segments have on average larger size compared to their single-segment firms’
counterparts is not trivial because a priori there is no reason for size differences at the
plant or firm-segment level (as opposed to size differences at the firm level, where one
8An alternative would be to use value added as a measure of output. The distinction is important when
aggregating plant-level data for analysis on more macro level, because plant value added can be summed
up and compared to the aggregate industry output in the national accounts. However, when comparing size
and productivity on the disaggregated plant level it should not matter much whether one uses gross output
or value added. Indeed, I have redone the analysis using value added for measuring size and the results
(unreported) are qualitatively unchanged and quantitatively very close.
101
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
de
ns
ity
10 15 20 25
log(nominal gross output)
plants 1997−1999
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
de
ns
ity
10 15 20 25
log(nominal gross output)
firm−segments 1997−1999
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
de
ns
ity
10 15 20 25
log(nominal gross output)
plants 2000−2006
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
de
ns
ity
10 15 20 25
log(nominal gross output)
firm−segments 2000−2006
Kernel : Epanechnikov, bandwith : 0.25
Figure 3.1 – Nominal gross output size distributions ; conglomerates - solid line, single-
segment firms - dashed line
would clearly expect conglomerate firms to be larger because they operate in several
industries).
Comparison of nominal output size distributions is convenient but it is subject to two
potential concerns stemming from possible concentration of conglomerates in specific
industries. First, one might be worried about the effects of variation in output prices
across industries. If conglomerates dominate industries with relatively higher output
prices, then the difference in the average nominal output in conglomerates and the ave-
rage nominal output in single-segment firms picks up these price differences. Conse-
quently, some researchers might like better to compare distributions of size expressed in
real terms. Second, one might be worried about higher selection of plants into conglo-
merates in industries with high minimal size requirements. It is easy to imagine that
conglomerates are predominant in industries in which it is difficult or impossible to ope-
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rate plants at a small scale (think for example of Motor Vehicle Manufacturing ; Pulp,
Paper and Paperboard Mills ; Alumina and Aluminum Production and Processing ; Iron
and Steel Mills and Ferro-Alloy Manufacturing ; or Railroad Rolling Stock Manufac-
turing). Then the difference between the size distribution of plants in conglomerates
and the size distribution of plants in single-segment firms will reflect high prevalence
of conglomerates in these industries with large minimum scale of operation. Next two
subsections address these concerns.
3.3.2 Employment size measure
Using employment to measure establishment size has the advantage of not being sub-
ject to cross-industry variation of output prices. Moreover, it is interesting to see whether
the evidence on size differences between conglomerate and single-segment plants obtai-
ned from measuring production output can be validated by looking at the input side of
the production process.
Looking at Figure 3.2, we see that the difference in size of conglomerate and single-
segment plants is even more marked when looking at employment. The shape of the es-
timated kernel densities differs substantially with the size distribution of single-segment
plants (firm-segments) being skewed to the right and that of conglomerate plants (firm-
segments) to the left.
3.3.3 Relative size measures
Conglomerates might be predominant in industries in which the minimum size of
operation is high. If, on the other hand, single-segment firms are more concentrated in
industries in which the minimum scale of operation is lower, and if we do not control for
this selection, the difference between the size distributions of plants in conglomerates
and in single-segment firms might arise solely because of this composition effect.9 The
9Notice, however, that this does not mean that the evidence presented above is unimportant or unin-
teresting. For example, this evidence could help us understand mechanisms that lead to the selection of
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Figure 3.2 – Total employment size distributions ; conglomerates - solid line, single-
segment firms - dashed line
problem is that when size is measured by nominal output or employment, we attempt to
compare the “absolute” size of an airplane-assembly plant in a large conglomerate to the
“absolute” size of a local leather manufacturer. This comparison across such different
industries may seem inappropriate. It is therefore interesting to consider an approach
that would control for industry-specific characteristics and allow us to compare the size
of these establishments in more “relative” terms.
To do this, I consider relative size measures, defined as the ratio of plants size to the
industry median size. Relative size measures have several advantages. Being a ratio they
are unitless, which may address the problem of cross-industry heterogeneity in output
prices. Moreover, they can be interpreted as the rank, in terms of a given size variable,
of a plant within its own industry. Therefore, relative production size measures take in
conglomerates into high minimal-size industries, which is an interesting research topic on its own.
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Figure 3.3 – Relative gross output size distributions ; conglomerates - solid line, single-
segment firms - dashed line
account the industry-specific characteristics such as the minimum scale of operation.
This addresses the problem of possible selection of conglomerates into some specific
industries, because now we can compare the size in different industries on a relative
basis.10
Figure 3.3 presents kernel density estimates of the distribution of the logarithm of the
relative gross output. The relative gross output is defined as the ratio of the nominal gross
output to the industry median nominal gross output. Estimates of the relative gross out-
put size distribution reveal once again sizable differences between the size distributions
for conglomerates and the size distributions for single-segment firms. As was the case
with nominal output and employment, the mass of the size distribution of conglomerate
10Maksimovic and Phillips (2002)used this the relative gross output size measure to compare growth of
firm-segments in conglomerates to the growth of size of single-segment firms.
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Figure 3.4 – Relative total employment size distributions ; conglomerates - solid line,
single-segment firms - dashed line
plants and firm-segments is shifted towards larger sizes, but it has also thicker tails. The
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects the hypothesis of equality of the two distributions at
the 5 percent level (p-value=0.0) for plants as well as firm-segments in all sub-sample
periods. Figure 3.4 shows that the results are similar when looking at the relative total
employment size, which is defined in analogous way.
On average plants and firm-segments in conglomerates have larger relative size than
plants and firm-segments in single-segment firms. This finding is important. Because the
relative size measures control for cross-industry variation in output prices as well as for
cross-industry minimum scale of operation differences, the result tells us that conglome-
rates operate plants and firm-segments that are relatively larger even with respect to other
plants within their own industry. For example, a plant of a conglomerate that produces
household appliances is larger than a plant of a single-segment firms that is specialized
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in production of household appliances. Moreover, the comparison of relative production
size makes sense even across industries : a conglomerated plant that produces locomo-
tives has higher size rank among all plants in the Railroad Rolling Stock Manufacturing
industry than the local leather manufacturer’s plant size rank among all plants in the
Leather Manufacturing industry.
These findings suggest that there are additional factors, other than higher selection
of plants into conglomerates in specific industries, that explain the patterns in the size
distributions of plants and firm-segments in conglomerates and single-segment firms.
One such factor could be the internal reallocation of resources inside conglomerates. An
interesting and long literature has asked whether the conglomerates allocate the resource
efficiently among their divisions and what are the effects of this internal reallocation
on firm valuation (Gomes and Livdan, 2004, Maksimovic and Phillips, 2002, Schoar,
2002) , conditions on the external markets, and more broadly the overall industry-wide
or economy-wide allocative efficiency (Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2006a). In my view,
the first and crucial element to answer these interesting questions is to examine carefully
the relationship between plant size, productivity and the organizational structure of the
firm. In section 3.4 I provide some new evidence on this relationship.
3.3.4 Average size differences - robustness checks and some details
In this section I check the robustness of my finding that plants and firm-segments
in conglomerates are on average larger than plants in single-segment firms using a re-
gression analysis. I also examine whether the differences in size of firm-segments come
mostly from the extensive margin (more plants in each firm-segment in conglomerate
firms) or from the intensive margin (plants that are larger in conglomerate firms).
As mentioned above, the limitation of the non-parametric kernel density estimation
approach is the impossibility to control for a lot of year, industry, firm, and plant charac-
teristics. Therefore, to check the robustness of my results I run regressions of plant size
on measures of diversification and a set of controls.
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Table 3.II – Regressions of plant size
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Diversification dummy
1.902???
(0.008)
1.931???
(0.009)
1.727???
(0.012)
1.756???
(0.017)
Nbr. segments
0.101???
(0.004)
Employment Herfindahl
0.403???
(0.039)
Plant age
0.072???
(0.001)
0.065???
(0.001)
0.065???
(0.001)
0.062???
(0.001)
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes
Year dummies no yes yes yes
R2 0.372 0.383 0.384 0.372
Nbr. observations 248,319 248,319 248,319 234,282
The dependent variable is logarithm of gross nominal output. Gross nominal output is the total value of shipments plus changes in
inventories of goods in progress and finished goods measures at the plant level. Diversification dummy is equal to one if the firm has
more than one 4-digit NAICS firm-segment. Nbr. segments is equal to the number of 4-digit NAICS firm-segments including those
outside manufacturing industries. Employment Herfindahl is employment-weighted measure of diversification. Age is the number of
years since the plant has been included in the ASM sample for the first time. Industry dummies are constructed on the 4-digit NAICS
level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ???, ??, and ? indicates statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level.
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 3.II show that the coefficient on diversification dummy
is positive and statistically significant when controlling for plant age, which is proxied by
the number of years since the plant has been included in the ASM sample, industry fixed
effects, and year dummies. The results show that plants in conglomerates are on average
almost twice as large as plants in single-segment firms and this even when comparing
within a given age class, 4-digit NAICS industry, and year.
In columns (3) and (4) I follow Schoar (2002) and I include alternative measures
of diversification, which allow to take in account not only classification of plants into
single-segment and conglomerate firms but also the actual degree of diversification of the
firms. These measures are the number of firm-segments on the 4-digit NAICS level and
a Herfidahl-based measure of diversification, which is equal to one minus a Herfindahl
index for the firm’s segments employment. I still include the diversification dummy in the
regression. This allows me to distinguish the impact on plant size of being in a single-
segment firm or a conglomerate and the impact of increasing the diversification of an
already conglomerate firm. The coefficients on the degree of diversification are much
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lower in magnitude that on the simple diversification dummy, but they are statistically
and economically significant. Clearly, the largest part of differences in average plant
size comes from differences between single-segment firms and diversified firms. On the
other hand, a unit difference in the number of firm-segments among diversified firms is
on average associated with a ten percent difference in the plant size.
I have repeated the analysis at the firm-segment level and the results are qualitatively
unchanged. Particularly I find that firm-segments in conglomerates are on average twice
as large as single-segment firms. The firm-segments in more diversified conglomerates
also tend to be larger than those in less diversified conglomerates. I have also done
robustness checks using alternative measures of size such as employment, value added,
and relative size measures. The results are robust to these changes.
In Table 3.III I examine whether the difference in firm-segment size comes mostly
from extensive margin (firm-segments in conglomerates having more plants than single-
segment firms) or from intensive margin (plants in the conglomerate firm-segments are
larger than plants in single-segment firms). This information is important when we want
to compare the results from previous studies, because some of them were done at the
firm-segment level (Maksimovic and Phillips, 2002) and others at the plant level (Schoar,
2002). One may be worried that a strong composition effect at the firm-segment le-
vel might make the results of these studies incomparable. We already know from pre-
vious paragraphs that there are differences in the plant size in conglomerates and single-
segment firms. Therefore, the intensive margin seems to be important. Table 3.III shows
that there are also differences along the extensive margin, although they seem to be less
important than those along the intensive margin. Comparing an average single-segment
firm to an average conglomerate, which in my sample has three firm-segments, implies
roughly a factor 2.2 increase in the average number of plants per segment, but the dif-
ference in the average relative output per plant is of factor 7.7. Sure, the variance of
the average output per plant is larger than that of average number of plants per firm-
segment, but it still appears that the largest bulk of firm-segment size differences comes
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Table 3.III – Extensive vs. intensive margin of firm-segment size differences
all years (1997 - 2006)
Nbr. of Relative
Total nbr. of plants per segment output per plant
segments in firm mean sd nbr. obs. mean sd nbr. obs
1 1.04 0.35 193,869 2.45 9.12 202,491
2 1.83 2.88 13,629 15.84 65.13 24,965
3 2.32 3.58 4,184 18.96 82.58 9,725
4 2.48 4.36 1,586 32.68 163.67 3,942
5 2.69 3.34 915 23.98 101.91 2,470
6 4.23 11.51 511 12.81 21.75 2,161
7 and more 3.37 8.49 761 16.07 31.78 2,565
Segments are defined at the 4-digit NAICS level. All statistics are computed from 1997-2006 pooled data. Mean relative output per
plant is simple arithmetic average of relative output across plants in all firms with a given number or segments. Relative output is the
ratio of plant’s nominal output to the median nominal output in its industry.
from differences in the plant size and not from differences in the number of plants in
each segment. Therefore, if we want to compare the relation between size and produc-
tivity across conglomerates and single-segment firms, the results should be qualitatively
similar if we are doing the analysis at the plant level or at the firm-segment level, provi-
ded that the firm-segment aggregation reflects correctly productivity and size at the plant
level.
3.4 Conglomeration and productivity
In this section I explore the relationship between size and productivity.
3.4.1 Productivity estimation
I estimate total factor productivity at the plant level using a Cobb-Douglas production
functions. I use two alternative measures of output : gross output defined as deflated
value of shipments plus changes in inventories of goods in process and final goods, and
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deflated value added. In case of gross output I assume the production function is
yi jt = α jki jt +β jli jt + γ jmi jt + εi jt ,
where yi jt is the logarithm of gross output of plant i in industry j and year t, and ki jt ,
li jt , and mi jt are the logarithms of inputs of capital services, labor services, and materials
of that plant in the given industry and year. Similarly, in case of value added I assume a
production function of the form
yi jt = α jki jt +β jli jt + εi jt ,
where yi jt now stands for the logarithm of deflated plant-level value added.
To correct for the simultaneity bias that arises from endogenous response of inputs to
productivity changes I use the methodology first developed by Olley and Pakes (1996).
The underlying idea is to use plant-level investment as a proxy for unobservable produc-
tivity shocks. Since I do not have information on plant-level investment in my data set, I
use the extension of this method proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), who showed
how to use intermediate inputs instead of investment for controlling for unobservable
productivity shocks. The inputs are divided into freely variable (labor) and the state va-
riable (capital). The error term εi jt is assumed to be additively separable in a transmitted
productivity component ωi jt , which impacts the plant’s decision rules, and an i.i.d. com-
ponent ηi jt . Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) assume that the demand for intermediate inputs
mi jt depends on the plant’s state variable ki jt and the transmitted productivity ωi jt . Under
the assumption that the intermediate inputs demand is monotone in ωi jt , the intermediate
inputs demand function can be inverted, which allows to write the transmitted producti-
vity component as a function of ki jt and mi jt only : ωi jt = φ
(
ki jt ,mi jt
)
. In the first stage
of the estimation procedure, the function φ
(
ki jt ,mi jt
)
is approximated by a third-order
polynomial in ki jt and mi jt and a consistent estimate βˆ j is obtained from regressing the
output on li jt and the polynomial approximation of φ
(
ki jt ,mi jt
)
. In the second stage, the
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estimates of α j and γ j, are obtained by GMM.11 Additional identifying assumptions that
ωi jt follows a first-order Markov process and that the state variable (capital) and the past
intermediate input demand do not respond to innovations in productivity over the last
period expectation are necessary. The first assumption allows to obtain a consistent esti-
mate of E
[
ωi jt |ωi jt−1
]
from the first-stage residuals and compute the residual for α j,γ j
as
̂ηi jt +ξi jt = yi jt− βˆlli jt−α jki jt− γ jmi jt− ̂E
[
ωi jt |ωi jt−1
]
,
where ξi jt denotes the innovations in productivity over the last period expectation. The
second assumption defines two moment conditions E
[
ηi jt +ξi jt |ki jt
]
= 0 and
E
[
ηi jt +ξi jt |mi jt−1
]
= 0, which allow to estimate αˆ j and γˆ j as the solution to :
min
α j,γ j
∑
h
[
∑
t
∑
i
(
̂ηi jt +ξi jt
)
Zhi jt
]
,
where Zi jt =
(
ki jt ,mi jt−1
)
and h is indexing the elements of Zi jt . The method is imple-
mented in the Stata command lp by Petrin et al. (2003). With the estimates of coeffi-
cients on inputs in hand, I calculate the plant-level total factor productivity as the residual
from the corresponding log-linearized production function.
The measures of output and inputs are obtained directly from the ASM data. Gross
nominal output and value added are deflated by the respective 4-digit NAICS industry
price indices obtained from the Statistics Canada CANSIM database. The labor input is
the total number of workers in the plant.12 Unfortunately, ASM does not provide infor-
mation on capital stocks or investment. To overcome this difficulty, I follow Burnside
et al. (2005) and use data on energy expenditures to proxy for capital utilization. Parti-
cularly, I assume that capital services vary in proportion with energy use.13 I therefore
11In case of estimating value-added production function the second-stage estimation step is modified
accordingly.
12I re-estimated TFP using only the number of production workers as the labor input. I also re-estimated
TFP using the total wage bill to proxy for possible differences in use of skilled labor across plants. All
results are qualitatively robust to these changes.
13This imposes an assumption on the form of the production function. Particularly, the elasticity of
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replace the input of capital services by energy expenditures deflated by industrial energy
price index obtained from the CANSIM database. The materials input is given by the
total material costs minus changes in inventories of materials deflated by the price index
for materials.
3.4.2 Productivity differences across conglomerates and single-segment firms
My empirical strategy to examine productivity differences of plants across conglo-
merates and single-segment firms is to regress plant-level TFP on a measures of cor-
porate diversification and a set of controls. Because the coefficients in the production
function were estimated separately for each 4-digit NAICS industry, the estimated TFP
includes industry-specific factors in addition to plant-specific differences. Since I want
to compare the productivity of plants that operate in many different industries, I need to
control for the variation of TFP that is due to these industry-specific factors. I therefore
include industry dummies in all regressions of plant TFP.14 I also control for plant age as
well as for year-specific factors such as fluctuations in the aggregate level of productivity
by including year dummies.
Table 3.IV presents the results using gross-output TFP as the dependent variable.
The coefficient on the conglomeration dummy in column (1) shows that conglomera-
ted plants are on average 15 percent more productive than plants in the single-segment
firms. Columns (2) to (3) show that a large part (around nine percentage points) can be
attributed just to the fact of being diversified. Subsequently, the differences in the degree
of diversification have an additional positive impact on plants’ measured TFP. However,
based solely on these results, it is hard to conclude that diversification creates value, be-
cause we cannot distinguish whether diversification raises the productivity or whether
more productive plants are simply more likely to select into conglomerates. Moreover,
capital services with respect to energy use has to be equal to unity.
14An alternative strategy would be to subtract industry average TFP from the plant-level TFP estimates
and then use this relative TFP measure as dependent variable in my regressions. This approach is less
flexible if one wants to include any additional control variables, and yields results that are qualitatively the
same and quantitatively very close to those presented in the text.
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Table 3.IV – TFP regressions - gross output productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Diversification dummy
0.153???
(0.003)
0.087???
(0.004)
0.092???
(0.006)
−0.011???
(0.003)
−0.059???
(0.004)
−0.056???
(0.006)
Nbr. segments
0.032???
(0.001)
0.024???
(0.001)
Employment Herfindahl
0.190???
(0.013)
0.156???
(0.013)
Log(relative gross output)
0.088???
(0.001)
0.088???
(0.001)
0.087???
(0.001)
Plant age
0.003???
(0.000)
0.003???
(0.000)
0.003???
(0.000)
−0.002???
(0.000)
−0.002???
(0.000)
−0.002???
(0.000)
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.955 0.955 0.955 0.958 0.958 0.959
Nbr. observations 229,739 229,739 216,839 229,739 229,739 216,839
The dependent variable is the estimated gross-output TFP obtained as the residual from estimation of a Cobb-Douglas production
function using the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) procedure. Relative gross output the ratio of plant’s total value of shipments plus
changes in inventories of goods in progress and finished goods to the industry median total value of shipments plus changes in
inventories of goods in progress and finished goods. Diversification dummy is equal to one if the firm has more than one 4-digit
NAICS firm-segment. Nbr. segments is equal to the number of 4-digit NAICS firm-segments including those outside manufacturing
industries. Employment Herfindahl is employment-weighted measure of diversification. Age is the number of years since the plant
has been included in the ASM sample for the first time. Industry dummies are constructed on the 4-digit NAICS level. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses. ???, ??, and ? indicates statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level.
these regressions on their own do not say anything about the efficiency of resource allo-
cation inside conglomerates.
One might think that there may be a problem in the comparison of the productivity of
plants across conglomerates and single-segment firms because, as shown in Section 3.3,
plants in conglomerates tend to be larger. In columns (4) to (6) I repeat the analysis ad-
ding a control for relative production size of the plant. Interestingly, the coefficient on
conglomeration dummy becomes negative and statistically significant. Plants that are in
conglomerates are on average one percent less productive than plants of the same size in
the single-segment firms. Columns (5) and (6) show that it is the fact of being diversi-
fied that has quantitatively significant negative effect (a productivity discount around six
percent), but the actual degree of diversification still has a positive effect on TFP. This
result may seem to justify the conglomeration discount often found in the stock market
valuation data (Berger and Ofek, 1995), but we will later see that it is compatible with
efficient allocation of resources among divisions of a conglomerate.
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Table 3.V – TFP regressions - value added productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Diversification dummy
0.618???
(0.004)
0.537???
(0.006)
0.524???
(0.009)
−0.026???
(0.004)
−0.044???
(0.005)
−0.061???
(0.006)
Nbr. segments
0.040???
(0.002)
0.009???
(0.002)
Employment Herfindahl
0.263???
(0.021)
0.135???
(0.014)
Log(relative value added)
0.352???
(0.001)
0.351???
(0.001)
0.348???
(0.001)
Plant age
0.016???
(0.000)
0.016???
(0.000)
0.015???
(0.000)
−0.004???
(0.000)
−0.004???
(0.000)
−0.004???
(0.000)
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.572 0.572 0.573 0.807 0.807 0.807
Nbr. observations 226,435 226,435 213,836 226,435 226,435 213,836
The dependent variable is the estimated value-added TFP obtained as the residual from estimation of a Cobb-Douglas production
function using the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) procedure. Relative value added is the ratio of plant’s value added to the industry
median value added. Diversification dummy is equal to one if the firm has more than one 4-digit NAICS firm-segment. Nbr. segments
is equal to the number of 4-digit NAICS firm-segments including those outside manufacturing industries. Employment Herfindahl is
employment-weighted measure of diversification. Age is the number of years since the plant has been included in the ASM sample
for the first time. Industry dummies are constructed on the 4-digit NAICS level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ???, ??,
and ? indicates statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level.
The results are robust to using TFP estimated from value added production func-
tion instead of gross output production function as the dependent variable. Actually,
Table 3.V shows that in the value-added case the reversion of the relationship between
conglomeration and productivity conditional on plant size becomes even more striking,
going from a 61 percent productivity premium to a three percent productivity discount
for the plants in conglomerates.
While the reversion of the relationship between productivity and conglomeration
once we control for plant size may seem puzzling, the results are actually in line with
what suggested some previous studies. Schoar (2002) looked at plants’ gross-revenue
productivity in US manufacturing controlling for the number of plants in the plant’s
firm-segment and firm, but not controlling for plant’s size. She found a seven percent
productivity premium for diversified firms. On the other hand, Maksimovic and Phillips
(2002), working with a similar data set, found that conditional on being in a given size
class, the firm-segments in conglomerates tend to be less productive than single-segment
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firms. However, none of previous studies compared these two findings and tried to re-
concile them within a unified econometric framework and using the same observations.
3.4.3 Explaining the Productivity Differences
How could we explain the two seemingly contradictory findings, and how they relate
to the corporate finance literature on conglomeration discount in stock valuation ? Could
we say anything about the impact of conglomeration on aggregate efficiency ?
In the second chapter of this thesis, I showed that a simple theory of efficient internal
reallocation of resources inside conglomerates that allows for endogenous selection of
plants into conglomerates can reconcile the two findings. In presence of frictions that
hinder efficient allocation of resources through external markets, conglomeration may
serve as a device that helps achieve allocative efficiency through internal transfers inside
conglomerates (Stein, 1997). In that case, conglomerates will channel resources towards
most productive plants more aggressively than external markets. This has two testable
implications that I will show to be consistent with my empirical findings. First, highly
productive plants should be more likely to select into conglomerates, since the gain from
internal reallocation of resources towards these plants is likely to be high. Hence, due to
this selection, the average productivity of plants in conglomerates should be higher than
that of plants in single-segment firms, which is consistent with the unconditional pro-
ductivity premium for conglomerated plants. Second, a highly productive plant should
be more likely operated on a large size if it is a part of a conglomerate than if it is a
part of a single-segment firm. This is a simple consequence of the fact that the reallo-
cation possibilities are larger in a diversified conglomerate than in a narrowly focused
firm and therefore the amount of resources that could be transferred towards the highly
productive plant is likely to be higher. Then, if we look at the cross-sectional distribution
of TFP by given size classes, we should find the following. On one hand, in small-size
classes, there should be a lower number of high-TFP plants in conglomerates than in
single-segment firms. On the other hand, in large-size classes there should be a higher
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number of high-TFP plants in conglomerates than in single-segment firms. I now look at
the relative TFP distribution in two representative size classes to verify whether the data
support these predictions.
In order to allow a comparison of TFP across plants in different industries and years
I construct the relative TFP measure as
RT FPi jt = T FPi jt−T FPpredi jt ,
where T FPi jt is the TFP estimated from the production function and T FP
pred
i jt is the
adjusted linear prediction of TFP from the regression of TFP on diversification dummy,
relative plant size, plant age, and plant industry and year dummies. The prediction is
adjusted by setting the values of the diversification dummy and of the relative plant size
to the sample averages of these variables. The relative TFP measure can be interpreted
as the rank of the plant in terms of TFP relative to the average TFP in its industry in a
given year.
Figure 3.5 presents non-parametric kernel density estimates of the cross-sectional
distribution of relative TFP in two representative size classes. The left panels correspond
to a small-size class with plants whose relative gross output or relative value added is in
the first decile of the relative size distribution. The right panels correspond to a large-size
class in which plants have relative gross output or relative value added in the last decile
of the relative size distribution. The estimation results show exactly what the theory of
efficient internal reallocation suggested. In the small-size class, there is a larger mass of
low-TFP plants in conglomerates than in single-segment firms. In the large-size class the
relation goes the other way around. The support of theory’s predictions is remarkably
strong when looking at value-added TFP, however Kolmogorov-Smirnoff tests reject
equality of distribution functions at the one percent level even for distributions of gross-
output TFP.
To relate these results back to the productivity discount for conglomerated plants
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Figure 3.5 – Relative TFP distributions conditional on plant size ; conglomerates - solid
line, single-segment firms - dashed line
conditional on plant size, notice that the number of small-size plants is much higher than
the number of large-size plants.15 Due to the larger number of small-size plants, in the
regression of the plant TFP the effect of conglomeration in small-size classes dominates,
which leads to a negative coefficient on the conglomeration dummy and a finding of a
productivity discount for conglomerated plants.
15This is true in general. In my sample, which I believe represents well the population of Canadian
manufacturing plants, the size distribution is close to a log-normal distribution. However, other studies
that used more complete samples encompassing also establishments in industries outside manufacturing
showed that the size distribution tends to be close to a Pareto distribution (Axtell, 2001, Rossi-Hansberg
and Wright, 2007). In that case the number of small-size establishments will also be higher than the
number of large-size establishments.
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3.5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper I provided a new empirical evidence on size and productivity of conglo-
merates and single-segment firms. The main findings are that (i) plants and firm-segments
in conglomerates tend to be much larger than in single-segment firms, (ii) unconditio-
nally on plant size, plants in conglomerates have on average higher TFP than plants in
single-segment firms, and (iii) this relation is reversed if we control for plant size. Exa-
mining the data in more detail I argued that the empirical findings are compatible with
more efficient allocation of resources inside conglomerates than on external markets with
frictions.
There are several extensions to current work that are interesting and that I envi-
sage to explore. First, an additional tests of the theory of efficient internal reallocation
could be done by examining whether conglomerates tend to be more present in indus-
tries that are more financially dependent or in industries that are more contract-specific.
Second, detailed Input-Output tables could be used to gauge vertical relatedness of in-
dustries in which a given conglomerate firm operates. Then, combining the data on size
and productivity with the vertical relatedness measure would inform us on whether the
internal reallocation tends to operate through production-chaining or whether most of
it goes through simple transfers of resources across horizontally diversified divisions.
Last, it would be interesting to examine dynamic implications of internal reallocation
of resources for size and productivity for a given plant. Effectively, the paper by Schoar
(2002) indicates that the dynamic effects of diversification can be quite different from
implication in a cross-section of plants.
CONCLUSION GÉNÉRALE
La littérature macro-économique récente a reconnu l’importance des frictions finan-
cières qui interviennent au niveau micro-économique pour le comportement des va-
riables macro-économiques. Cependant, il reste toujours un éventail de questions à ré-
pondre concernant les effets agrégés des frictions financières. Dans cette thèse, nous
avons abordé deux thèmes. Qu’est-ce qui détermine la sévérité des frictions financières ?
Comment les frictions financières influencent-elles l’organisation du secteur productif
du pays ? Nous avons essayé de répondre à ces questions tout en suivant l’approche
moderne en macro-économie, qui met l’accent sur les liens entre les décisions micro-
économiques des agents et les implications pour les variables macro-économiques.
Dans le premier essai, nous avons présenté un modèle qui explique comment le ni-
veau de protection des investisseurs est déterminé par un processus politique. L’idée
principale est qu’une faible protection des investisseurs agit comme une barrière à l’en-
trée des agents avec des besoins de financement externe élevés dans l’entrepreneuriat.
Les entrepreneurs avec des besoins de financement externe faibles favorisent un niveau
faible de protection des investisseurs, car cela augmente le prix du bien produit par le
secteur entrepreneurial et par le même biais leurs profits. Le niveau de protection des
investisseurs sélectionné par un vote majoritaire est inversement relié à l’inégalité en be-
soins de financement externe parmi les entrepreneurs. Ce résultat peux expliquer pour-
quoi nous observons une faible protection des investisseurs dans des pays avec forte
inégalité de richesse ou dans des pays où la corruption provoque un traitement inégal
des entrepreneurs.
Le deuxième essai a considéré le rôle des conglomérats dans une économie avec
frictions financières. Nous avons montré qu’un modèle où les conglomérats permettent
d’éviter partiellement les frictions sur le marché du crédit, peut expliquer plusieurs faits
stylisés concernant la taille et la productivité des établissement. Notre étude a suggéré
que les conglomérats peuvent avoir des effets positifs sur le développement économique
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via une amélioration de l’allocation du capital vers les projets plus productifs.
Dans le troisième essai nous avons présenté une nouvelle évidence empirique concer-
nant la distribution de la taille des établissements et leur productivité totale des facteurs.
Nos estimations à partir des micro-données sur les établissements du secteur manufac-
turier canadien ont montré que les établissements qui font partie des conglomérats sont
plus larges que ceux dans les firmes non-diversifiées. Concernant la productivité, les éta-
blissements dans les conglomérats semblent être en moyenne plus productifs que leurs
contreparties dans les firmes non-diversifiées, mais cette relation est inversée si nous
contrôlons pour la taille de l’établissement. En examinant les données plus en détail,
nous avons avancé que ces résultas sont compatibles avec une meilleure allocation des
ressources dans les conglomérats que dans les firmes non-diversifiées.
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Annexe I
Appendices to Chapter 1
I.1 Lemmas and Proofs
Lemma 7. Under any policy γt ≥ γH , with γH ≡ 1−pipi (κH−κL), only types z≤ zt obtain
external financing.
Proof. Recall that from constraints (1.3) and (1.4) the auditing probability for any type
z ≤ zt must satisfy pLt (z) = [x(z)−wt ]r−qt+1κL(1−pi)qt+1(κH−κL)−piqt+1γt . Then as γt → γ
H− constraint (1.3)
implies pLt (z)→∞, which contradicts the feasibility constraint pLt (z)≤ 1. On the other
hand, if γt > γH then constraint (1.3) implies pLt (z)< 0, which contradicts the feasibility
constraint pLt (z) ≥ 0. Thus, for any level of investor protection γt ≥ γH types z > zt
have no access to external finance. The set of entrepreneurs under any policy γt ≥ γH
is therefore Ωt =
{
z ∈ [0,1] : z≤ zt
}
leading to the same capital supply. As the capital
demand is independent of γt , the equilibrium prices and allocations are the same under
any γt ≥ γH .
Lemma 8. For given γt and wt , the measure of entrepreneurs and the capital supply are
increasing in the price of capital qt+1.
Proof. Applying the implicit function theorem on equation (1.7), we find
dz?t
dqt+1
=

κ
x′(z) if z
?
t ≤ zt ,
κ−piγt
x′(z) if z
?
t > zt ,
which is always positive. Then differentiating the capital supply KSt+1 = κG(z
?
t ) with
respect to qt+1 we obtain
dKst
dqt+1
= κ ∂G(z)∂ z
dz?t
dqt+1
, which is positive.
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Proof of Lemma 3. From definitions of q and q(γ) and because wages will never be hi-
gher than F2 (κ,1), it follows that if x(1)>
κF2(κ,1)
(1−pi)(κH−κL) then q¯(0)> q. The same lower
bound on x(1) also ensures that q′ (.) > 0 so that q(γ) > q for any feasible policy γ .
Define zt
∣∣
q by the following equation x
(
zt
∣∣
q
)
= wt +
q
rκL. That is, zt
∣∣
q is the least effi-
cient financially unconstrained type when the price is equal to q. Also, let z?t |q denote the
type that is indifferent between becoming entrepreneur and investing on the international
market when the price is equal to q. Formally, z?t |q is the value at which, for a given price
q, V Et
(
z?t |q
)
= V It . Then the cut-off prices q and q(γ) are such that z?t |q = zt
∣∣
q under
any feasible policy, and z?t |q(γ) = 1 under the policy γ .
Now I can show how the capital supply changes when the investor protection moves
from γ ′ to γ ′′, with γ ′ < γ ′′. Consider first the range of prices
(
q,q(γ ′′)
)
. For any price q
in this range we have z?t |q > zt
∣∣
q under any γ and z
?
t |q < 1 under γ ′′. The agency problem
arises for the indifferent type and the highest-cost type chooses to be an investor under
γ ′′. Moreover, given any price q, ∂V
E
t (z)
∂γt < 0 for all types z > zt
∣∣
q. Therefore, when γt
increases, z?t |q has to decrease in order to preserve equality in equation (1.7). Less agents
decide to become entrepreneurs and the effect on the aggregate capital supply curve is
negative.
Second, consider the range of prices
[
0,q
]
. Any price q in this range implies z?t |q ≤
zt
∣∣
q under any γ . The type that is indifferent between becoming entrepreneur and inves-
ting abroad experiences zero auditing probability and the effect of changes in investor
protection on his expected utility and on the capital supply is nil.
Finally, consider the range of prices [q(γ ′′) ,∞). Any price q in this range implies
z?t |q ≥ 1 under γ ′′ and the highest-cost type is willing to become an entrepreneur under
γ ′′. Thus, under γ ′′, capital supply is at its maximum level equal to κ . Since q(.) is
increasing, the capital supply at price q is also equal to κ under any policy γ ′ < γ ′′ and
the effect of change in policy from γ ′ to γ ′′ on the capital supply is nil.
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I.2 The Role of the Shape of the Distribution
In this appendix I establish some results concerning the effects of distributional
changes analytically and I discuss the effects of distributional changes on political equi-
librium in more detail.
Lemma 9. Consider two economies with distinct Beta start-up cost type distributions g
and h with cumulative distribution functions G(z) and H (z). If :
1. g has thicker tails than h and the economies have the same first-best level of capital
stock, or,
2. g has thicker tails than h and they have the same skewness, or,
3. h first order stochastically dominates (FOSD hereafter) g,
then in economic equilibrium for any given level of investor protection γt ∈
[
0,γH
]
we
have : qt+1,g ≤ qt+1,h,G1
(
z?t,g
)≥ G2(z?t,h), and z?t,g ≤ z?t,h.
Proof. Consider the capital supply curve under any given policy γ : KSt+1,i (qt+1) =
κGi
(
z?t,i
∣∣∣γ
qt+1
)
, where the subscript i= g,h denotes the situation under the different dis-
tributions. z?t,i
∣∣∣γ
qt+1
is determined by V Et
(
z?t,i
∣∣∣γ
qt+1
)
=V It . Notice that for a given (γ,qt+1),
neither V Et (.) nor V
I
t depend on the shape of the distribution of start-up costs. Therefore
z?t,i
∣∣∣γ
qt+1
= z?t |γqt+1 under both g and h. Moreover, z?t |
γ
qt+1 is increasing in qt+1 and decrea-
sing in γ .
Notice that the definition 5 implies that if g has thicker tails than h, then there is a
unique number x such that 0<G(x)=H (x)< 1. For any z< x we have G(z)≥H (z) and
for any z > x we have G(z)≤ H (z). Define a price q˜(γ) such that z?t |γq˜(γ) = x. It follows
that if condition 1 or condition 2 holds, then for any price in the range (0, q˜(γ)] the capital
supply under the distribution g is larger than under the distribution h, κG
(
z?t |γqt+1
)
≥
κH
(
z?t |γqt+1
)
.
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If condition 3 holds, then the capital supply under the distribution g1 is larger than
under the distribution g2 for any price qt+1, because κG
(
z?t |γqt+1
)
≥ κH
(
z?t |γqt+1
)
is
implied by the definition of FOSD.
Now consider the capital demand curve. Because it depends solely on the marginal
product of capital, it is the same under both distributions and it is strictly decreasing in
qt+1. Therefore, the capital market clears at a lower price and a higher quantity under the
distribution g than under the distribution h, provided that equilibrium prices are in the
interval (0, q˜(γ)] if condition 1 or condition 2 holds. Therefore, in the equilibrium we
have qt+1,g ≤ qt+1,h and κG
(
z?t,g
)≥ κH (z?t,h). Moreover, from monotonicity of z?t |γqt+1
in qt+1 it follows that in equilibrium we also have z?t,g ≤ z?t,h.
To complete the proof we must verify that the equilibrium prices under any policy γ
are always in (0, q˜(γ)] if condition 1 or condition 2 holds. Under condition 1 the equili-
brium stock of capital under perfect investor protection is the same in the two economies,
κG
(
z?0g
)
= κH
(
z?0h
)
. Therefore q0g = q
0
h = q˜(0) and the number x is x = z
?0
g = z
?0
h . Un-
der condition 2 the equilibrium capital stock under perfect investor protection is larger
under distribution g than under h since there is more entrepreneurs that can produce
capital good at lower start-up costs, κG
(
z?0g
)
> κH
(
z?0h
)
. Therefore, in that situation
the number x is such that x ≥ z?0h and q˜(0) ≥ q0h ≥ q0g. Given this and the monotoni-
city of z?t |γqt+1 in γ and in qt+1, we deduce that q˜(γ) is increasing and for all γ we have
q˜(γ)≥ q0h ≥ q0g. Now, remember that the capital supply is the same under distributions g
and h at price q˜(γ). Moreover, for any γ and under any distribution the capital supply at
price q˜(γ) is higher or equal than the equilibrium stock of capital under perfect investor
protection, κG
(
z?t |γq˜(γ)
)
≥ κG(z?0g ) and κH (z?t |γq˜(γ)) ≥ κH (z?0h ). Because q0h and q0g
are equilibrium prices and the capital demand curve is decreasing, we have that at price
q˜(γ)≥ q0h ≥ q0g capital demand is lower than capital supply under both distributions, and
therefore the equilibrium prices must be in (0,q(γ)].
Lemma 10. Consider two economies with distinct Beta start-up cost type distributions
g and h with cumulative distribution functions G(z) and H (z). Let denote zMg and z
M
h the
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decisive voter types in the two economies respectively. If g has thicker tails than h and
the economies have the same first-best level of capital stock, then he decisive voter zMg is
relatively lower cost type than zMh , z
M
g ≤ zMh .
Proof. The identity of the decisive voter in each case is given by G
(
zMg
)
= G(z?0g )/2, and
H
(
zMh
)
= H(z?0h )/2. Because the economies have the same first-best level of capital stock
we must have κG
(
z?0g
)
= κH
(
z?0h
)
under perfect investor protection γ = 0 and it follows
that x = z?0g = z
?0
h . But then G
(
zMg
)
= H
(
zMh
)
and necessarily zMg < z
M
h < x.
If the start-up cost distributions do not imply the same first-best level of capital ac-
cumulation but g has thicker tails than h or h first-order stochastically dominates g then
from Lemma 9 we know that z?0g ≤ z?0h and G
(
z?0g
)≥H (z?0h ). This has two opposing ef-
fects on the identity of the decisive voter. One one hand, z?0g ≤ z?0h would imply zMg ≤ zMh
if G
(
z?0g
)
= H
(
z?0h
)
. On the other hand, G
(
z?0g
) ≥ H (z?0h ) implies G(zMg ) ≥ H (zMh ),
which may require zMg ≥ zMh . This is why it is not possible to establish the more general
version of Lemma 10 analytically. In order to obtain that zMg ≤ zMh the difference z?0−zM
has to be increasing with the variance and/or skewness of the type distribution. In all my
numerical simulations this monotonicity is satisfied.
An immediate consequence of the shift in the identity of the decisive voter is that
under distributions that have thicker tails or that are first order stochastically dominated,
the marginal cost for the decisive voter of choosing more distortionary policy is relatively
lower.
To shed some light to the way distributional changes affect the marginal benefit of
choosing more distortionary policy I study how much the price qt+1 increases when the
investor protection is deteriorated at the margin. From equilibrium conditions (1.8) and
(1.10) we have :
dqt+1
dγt
= F11 (κG(z?t ) ,L)κg(z
?
t )
[
∂ z?t
∂γt
+
∂ z?t
∂qt+1
dqt+1
dγt
]
,
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therefore
dqt+1
dγt
=
F11 (κG(z?t ) ,L)κg(z?t )
∂ z?t
∂γt
1−F11 (κG(z?t ) ,L)κg(z?t ) ∂ z
?
t
∂qt+1
> 0,
where g(z) denotes the probability density function and ∂ z
?
t
∂γt =
piqt+1[κL−(x(z?t )−wt)r]
x′(z?t )r[(1−pi)(κH−κL)−piγt ] <
0 and ∂ z
?
t
∂qt+1
= κ−piγtx′(z?t )r > 0. Although it is not always possible to compare
dqt+1
dγt under dif-
ferent distributions analytically, it can be done at γt = 0 in the particular case of distribu-
tions that differ in inequality but share the same first-best level of capital accumulation.
Lemma 11 establishes this result.
Lemma 11. Consider two economies with distinct Beta start-up cost type distributions
g and h with cumulative distribution functions G(z) and H (z). Given the same initial
stock of capital in the two economies, in equilibrium
(
dqt+1
dγt
)
g
<
(
dqt+1
dγt
)
h
at γt = 0 if g
has thicker tails than h and the economies have the same first-best level of capital stock.
Proof. First notice that because the economies have the same first-best level of capital
accumulation we have z?0g = z
?0
h = z
?0, G
(
z?0
)
= H
(
z?0
)
, and q0t+1,g = q
0
t+1,h. Then the
only term that could differ in the numerator and denominator of dqt+1dγt under g and h is
the value of the pdf. From the assumption that g has thicker tails than h it follows that
g
(
z?0
)
> h
(
z?0
)
. Thus
(
dqt+1
dγt
)
g
<
(
dqt+1
dγt
)
h
.
For values of γt ∈
(
0,γH
)
and economies with different levels of the first-best capital
accumulation we can compare analytically some components of dqt+1dγt , but we need to
make some assumptions on the functional forms.
Lemma 12. Assume the production function F (K,L) =KνL1−ν , with 0< ν < 1, and the
cost function x(z) = ζ +θz, with ζ ,θ > 0. Consider two economies with distinct Beta
start-up cost type distributions g and h with cumulative distribution functions G(z) and
H (z). If g has thicker tails than h and the economies have the same level of the first-best
capital accumulation, or g has thicker tails than h and the same skewness, or h FOSD g,
then in equilibrium we have the following for any γt :
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1. F11
(
κG
(
z?t,g
)
,L
)≥ F11(κH (z?t,h) ,L),
2.
∂ z?t,g
∂γt ≥
∂ z?t,h
∂γt ,
3.
∂ z?t,g
∂qt+1,g
=
∂ z?t,h
∂qt+1,h
.
Proof. All these inequalities use the fact established in Lemma 10 that given any level of
investor protection, the considered distributional changes imply in equilibrium qt+1,g ≤
qt+1,h, G
(
z?t,g
)≥ H (z?t,h), and z?t,g ≤ z?t,h.
Part 1 follows from G
(
z?t,g
)≥H (z?t,h) and the assumption that F (K,L) has a Cobb-
Douglas form, therefore F11 (K,L) is negative and increasing in K.
Part 2 follows from qt+1,g ≤ qt+1,h and the assumption that x(z) is affine, therefore
x′ (z) is constant.
Part 3 follows from the assumption that x(z) is affine, therefore x′ (z) is constant.
We can see from Lemma 12 that in numerator of dqt+1dγt we have two (negative) terms
that are larger under g. Unfortunately, we cannot analytically obtain unambiguous com-
parison of g
(
z?t,g
)
to h
(
z?t,h
)
. Numerically, for the economies with the same level of
first-best capital accumulation under the benchmark parametrization as in Table 1.I, we
have always g
(
z?t,g
) ≤ h(z?t,h) and therefore (dqt+1dγt )g ≤ (dqt+1dγt )h. An important result
of these numerical experiments is that the decrease in marginal cost of distorting inves-
tor protection associated with the change in the decisive voter identity is stronger than
the decrease in marginal benefit associated with weaker general equilibrium effect. This
leads to selection of lower investor protection in political equilibrium. The comparison
of economies with the same first-best level of capital accumulation can serve as an upper
bound in evaluating the decrease in the marginal benefit from deterioration of inves-
tor protection for the decisive voter. Changes toward distributions with thicker tails but
implying higher first-best level of capital accumulation or to distributions that are first
order stochastically dominated will lead to smaller decreases in the marginal benefit and
selection of lower investor protection.
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I.3 Data Description
I.3.1 Variables Obtained Directly in the Data
anti-director rights index : Sum of six dummy variables indicating whether (1)
the country allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote, (2) shareholders are not re-
quired to deposit their shares prior to the General Shareholders Meeting, (3) cumulative
voting or proportional representation of minorities on the board of directors is allowed,
(4) an oppressed minorities protection mechanism is in place, (5) the minimum percen-
tage of share capital required to call an Extraordinary Shareholders Meeting is less than
or equal to ten percent, (6) shareholders have preemptive rights that can only be wa-
ved by a shareholders meeting. The index was developed by La Porta et al. (1998) for
49 countries reflecting laws in 1993. It was extended by Pagano and Volpin (2005) to
the period 1993 - 2001 and revised by Djankov et al. (2008b) for 72 countries accor-
ding to laws in place in 2003. When I construct the measures of investor protection I
use the values corresponding to year 2000 in regressions on the Gini coefficient of the
wealth distribution and year 2003 in regressions on the interaction of start-up cost and
corruption index.
creditor rights index : Sum of four dummy variables indicating whether (1) there
are restrictions, such as creditor consent or minimum dividends, for a debtor to file for
reorganization, (2) there is no automatic stay on assets, (3) secured creditors are paid
first out of liquidation, (4) management does not retain administration during the reor-
ganization. The index was developed by La Porta et al. (1998) for 1993 and extended
by Djankov et al. (2007) to the interval 1978 - 2003. When I construct the measures of
investor protection I use the values corresponding to year 2000 in regressions on the Gini
coefficient of the wealth distribution and year 2003 in regressions on the interaction of
start-up cost and corruption index.
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anti-self-dealing index : Measures legal protection of minority shareholders against
expropriation by corporate insiders. Focuses on private enforcement mechanisms, such
as disclosure, approval and litigation. Based on a standardized case study by law firms.
Based on legal rules prevailing in 2003. Constructed by Djankov et al. (2008b). Ranges
from 0 to 1.
efficiency of debt enforcement : Measures the efficiency of debt enforcement in a
country. Based on a standardized case study by law firms. Based on legal rules prevailing
in 2006. Constructed by Djankov et al. (2008a). Ranges from 0 to 1.
rule of law index : Measures the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the
courts as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Constructed by Kaufmann et al.
(2008) for 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002-2008. Ranges from -2.5 to 2.5. In the construction
of effective investor protection measures I use values of year 2000 or 2003. I re-scale the
index to 0 to 5 scale.
English legal origin dummy : Equals 1 if the country’s commercial law is originated
in English Common Law. From La Porta et al. (1998) and Djankov et al. (2007).
Gini wealth : Gini index of household wealth distribution in a country. Estimated by
Davies et al. (2007) using data for year 2000.
cost of entry : Direct cost associated with meeting government requirements to get
the legal status of a firm plus the monetized value of the entrepreneur’s time, measured as
a fraction of GDP per capita. I use the data compiled by the World Bank Doing Business
project using the same methodology as Djankov et al. (2002). I use values for years 2004
and 2006.
corruption : Corruption Perception Index. Draws on corruption-related data from
expert and business surveys carried out by a variety of independent and reputable insti-
tutions. Compiled by Transparency International I use data for 2003 and 2006. Originally
ranges from 0 to 10 with higher score indicating lower corruption. I invert the scoring by
rescaling to 0 to 10 scale with higher score indicating higher corruption.
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I.3.2 Constructed Variables
formal investor protection : f ip = anit-director index+creditor rights index10
effective investor protection 1 : eip(1)= anti-director index+creditor rights index10 × rule of law5
effective investor protection 2 : eip(2) = anti-director index+creditor rights index+rule of law15
Annexe II
Appendix to Chapter 2
II.1 Numerical Algorithm
I solve the model using value function iteration. The main step finds prices and the
corresponding invariant distribution over individual states such that the capital market
and the labor market clear. The invariant distribution is stored as a long N = 3 million
sample of triplets (ζn,θn,an). The algorithm proceeds as follows.
1. Guess prices rp, wp and the invariant distribution
(
{ζn,θn,an}Nn=1
)p
.
2. Given the guesses, solve Bellman equation (2.1) for a finite number of states. Par-
ticularly, the end-of-period assets ω and the net worth at the beginning of period a
are discretized into grids. Use a shape-preserving spline interpolation to evaluate
the value functions on the points outside the grid. To compute the expected value
of entrepreneurship, use a selection of entrepreneurs from the guessed invariant
distribution as a sample of business partners. The expectation is approximated by
a Monte-Carlo integral over 1000 points. Once convergence of value functions is
achieved, recompute savings decision rules on a finer grid of end-of-period assets.
3. Obtain the updated invariant distribution over individual states
(
{ζn,θn,an}Nn=1
)p+1
by using the system’s transition function to simulate a long time-series for an indi-
vidual agent. To obtain conglomeration decisions, use a selection of entrepreneurs
from the guessed invariant distribution as a sample of business partners. To update
saving decision rules use piecewise linear interpolation.
4. Check capital and labor market clearing conditions. If markets do not clear, choose
new interest rate rp+1 and wage rate wp+1 accordingly. The algorithm terminates
when both excess demands are lower than 10−3.
